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Under what conditions is redistribution demanded from below? It is not always the case that, in 
the face of inequality, the poor have the motivation or the collective capacity to bring 
redistributive claims to the political arena. This dissertation argues that claims for land 
redistribution are more likely to emerge in places where prior dispossessions (or land theft) 
occurred, and where those dispossessions targeted lands to which prior legal rights existed. 
Although dispossessions increase land inequality, it is not inequality alone, but rather the process 
by which it was created, which generates a perception of illegitimacy of the distribution of 
property rights. An attack against prior legal rights to land generates the justification and the 
capacity to mobilize against dispossessions. These, in turn, enable the translation of grievances 
into political claims for land redistribution.  
The type of legal rights attacked by dispossessions defines the trajectories of rural 
conflict and agrarian reform in different countries. The stronger and more certain the legal rights 
to the land are, the higher the mobilization for land reform and the more radical its outcomes are 
likely to be. When dispossessions ignore or deny property or ownership rights, rural mobilization 
will be high and will generate radical land reform outcomes. In turn, the infringement of legal 
possession rights is likely to generate medium levels of rural mobilization and moderate land 
 
 
reform policies. Finally, when dispossessions target lands that are occupied de facto, rural 
mobilization will be low and it will not promote land reform policies.  
The dissertation proposes a methodological strategy to apply the theory, which consists in 
the study of the impact of dispossessions that occur during critical eras for the political economy 
of land. Such eras are initiated by exogenous shocks that generate an increase in the value of 
land, and hence produce incentives for land appropriation, and for its dispossession when the 
lands are occupied. The theoretical and methodological strategy are applied to Latin America 
through the analysis of the impact of one such critical era—the region’s first export boom (1870-
1920s)—on rural political contestation in the mid-20th century (1910s-60s).  
The dissertation offers an in-depth study of the Mexican and Colombian cases. It shows 
that each of these cases followed different trajectories of rural conflict and land reform during 
the periods under analysis because dispossessions varied in scope and targeted different types of 
legal land rights during the export boom. In Mexico, dispossessions were massive and mainly 
attacked ownership rights of indigenous/peasant groups, while in Colombia they were less 
massive but still significant, and they mainly attacked legal possession rights of settlers of the 
agrarian frontier. The two main cases are compared with each other, as well as with the case of 
Argentina, which is argued to illustrate the third path of rural contestation in the region—
characterized by fewer dispossessions that mainly attacked indigenous groups who de facto 
occupied the lands.  
The study of the two main cases combines qualitative analysis based on historical and 
secondary literature with GIS geo-referencing and basic quantitative analyses of unexplored 
archival data. The study of the third case is based on secondary literature. The data on which the 
dissertation is grounded was obtained through intense archival work in Mexico City, Bogotá and 
 
 
Buenos Aires during an 18 month-long period. For each of the main case studies, I constructed a 
dataset that contains all petitions of protection against land conflicts made before administrative 
authorities during the export boom, as well as all agrarian reform land allocation decisions made 
in the subsequent period. The datasets also include indicators of population, distance to post-
colonial institutions, land fertility and suitability, and other historical and geographical controls.  
The theory and methodological strategy are formulated in a general way, which may be 
used to explain other contexts and time periods. The findings of the dissertation expect to 
produce positive and normative theoretical implications on different strands of the political 
science literature, including the politics of redistribution and land reform, contentious politics 
and social movements, historical institutionalism, the impact of colonialism, the theory of 
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According to Marx, private property, the fundamental basis of capitalistic accumulation, 
originated in theft. In England, such theft took the form of the enclosure of communal lands 
worked by peasants and the usurpation of public lands held by the state, which occurred since the 
15th century but reached their zenith in the 18th with the advent of commercial agriculture (2008 
[1867], 366-71). The theft was institutionalized through the “legal fiction” of modern (i.e. 
individual and absolute) private property, which denied the character of rights to prior forms of 
tenure. Even though the history of this robbery was “written in the annals of mankind in letters of 
blood and fire” (2008 [1867], 365), by the 19th century “the very memory of the connexion 
between the agricultural laborer and the communal property had, of course, vanished” (369).  
But what if the “original sin” of land despoilment were not lost with the passage of time? 
What if there was something peculiar about the robbery that impeded its victims from forgetting 
about it and from conceiving of private property as legitimate? This dissertation argues that when 
land theft or dispossession targets lands over which prior legal rights exist and are strong or 
certain, mobilization of the rural poor for land redistribution is likely to be high and to generate 
radical land reform outcomes. Thus, variation in the strength of rural mobilization and in the 
policy outcomes that it pushes forth is a function of the strength and certainty of the land rights 
that are violated through dispossession.  
When dispossession attacks property or ownership rights, rural mobilization will be 
higher and will generate more radical land reform outcomes than when dispossession attacks 
possession rights. The infringement of the latter rights is likely to generate medium levels of 




that are occupied de facto—i.e. their occupants have a land claim that has not been recognized by 
a state institution—rural mobilization will be low and it will not promote land reform policies. 
Diagram 1 illustrates the argument:  
 
Diagram 1. Gist of the Argument: The Influence of Land Rights  
on Rural Mobilization and Agrarian Reform 
 
           Land Rights                                Mobilization                        Agrarian Reform 
     
                                            
This means that having a piece of paper matters for the rural poor to feel entitled to the 
land and to be capable of mobilizing for its recovery if dispossession occurs. The piece of paper 
may be quite old. As I will show in the empirical chapters of this dissertation (Chapters 3 
through 6), the land rights that influenced peasant mobilization in 20th century Latin America 
came from as early as the 16th century, when the Spanish Crown allocated them, as well as from 
the early 19th century, when the post-independence governments confirmed those rights and 
allocated new ones. Hence, I argue that the allocation of land rights has enduring institutional 
legacies on social mobilization, and that the mechanism through which those legacies are 












As Chapter 1 explains in more detail, when dispossessions target lands over which 
occupants have legal titles, they provide victims with the justification and the capacity to 
mobilize against dispossessions, and hence to translate grievances into political claims for land 
redistribution. The dispossession of lands with legal rights must be carried out through legal 
manipulation or fraud—force is not enough for a dispossessor to become the new owner. Fraud 
generates a perception or narrative of illegitimacy of the laws and institutions that were supposed 
to protect the rights of the dispossessed, and that had probably protected those rights in previous 
moments. If fraud leads to an effective dispossession, then it can involve the victims’ 
unsuccessful quest for legal protection or remedy. When that protection is not granted despite the 
existence of rights, the perception or narrative of illegitimacy is likely to accrue, creating a 
radical critical view of the laws and institutions in charge of protecting property rights, and a 
more eager desire to transform or subvert them. Further, even if unsuccessful, the quest for legal 
protection or remedy is likely to generate or increase the collective action capacity of the victims 
of dispossession. Such capacity may be utilized for political purposes, such as mobilization and 
claims of land redistribution, once the legal strategy of protection fails. Consequently, the 
dispossession of lands with legal rights is likely to generate both the justification and the 
capacity to mobilize for agrarian reform.  
I thus argue that the mobilization of the rural poor for land redistribution is justified and 
made possible by the perception or narrative of injustice inflicted upon them by state institutions. 
This implies that peasants claiming land reform are not only or mainly motivated by interest or 
passion, but rather by a norm of justice. It also implies that such norm consists not only or 
mainly in the distributive justice rationale according to which scarce goods—like land—should 




particular. It consists also, and perhaps especially, in the corrective justice rationale according to 
which wrongful harms should be repaired in such a way that the victim is returned to the 
situation in which she was before the harm was committed. 
The corrective justice rationale is rarely mentioned in the legislation and literature on 
land reform. Land reform is usually understood (by the social sciences) and justified (as public 
policy) as a redistributive measure. Its main goals are to reduce land inequality and to alleviate 
rural poverty (Lipton 2009, 2; Thiesenhusen 1995, 15). It can thus be inferred that land reform is 
caused by high levels of inequality, which either lead the rural poor to demand land 
redistribution or push technocratic elites to adopt that solution for the sake of efficiency or 
growth. However, as I will show in the empirical chapters, many of the land claims made by the 
rural poor do not refer to objective land inequality but rather to dispossessions of lands to which 
they had legal claims. This does not mean that inequality is not relevant, since dispossessions are 
quite likely to increase land inequality by concentrating lands in the hands of landed elites or 
entrepreneurs who dispossess peasants. But what seems to motivate or justify land reform claims 
is not inequality alone, but rather the process by which it was created, which generates a 
perception of illegitimacy of the property rights system and of the state institutions in charge of 
their protection.1  
 
My theory seeks to explain the demand side of rural mobilization for land reform. Indeed, 
the few recent comparative studies that have attempted to explain the causes of land reform in 
Latin America (Lapp 2004; Ondetti 2012; Albertus forthcoming) have focused on the supply side 
                                                      
1 This is in line with recent studies that have shown the link between inequality, redistributive demands 
and democratization to be inconclusive (Kaufman, 2008; Ansell and Samuels, 2012; Albertus and 




of those reforms, and more specifically on elite splits as political opportunities for land 
redistribution. Even though I take elite splits to be an important cause of land reform, I argue 
they are necessary but not sufficient for land reform to be adopted and to have a radical content. 
When political opportunities for land redistribution are opened by elite splits, land reform will 
also need to be demanded from below in order for redistribution to actually occur—unless it is 
strictly an efficiency strategy adopted from above2, something rare in general and inexistent in 
Latin America, where peasants’ claims for reform have been predominant (Eckstein 1978, 7; 
Lapp 2004, 11). Redistributive land demands will take place as a response to dispossessions. But 
while dispossessions abound in history, it is only dispossessions against lands with strong and 
certain legal rights that will generate high peasant mobilization and radical land reform 






                                                      
2 Agrarian reforms that are carried out as a strictly from above project seek to enhance economic 
efficiency and/or to weaken the landowning class. Taiwan could be an example of this rare phenomenon. 
In that sense, the scope of my theory is restricted to agrarian reforms that respond to popular claims of 
redistribution or that attempt to promote popular mobilization by anticipating those claims. However, I 
suspect that many of the agrarian reforms that at first sight look like projects from above are at least in 
part a response to claims for redistribution or a mechanism for mobilizing a sector of the population that 
will benefit from redistribution. Indeed, in redistributive programs someone loses and someone wins 
always, and a political elite is likely interested in weakening the landowning class in order to strengthen 
another power basis.  Now, I do contend that, in Latin America, popular claims have always been causally 
relevant for the enactment of agrarian reforms, so theories that explain them as exclusively from above 
projects are incomplete at best. Moreover, my hunch is that popular claims were also causally relevant for 
the enactment of many agrarian reforms in other regions (for instance, in Italy and Ireland, or in 








To make the theory testable, in Chapter 1 I also propose a methodological strategy that 
seeks to identify critical eras of land dispossession in order to adequately capture their causal 
impact. I define those critical eras as periods initiated by economic or political shocks that lead 
to an increase in the value of land, thereby generating incentives for landed elites, entrepreneurs 
or other powerful actors to appropriate valuable lands and dispossess their inhabitants. I propose 
the concept of critical era or period as a novel methodological tool for historical-institutionalism, 
which differs from the already classical concept of critical junctures (Collier and Collier 1991; 
Mahoney 2001; Pierson 2000, 2003). Instead of being a very short period of time in which key 
decisions that change a path of events are taken, a critical era is a longer period of time triggered 
by a structural change, in which a series of events consisting in the implementation of certain 
policies—more than in the adoption of the policies themselves—change the course of events in a 




Economic or political shocks that increase the value of land can consist in export booms 
or civil wars, among others. I chose to study Latin America’s first export boom (1870s-1920s), a 
crucial period for the region in which it entered the international market and consequently 
transited from subsistence to commercial agriculture (LeGrand 1980, 1986; Knight 1986; 
Coatsworth 1981; 2008; Sábato 1990; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Adelman 
1994; Barsky and Gelman 2001). Following the classical political economy perspective (Locke 
1988 [1689]; Marx 1978 [1845], 2008 [1867]; Moore 1966), I argue that such transition 
transformed the system of property rights through the massive enclosure of lands. But I also 
argue that such transformation spurred rural mobilization in the early 20th century (1910s-60s) 
because the lands enclosed were in many cases owned or legally possessed by peasants. In 
consequence, the new land rights established through enclosures could not be institutionalized 
because the dispossessed challenged their legitimacy through demands of redistribution.  
    The dissertation applies the theoretical and methodological frameworks by offering an 
in-depth study of the cases of Mexico and Colombia. I argue that in both countries 
dispossessions of lands with legal rights during the export boom brought about land reform 
claims in the early 20th century. However, the two cases differ in the extent of dispossessions and 
in the type of land rights that were targeted through them, and, consequently, they also differ in 
the extent and impact of rural mobilization in the aftermath. While most of the lands 
dispossessed in Mexico were owned by indigenous/peasant groups, the majority of dispossessed 
lands in Colombia were possessed by individual peasant settlers. This implied that peasant 
mobilization for land reform existed in both, but that it was higher and produced more radical 




Chapter 2 describes the research design, which justifies the selection of the two cases, 
specifies the hypotheses and predictions and explains the sources and indicators used to test 
them. The design proposes both within and across-country hypotheses. The within-country 
studies seek to show that there exists a causal relation between land dispossessions and land 
reform claims in both Mexico and Colombia. The cross-country analysis attempts to show that 
the differences between the two countries in terms of the degree of rural contestation and the 
level of radicalism of land reforms are a result of the extent and type of rights attacked by 
dispossessions during the export boom. 
The first empirical chapters devoted to each country (Chapters 3 and 5) provide evidence 
of the magnitude of dispossessions during the export boom and of the type of land rights that the 
main victims of dispossession had, as well as of the way in which dispossessions affected the 
extent and form of subsequent claims for land reform. They also show how dispossessions 
coincide geographically within each country. In turn, the second empirical chapters devoted to 
each country (Chapters 4 and 6) show how the relation between dispossessions and land reform 
claims holds statistically within each of the case studies at a municipal (and for Mexico also sub-
municipal) level of analysis.  
Chapter 7 compares the two cases, arguing that the difference in the extent, form and 
impact of rural mobilization is the result of the extent of dispossessions and of the type of land 
rights previously attacked through them. Chapter 7 also refers to the case of Argentina, using 
secondary literature to show that this country followed yet another path of rural conflict and land 
reform, and that such pattern may also be explained by the extent of dispossessions and the type 
of land rights targeted through them during the export boom. Indeed, I argue that in Argentina 




indigenous groups. This implied lower levels of claims for land reform in the subsequent period 
because of the absence of a strong sense of entitlement and collective action mechanisms to 
challenge the legitimacy of property rights and the state institutions in charge of their protection. 
Chapter 7 also contains some references to other cases in the region that likely followed one of 
the three paths identified, with the aim of suggesting ways in which the theory could be 
generalized. The Conclusion identifies the contributions of the dissertation and the ways in 
which some of its findings could be expanded.  
The empirical study that I carried out for this dissertation was characterized by the 
gathering and analysis of original unexplored data obtained through archival work in Mexico 
City, Bogotá and Buenos Aires during an 18 month-long period. It is also characterized by an 
analysis that combines the qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as different empirical 
tools. In Chapters 3 and 5 (devoted to Mexico and Colombia, respectively), I provide a 
qualitative study of the distinct paths of rural conflict and agrarian reform followed by Mexico 
and Colombia, which combines an in-depth assessment of historical and secondary literature 
with GIS geo-referencing of the archival sources. In Chapters 4 and 6 (also devoted to Mexico 
and Colombia, respectively), I quantitatively analyze the archival data to show that there exists a 
strong correlation between the dispossessions occurred during the export boom and the claims 
for land reform made during the early 20th century. For each of my case studies, I constructed a 
dataset that contains all petitions of protection against land conflicts made before administrative 
authorities between 1867 and 1910 for Mexico and between 1827 and 1930 for Colombia, as 
well as all agrarian reform land allocation decisions made between 1916 and 1934 for Mexico 




post-colonial institutions, land fertility and suitability, and other historical and geographical 
controls.  
 
 Before getting to the substance matter, in the following Glossary I provide a few 







Agricultural frontier: the region where the boundary between occupied and cultivated lands 
and empty and uncultivated lands is found. The agricultural frontier is considered open where 
there still exists a significant amount of empty uncultivated lands, and closed when such lands 
are exhausted. In between those two situations, Marco Palacios (2011) has proposed the concept 
of latifundia frontier, defined as the areas where unoccupied lands neighbor occupied and 
privately owned estates.  
Appropriation or seizure: the act of taking something and holding it as if it were private 
property, even when it cannot be legally held thus—such as when the thing is owned or legally 
possessed by someone else. In the case of lands, their appropriation or seizure often entails their 
enclosure (see the definition below).  
Corporation: group or collective with legal and/or political standing.  
Disentailment: the fragmentation or individualization and entry into commerce of lands held 
collectively or corporately. As we will see in the following chapters, in Latin American colonial 
and early post-independence periods, lands and other assets were held collectively or corporately 
both by the Catholic Church and by indigenous/peasant groups. In the latter case, the lands could 
not be sold or transferred in any other ways. During the 19th century, liberal land legislation saw 
these assets as unproductive, and hence disposed that they became susceptible of individual 




assets) through their confiscation and sale or auctioning, and in other cases (notably with respect 
to indigenous/peasant lands) through their division among the members of the corporations.  
Dispossession, despoilment or theft: the appropriation or seizure of assets (in this case lands) 
occupied by individuals, groups of individuals, or corporations. As we will see, I argue that land 
dispossession may be carried out either through legal manipulation (or fraud), through violence 
(or force), or through a combination of the two. This depends on the type of rights or claims that 
victims of dispossession have to the lands they occupy, such that owned lands are dispossessed 
primarily through legal manipulation, de facto occupied lands are mainly dispossessed through 
violence, and legally possessed lands are dispossessed through a combination of legal 
manipulation and violence.  
Enclosure: the delimitation of the boundaries of an asset, which in the case of lands may be 
done through the imposition of visible objects like fences and/or through legal procedures 
recognizing the boundaries, such as the land surveys. 
Encroachment: the appropriation or seizure of a piece of a thing. In the case of lands, 
encroachments are often made by occupants of neighboring pieces of land who claim to also own 
the encroached piece. This is easily carried out when the boundaries between the lands are not 
clear or well specified, which can happen even when legal titles or documents specify the rights 
to the lands, since those documents—especially when they are old—may establish imprecise 
borders.  
Land or agrarian reform: a policy consisting in the transformation of land tenure patterns that 
has the purpose of reducing land inequality and thus alleviating poverty. As Lipton (2009, 323-9) 




disagreements abound about the meaning of such goals and the ways of balancing and effectively 
implementing them. Thus, what is crucial in identifying a land or agrarian reform is determining 
that it has the direct aim of redistributing land, i.e. of transferring land rights from to the rich to 
the poor (in this sense see also Dorner 1992, 4; Thiesenhusen 1995, 15; Lapp 2004, 2-4; 
Barraclough 1999, 1; Ondetti, 2012). This may imply legislation expropriating or confiscating 
idle lands, establishing limits to the size of holdings and expropriating or confiscating lands held 
in excess, collectivizing or decollectivizing lands, etc., but always with the purpose of taking the 
lands from a richer sector of the population and transferring them to a poorer one.  
Policies that change the pattern of land tenure with a purpose other than land 
redistribution should not be considered land reform. Thus, contrary to Albertus (forthcoming) I 
exclude from the definition of land reform programs of colonization or settlement of public 
unused lands even when they allocate the lands to the poor (Lipton 2009, 329; Lapp 2004, 3), 
unless those lands are claimed or used by richer sectors. Further, contrary to Mahoney (2001), I 
also exclude from the definition of land reform policies that require the fragmentation (or 
disentailment) of collective lands when they do not entail the seizure of lands from richer sectors 
but mainly their division among poor people already holding the lands. While these two types of 
programs may be part of an agrarian reform that also seeks to redistribute land from the rich to 
the poor, on their own they should be considered a different type of land policy. In fact, as we 
will see, they were extensively implemented in Latin America during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, but they were never labeled land or agrarian reform.  
Some authors like de Janvry (1981) distinguish land reform and agrarian reform policies, 
arguing that the latter entail more than just a change in the land tenure pattern for redistribution 




irrigation, infrastructure and technological support.  I will, nonetheless, follow Thiesenhusen 
(1989, 7) in using the terms interchangeably since, in fact, the Spanish language does not have 
separate terms for the two—referring only to agrarian reform, even when the policy does nothing 
else than changing the land tenure pattern.  
Land tenure patterns: the legal or institutional relations between people and lands that 
characterize a particular society. Such relations may include different combinations of the 
following rights or situations: 
Property or ownership: a legal right that creates a relation between a thing (in this case 
land) and a person or group, which consists in the latter’s entitlement to possess, use, 
perceive the fruits of and (unless otherwise specified) transfer the thing. Such relation is 
not dependent on the person holding or occupying the thing; it persists as a legal 
abstraction even when the person does not have a de facto relation to the thing. In the 
case of land and other immobile assets, property or ownership rights are generally 
acknowledged and protected by a formal legal title whose transfer is necessary for the 
transfer of the rights.  
In continental law—which rules most Latin American countries—property or 
ownership may be acquired not only through transfers, but also through inheritance (in 
case of death of the owner), occupation (when the thing does not belong to anyone), 
accession (when the thing becomes added to another one) and prescription (when a thing 
belonging to someone is possessed by another in good faith for a period of time).  
Possession: a fact consisting in the tenancy or occupation of a thing with the intention of 
being its owner, which, under certain circumstances, may be considered a right. As said 




the claim that it is hers. However, persons different from the owner of a thing may also 
possess it, and even derive a legal right to it, which at first is not linked to property but 
can generate an expectation of acquiring ownership. This is the case because, as said 
above, in continental law, one of the ways in which ownership may be acquired is 
through prescription, which consists in the possession of a thing that belongs to another 
for a period of time established by the law. That period varies in different legislations 
across and even within countries. But in general it tends to be shorter whenever the 
possession is public (versus clandestine or hidden), peaceful (versus retained through 
violence), regular (i.e. based on a title that is thought to transfer ownership rights) and in 
good faith (i.e. acquired under the notion that the acquisition was carried out without 
fraud or other vices, even if that notion is no longer held after the acquisition). Now, 
possession may also lead to ownership through prescription when the possession does not 
comply with the former conditions; the law is just likely to require the passage of a longer 
period of time for that to happen. Prescription may operate over both private and public 
assets that are susceptible of it (some private and public lands assets are imprescriptible 
by law, such as collectively owned lands and lands destined to public service, but in 
general others are prescriptible).  And, in the meanwhile, the possessor is reputed to be 
the owner and to possess it in good faith unless proven otherwise.  
As we will see in following chapters, Latin American legislations on public lands 
have tended to recognize possession rights to people who occupy and cultivate public 
empty lands for a short period of time. Those rights consist in the right to preferentially 
claim the allocation of the land in question, and in the right to not be disturbed in the 




lands may not be allocated to non-possessors and that possessors may not be kicked out 
of the lands. Even though the possession of public lands may be considered a promise 
made by the state to afford ownership after a period of time, possession rights create a 
weaker and less certain relation between a person and a thing than property rights. This is 
so, first, because possession rights entail the right to occupy, use and perceive the fruits 
of the land but not the right to transfer it. Second, because possession rights depend on 
the fact that their holders have the sustained capacity to hold or occupy the land, such that 
if they cease to do so, the right of possession is lost. And third, because possession rights 
are very rarely recognized by formal titles, so their holders can only prove them through 
their actual holding of the thing or, when lost, through testimonies, which are weaker 
proofs than documents.  
Occupation or sheer tenancy: the fact of holding or occupying a thing but not as its 
owner. This fact may generate possession and eventually ownership rights only when the 
thing does not belong to anyone, which is never the case of public assets, and which may 
only happen with respect to private things when they are lost and not claimed by the 
owner for a period of time. In the rest of the cases, tenancy or occupation can only 
generate the right to use the thing when its owner transfers that right and when, 
consequently, the holder recognizes the owner as such. This means that, even if they 
claim them as their own, occupants of private or public lands who do not have possession 
or ownership rights to them may not be legally considered right-holders but merely de 
facto occupants.  
Land may be held under the former three rights or situations either individually or collectively. 




have legal standing to exercise them. As we will see in subsequent chapters, in Latin American 
colonial and early post-independence period, indigenous/peasant groups were often corporate 
landowners—and, in some cases, also possessors or de facto occupants—which had not only 
legal standing to exercise rights, but were also territorial units with political functions and certain 
degree of autonomy. This implied, among other things, that they could elect their own 
authorities, and that the latter represented all the members of the corporation, which hence 
related to state authorities as a collective entity. Lands collectively owned by indigenous/peasant 
groups were generally inalienable or intransferable—which also tends to be the case nowadays.  
Peasants: rural inhabitants who work the land mainly as a subsistence economic activity—which 
includes agriculture, but also shepherding or cattle farming—be it as owners, renters or 
possessors. Peasants is the most commonly used word to translate the term campesinos—of 
widespread use in Latin America. However, its use has become polemical, since it can imply a 
reference to either economic self-sufficiency—which stems from the original French term 
paysants, but which is rarely present in Latin American campesinos (Womack 1968)—or to a 
communitarian solidarity of the moral economy type (often with ethnic connotations)—which 
some argue was not present in all forms of rural collective life (see, for instance, Kourí 2002). 
My use of the term does not necessarily imply either of those references. Nevertheless, I do 
recognize and give relevance to the ethnic origins of an important part of the Latin American 
peasantry—whose magnitude was a crucial factor for the way in which peasants conceived of 
their relation to the land, given the colonial and post-independence institutions that granted 
collective rights to indigenous groups in the form of pueblos, resguardos, ejidos, etc. Now, by 
the 19th century, many of the groups with collective rights to their lands were more clearly 




relations (mestizaje) and their conversion to Catholicism. On the other hand, some Latin 
American campesinos were of a mestizo or European origin, and occupied lands in an individual 
way. To distinguish these situations from peasants with an indigenous origin and a collective 
ownership history, I refer to the latter specifically as indigenous/peasants.   
Property rights system: the set of laws, institutions and authorities that define the land tenure 
patterns of a given society and that regulate the distribution of rights that they entail.  
Public vacant lands: lands owned by the state that were originally empty, which are alienable 
and prescriptible (notably because they are not destined to serve a public purpose) and can hence 
be privatized, i.e. enclosed and transferred into private hands. In Latin America, since the colony, 
the legal rule has been that all lands that are not privately owned belong to the state. This means 
that, even if empty, such lands may not be legally owned or possessed unless approved by the 
law. As we will see, during the late 19th century public empty lands were privatized in large 
amounts both through sales or bonds’ redemptions, and through gratuitous allocations, with the 
purposes of putting them into commerce, expanding ownership and obtaining revenue for the 






Chapter 1: Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
 
Land reforms were a central feature of Latin American politics in the 20th century. In most 
countries, peasants demanded the redistribution of land, and elites mobilized them in elections or 
revolutions by promising agrarian reforms. With the exception of Argentina and Uruguay, all 
Latin American countries enacted land reforms during the 20th century, ranging from superficial 
to structural policies (Lapp 2004, 13; Ondetti 2012). The peak of the enactment of land reform 
legislations occurred in the 1960s, and that of their implementation in the 1970s (Ondetti 2012; 
Albertus, forthcoming). Between 1930 and 2008, land reforms redistributed more than 160 
million hectares (Albertus, forthcoming).  
Along with labor regulations, land reforms were the most important manifestation of 
distributional conflict in the region (Collier and Collier 1991; Przeworski and Curvale 2008). 
And they were strongly connected to political instability. In some contexts, agrarian reforms 
motivated reactionary coups (e.g., Guatemala and Chile). In others, their enactment by 
revolutionary or authoritarian regimes with redistributive agendas served to justify their 
permanence in power to preempt their dismounting (e.g., Mexico, Cuba, Bolivia, and Peru). Yet 
in others, inefficacious agrarian reforms provoked the emergence of revolutionary armed groups 
(Colombia and El Salvador). 
However, so far the causes of these reforms have not been satisfactorily explained from a 
comparative perspective. Land reforms have captured the attention of policy-makers and activists 




analyses3 or, when comparing cases, they have analyzed the impact of different institutional 
designs of land reform on various phenomena, but seldom the causes of such variation. Thus, the 
works of Alexander (1963, 1974), Hanke (1968), Petras and Laporte (1971), De Janvry (1981), 
Thiesenhusen (1989, 1995), Dorner (1992), Kay (1998), Barraclough (1999), Binswanger-
Mkhize, Bourguignon and van den Brink (2009), and Lipton (2009) offer insightful analyses of 
the different goals and contents of agrarian reform legislation, the procedures and effectiveness 
with which it has been implemented and the effects it has had on land inequality and land tenure 
patterns, productivity and economic development, political participation and social organization 
of the peasantry, among others. Whenever these works refer to the causes of land reform, they 
tend to do so tentatively, i.e. mentioning a list of factors likely to spur reforms in general, but not 
explaining the ways in which those different factors operate in particular contexts, nor how they 
may account for variation in the emergence and content of land reforms. For instance, 
Thiesenhusen (1989, 9) argued that the catalyst of land reform could be any of the following:  
“the death of a dictator, the eclipse of an especially repressive military regime, the advent 
of a reformist military, the politicization of religious groups, the invasion of land by 
organized peasants, international pressures or pacts, the split of a coalition or class, the 
demonstration effect offered by other countries, guerrilla movements, martyrdom, or even 
an election--or more than one of these occurring in some fortuitous combination”.  
 
In his later work (1995), Thiesenhusen narrowed the list down and also tried to offer an 
explanation of the variation of land reforms in terms of their magnitude. He argued that major 
                                                      
3 For examples of single-case analyses, see, among others, Gotkowitz (2007) on Bolivia; Ondetti (2008) 
on Brazil; Kauffman (1972) on Chile; Feder (1965), Duff (1966), LeGrand (1980, 1986) and Berry (2002) 
on Colombia; Seligson (1979) on Costa Rica; O’Connor (1968) on Cuba; Redclift (1978) on Ecuador; 
Hildebrand (1962) on Guatemala; Sanderson (1984), Magaloni et al (2012), Dell (2012) on Mexico; 




reforms could only happen as a result of a revolution and when peasants’ claims were such that 
they could surpass already weak landowners, while minor reforms were promoted to reduce 
from-below opposition or to obtain foreign funding. Similarly, Alexander (1963) had mentioned 
as likely factors facilitating agrarian reform in Latin America the loss of power of landowners, 
the Cuban revolution and the United States government promotion of the Alliance for Progress in 
the 1960s. And de Janvry (1981) described the region’s 1960s reforms as from-above attempts to 
undermine revolts and thus reinforce capitalist relations, a conclusion endorsed by Kay (1998). 
A common trait in these underspecified explanations is that they take into account both 
the demand and the supply side of land reform, stating factors related both to peasants from-
below claims and mobilization for redistribution and to elites’ from-above decisions to 
redistribute. More recent comparative works have advanced a lot in theorizing the causes of land 
reform, but they have mainly focused on its supply side. Thus, Lapp (2004) explained the 
emergence of land reforms in the 20th century as a result of democratic openings produced by 
elite splits, which led parties or factions within them to extend the suffrage and mobilize newly 
enfranchised peasants through land reform promises. In contrast, following Huntington (1968, 
388) and Tai (1974, 473), Albertus (forthcoming) claims that land reforms were much more 
likely to occur under authoritarian regimes than under democracies. And he further specifies that 
the difference between regimes is greater with respect to redistributive land reforms—as opposed 
to colonization programs or negotiated land transactions—and that there is also variation across 
authoritarian regimes, with land reform being more likely when intra-elite or coalitional splits 
exist and when there are fewer veto points. Finally, in a similar vein to Thiesenhusen (1995), 




arguing that they were enacted as a preemptive response to the Cuban revolution under the 
auspices of the US Alliance for Progress.  
 
Although illuminating, these explanations do not account for some key facts. For 
instance, some of the most important agrarian reforms—the Mexican, Bolivian, Guatemalan, 
Venezuelan—happened before the Cuban Revolution, so diffusion might help explain later cases 
but not early ones. In turn, as noted by Albertus, many agrarian reforms—like the Cuban, 
Peruvian, Salvadorian, Honduran, and Paraguayan—were enacted by non-democratic regimes, 
so they can hardly be explained as a result of suffrage extension. However, many authoritarian 
regimes that enacted agrarian reforms—such as the Mexican, Bolivian, Cuban and Nicaraguan—
did not only evidence intra-elite splits or low institutional constraints, as Albertus argues; they 
were also (and perhaps more importantly) social revolutions in their origins, so the adoption of 
those reforms is a sign of from-below pressure.  
As said, all these accounts explain Latin American land reforms as from-above processes 
despite the extensive evidence of peasant mobilization for reform. The authors acknowledge the 
existence and importance of such mobilization, but they do not give it a significant causal role in 
their theories. Thus, Lapp (2004, 11) asserts that demand for land reform was ubiquitous and 
persistent in Latin America, and yet, it was insufficient to promote reform as peasants’ protests 
and land invasions were frequently met with repression or neglect. In turn, Albertus 
(forthcoming), quoting Kay (1998, 15), notes that “Agrarian reforms have generally been the 
outcome of political changes from above”, even though peasants’ uprisings may inform the 




These conclusions seem to be the result of a restrictive view of demands for land reform, 
which only includes peasants’ revolts at the eve of land reform. As I will argue here and show in 
later chapters, however, peasant mobilization for land in Latin America has consisted in a much 
wider repertoire, including legal petitions before administrative and judicial institutions, and 
political claims to state officials and political parties. Such claims and petitions have not only 
been formulated at the eve of land reform, but also much earlier, and their accumulation and lack 
of adequate response by state institutions seems to have been an important driver of peasant 
mobilization for reform. Moreover, the fact—noted by Kay (1998) and Albertus (forthcoming)—
that peasant mobilization has influenced the scope and spatial patterns of land reform does not do 
away with the causal role of from-below pressure, but actually indicates its relevance.  
I thus propose to bring the demand side back to the explanations of agrarian reform. As 
the contentious politics literature has taught us, the existence of political opportunities is only 
one of three elements jointly explaining the conditions under which people are motivated and 
capable of making collective claims, along with framing processes and mobilizing structures 
(Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 1997, 2001). Certainly, the emergence of land reform 
as a relevant policy choice in the political arena is, in part, a result of elite choices and of the 
current political conditions that influence those choices—such as elite splits caused by 
democratization or revolutionary processes, or the international diffusion of policies. But 
political opportunities are not, on their own, capable of explaining why elites choose that specific 
policy content if it is not to cater to claims of redistribution, unless their choice is purely a 
strategy from above.4 In turn, claims of land redistribution are not likely present or strong 
                                                      
4 I hence distinguish agrarian reforms that respond to popular claims of redistribution or that attempt to 




enough without the existence of a justification and an organization structure. Thus, even though 
the timing in which elites promote an agrarian reform program may vary depending on the nature 
of their splits, or the degree of diffusion of reform policies, the latter are only likely to be enacted 
in contexts where claims for land redistribution are strong enough for elites to strategically need 
to address them in return for peasant support.  
I offer a theory that explains the emergence and level of radicalism of claims for land 
redistribution and that connects them to the actual enactment and implementation of land reform 
policies. The theory’s novelty is to identify prior land dispossessions, and the type of legal rights 
that they attack, as a key factor explaining redistributive land claims and their policy outcomes. I 
also propose a novel methodology for capturing the causal impact of dispossessions on claims 
for land redistribution, which consists in identifying critical eras for the political economy of 
land in which dispossessions occur massively as a result of exogenous shocks. According to 
historians, one such era occurred in Latin America between the 1870s and the 1920s, the region’s 
first export boom.  
 
The Theory: Land Dispossessions as a Cause of Land Reform Claims 
It may sound obvious that, at the loss of land through dispossession, people would react through 
claims of land. However, this is not what theorists tend to expect, nor what social scientists 
highlight in their studies. As noted in the introduction, in Capital, Marx argued that the original 
land theft on which all of capitalism was based was not disputed by its victims because it became 
                                                                                                                                                                           
carried out as strictly from above projects that seek to enhance economic efficiency and weaken the 
landowning class, on the other. Taiwan seems to be a case of the latter. My theory only focuses on the 
former, although I suspect that many of the agrarian reforms that at first sight look like projects from 
above are at least in part a response to claims for redistribution or a mechanism for mobilizing a sector of 
the population that will benefit from redistribution. Indeed, in redistributive programs someone always 
loses and someone always wins, and political elites are only likely interested in weakening the 




institutionalized through the legal fiction of private property (2008 [1867], 365). In this he 
followed Rousseau, who in his Second Discourse on Inequality (1992[1755]) had described the 
process through which land dispossession from the powerless by the powerful came to be 
perceived as legitimate by the former, due to the institution of property. For both authors, the key 
for victims of dispossession to abstain from challenging the distribution of land ownership was 
the generation of a perception of legitimacy of the institutions of private property, which made 
them feel unentitled to the land they once occupied and worked.  
My theory proposes to study the conditions under which such perception (or a narrative) 
of legitimacy is not generated due to the type of legal rights that victims of dispossession have to 
the lands. According to Dahl (1971, 95), the disadvantaged respond to a situation of objective 
inequality or injustice only when they perceive it, judge it relevant, consider it illegitimate and 
breed frustration from it. I refer indistinctively to perception/motivation and 
narrative/justification because I believe that the legitimacy argument may be based on either a 
psychological or a framing mechanism, and that it would be very hard to empirically disentangle 
them. The psychological mechanism consists in the notion developed by Tocqueville (1856), 
Gurr (1970) and Moore (1978), that objective inequality alone does not constitute a cause for 
claim-making; subjective grievances must exist, which allow people under conditions of 
subordination or exclusion to perceive those conditions as unbearable, and therefore to have a 
motivation for challenging them. The framing mechanism consists in the notion developed by 
contentious politics scholars that claim-making depends not so much on perceptions of injustice 
as on processes through which the notion of injustice may be formulated and communicated to 





As we will see next, I argue that the stronger and more certain their rights to the land, the 
more will victims of dispossession perceive or frame the rights of dispossessors as illegitimate 
and collectively organize to challenge them. I hence seek to combine two strands of literature. 
First, the literature on institutional legitimacy and its effects, which highlights the capacity of 
legal institutions to generate a sense of entitlement and fairness in citizens5 that may promote 
claim-making when previously recognized rights are denied. Second, the contentious politics 
literature that is concerned with the reasons why people do not always rebel under objective 
conditions of injustice6, and which points to the need of a narrative of grievances and of 
mobilizing structures for those conditions to be considered unbearable and to be consequently 
challenged when political opportunities emerge.7  
Now, I argue that a particular type of narrative, based on a particular content of justice, is 
what leads peasants to claim land redistribution. Contrary to common visions of land reform 
(Thiesenhusen 1995, 15; Lipton 2009, 2), that narrative is not grounded mainly on the dictum of 
reducing land inequality that the distributive justice perspective provides. It is also, and 
importantly, grounded on the dictum of restoring dispossessed lands that the corrective justice 
perspective provides. This may help explain why, in Latin America, there is no evident 
relationship between land inequality and claims for land redistribution.  
Indeed, claims for land reform were not prevalent during the region’s peak of land 
inequality (the second half of the 19th century); rather, they began to be systematically voiced 
                                                      
5 Hegel (2008 [1820], 198-214); Weber (1978[1922], 215, but also 1991[1918]); Hart (1997[1961], 
especially 167-80, 200-12); Rawls, (1999[1971], especially Chapter VI, 1993, 225); Habermas (1979, 
205, 1996, 300); Tyler (2003); Rosenfeld (2001). 
6 Tocqueville (1856); Moore (1966, 1978); Gurr (1970); Dahl (1971).  




from the second decade of the 20th century on, and they were addressed through agrarian reform 
policies mainly in the 1960s, when land inequality significantly receded and when land began to 
lose importance as a productive asset (Przeworski and Curvale 2008). Moreover, previous 
patterns of land inequality do not seem capable of explaining either the adoption of land reforms 
or their level of radicalism. As Graph 1 shows, land reforms were adopted in countries that 
experienced very divergent levels of land inequality in the decade prior to their enactment.8 
However, there does not seem to exist a direct relationship between the level of radicalism of 








                                                      
8 For land inequality, I use Vanhanen (1997, 261-7)’s data on percentage of family farms of the total 
holding area in each decade, which is based on specific size criteria for what is considered a family farm 
in each country. I take the decade prior to the enactment of the first agrarian reform in each country, or to 
the most relevant agrarian reform claims when a reform was never implemented. This is an imperfect way 
of measuring land inequality because it does not consider the relative value of land (Przeworski and 
Curvale 2008), the difference between family farms and the largest ones (as the land Gini coefficient 
does), or other forms of land tenure of the poor, such as collective or corporate ownership of 
indigenous/peasants. However, it is still a telling measure of inequality, since family farms are defined as 
small-sized farms (thus, the higher their proportion, the fewer big land extensions one could expect) and 
since the greater the number of families who own land, the more land is distributed across the national 
population. Further, it is to my knowledge the only existent cross-country indicator of land inequality for 
the period under consideration, given that many countries had not yet adopted or were only in the process 
of adopting census and cadaster institutions in the second half of the 19th century.  As said, I use this 
inequality measure for the decade prior to the implementation of the first land reform in each country 
during the 20th century; however, the relation (or better, the lack thereof) between inequality and 





Graph 1. Levels of Radicalism of 20th Century Agrarian Reforms  
and Land Inequality in the Preceding Decade in Latin America 
(Constructed using Vanhanen 1997; De Janvry 1981;  




For levels of radicalism of agrarian reform, I use a measure of my own creation based on 
the de iure content of laws and programs of agrarian reform, as described mainly by de Janvry 
(1981). As I explain in more detail in Chapter 2, the measure includes the exceptionality of the 
enactment process, the type of targeted lands (whether private or only public), the level of 
respect for the due process in the land allocation process, the land tenure of allocated lands, and 
the amount of lands allocated. Using this measure we can see that, in some places where 
inequality was acute in the late 19th century, such as Argentina and Uruguay, agrarian reform 
claims were very weak and an agrarian reform was never implemented. But places with similar 
prior levels of land inequality like Guatemala and Nicaragua did experience strong agrarian 
reform claims and measures in the 20th century. And places with even higher levels of inequality, 











































































































As we will see next, I argue that variation in the adoption and level of radicalism of 
agrarian reforms is a result of the differences in the extent and form of prior land dispossessions, 
not of inequality alone. 
 
The Causal Mechanisms 
The relation between agrarian reforms and prior dispossessions that I hypothesize is grounded on 
the following mechanism: the existence of prior occupants implies that land seizures cannot be 
carried out without the use of force or fraud. In turn, the use of force or fraud creates a 
perception or narrative of illegitimacy of the property rights acquired by appropriators and of the 
institutions in charge of their protection. This perception or narrative does not allow the 
allocation of property rights to be completely excluded from the political arena, thereby 
admitting the possibility of future challenges through agrarian reform. As Stephen Holmes 
(partly following Carl Schmitt) argues, “[a]ll historically known systems of private property (…) 
are normatively based on the principle that what is stolen must be returned and, simultaneously, 
historically based on the refusal to return what was stolen. This paradox does not undermine 
functioning systems of private property, presumably, because the original sin of violent 
expropriation is lost in the mists of time… [However,] When force and fraud have been used to 
transfer property within living memory, the legitimacy of the property system as a whole is 
called into question”.9    
 
Now, I propose a distinction between the use of force and the use of fraud. Land 
dispossessions, I hypothesize, can be carried out through sheer force whenever occupants do not 
                                                      




have legal rights to the land—be it ownership or possession rights recognized by state 
institutions—10 but simply a de facto relation to it. In such a circumstance, the dispossessor can 
claim to be the new occupant of the land, and even request a legal title over it when the land is 
public—either by buying it to the state or by claiming its allocation on the grounds of her 
possession. However, force is not enough to carry out dispossessions whenever occupants have 
legal rights to the land, since those rights must be overlooked, denied or annulled for the 
dispossessor to be recognized as the new legitimate possessor or owner. In such situation, 
dispossessions must be carried out through legal manipulation or fraud.  
Perhaps counter intuitively, I argue that the use of fraud generates a greater perception of 
illegitimacy than the use of force alone. Fraud implies ignoring, abusing and/or manipulating the 
laws and institutions that were supposedly intended to protect the rights of the dispossessed, and 
that had probably protected those rights in previous moments. Further, if fraud leads to an 
effective dispossession, then it can involve the victims’ unsuccessful quest for legal protection or 
remedy. When that protection is not granted despite the existence of rights, a strong perception 
or narrative of injustice is likely to emerge. The use of fraud can thus create a more radical 
critical view of the laws and institutions in charge of protecting land rights, and/or a more eager 
desire to transform or subvert them. Consequently, whenever the dispossession of lands involves 
the denial or overlooking of previous legal rights, we should expect victims of dispossession to 
have a better platform for claims-making, and therefore to mobilize more fervently for agrarian 
reform. 
                                                      
10 Thus, I am here distinguishing people’s belief in having a legitimate right or claim to the land and such 
right or claim actually existing under the eyes of the state. The existence of a right may be judged by the 
actual existence of a piece of paper (a written title or a promise of receiving a future title) provided by the 
state, or by the existence of a law establishing conditions for the right to be recognized (as often happens 
with possession rights). But the recognition of the right of the state can also consist in its enforcement in 




Dispossessions against prior land rights generate not only a narrative or perception of 
illegitimacy of the property rights system but also may act as a catalyzer of collective action. 
Indeed, rights encourage landholders to seek protection or redress before state authorities at 
times of threat, by using the legal framework and processes that so far recognized them as right-
bearers. Although they may seek such protection individually, the coordination and pooling of 
resources to request protection in tandem may facilitate their action by reducing transaction costs 
and increasing pressure. Such way of proceeding is more likely when victims have a common 
dispossessor and similar claims to the land. So, when dispossessions attack prior rights and when 
they are not too incapacitating—because they do not consist mainly or only on force—they are 
likely to foster a form of collective action consisting in legal claims of protection or redress. 
Even if these claims are unsuccessful, such collective action is likely to generate capacity for 
future contentious mobilization. 
The strength of agrarian reform claims depends not only on the existence but also on the 
type of land rights that prior dispossessions violate. I argue that attempts against ownership 
rights generate a greater motivation or justification for claim-making than attempts against 
possession rights, and that the latter generate a greater motivation or justification than de facto 
occupations (see the glossary for the precise definition of these different rights and claims). This 
is so due to the greater legal certainty and capacity for collective action that these rights afford to 
their holders. Indeed, because they have a piece of paper proving their entitlement to the lands, 
as well as the state’s responsibility to protect them, owners may more readily perceive 
dispossessions as unjust and/or be able to articulate a narrative of injustice and illegitimacy based 
on their loss. They may also feel more entitled and capable to bring claims of protection to the 




usually have a piece of paper, they do have a legal right to use and occupy the land, and in many 
occasions to eventually receive its ownership, which affords them with a weaker but still legal 
claim to the protection of the state, and which can then push them to perceive land dispossession 
as illegitimate and to try to mobilize for their protection. De facto occupants, in contrast, may 
well feel aggrieved by dispossession, but such grievance is not as likely to translate into a legal 
claim of protection before the state, which has not recognized their occupation as a legal right. 
Diagram 1 (in the Introduction) illustrates the predicted degree of strength of agrarian reform 
claims depending on the type of rights (or lack thereof) violated by dispossessions.  
 
The Timing 
The trajectories leading to agrarian reform claims and policies addressing them are influenced 
not only by the existence and type of prior rights, but also by the timing of dispossessions. In 
general, agrarian reform claims are more likely to be voiced and successfully addressed through 
legislation in future moments of elite splits or other forms of propitious political opportunities, 
rather than when dispossessions are taking place. Indeed, when they have entitlements, the 
victims of dispossessions will first attempt to protect their lands through the legal framework and 
processes that so far recognized and protected them as right-bearers. And only when they reckon 
that such framework and processes are biased—due to the state authorities’ explicit collusion or 
lack of capacity to enforce the law—will they recur to contentious claims of redistribution. 
Actually, victims’ unsuccessful quest for legal protection or remedy is likely to increase both 
their justification for claim-making—based on a narrative of unfair treatment—and their capacity 
for collective action—resulting from the organizational resources devoted to the cause. However, 




dispossessions, in which the biases of state institutions may not only consist in legal 
manipulation but also in outright repression. Therefore, it is likely that grievances of 
dispossession will only be voiced as claims of agrarian reform when political opportunities open 
up that reduce the costs of mobilization and/or increase the benefits of elites allowing it to 
happen. It is also likely that those claims will be stronger and more likely addressed through 
radical agrarian reform legislation when prior rights over dispossessed lands consisted in 
ownership, not possession rights.  
This pattern is however unlikely to exist when victims of dispossession do not have legal 
rights to the lands they occupy, and when dispossessions are therefore mainly carried out through 
force—often employed directly by state authorities—not fraud. These victims of dispossession 
are likely to respond to force in kind, instead of attempting to use the institutional channels of 
resistance, which are not available to them. This, in turn, is likely to produce the elimination or 
marginalization of victims of dispossession, and therefore to reduce their capacity to voice 
subsequent claims of agrarian reform. Table 1 illustrates the expected form and timing of 
resistance to dispossessions and claims for agrarian reform, depending on the existence and type 
of land rights.11  
 
 
                                                      
11 The causal sequences are depicted in an ideal and simplified way, which may not account for important 
complexities taking place in concrete situations. For instance, the stages in the different columns are 




Table 1. Hypothesized Historical Periods and Processes 
 
We may hence conceive of the combination of prior dispossessions against legal rights 
and political opportunities as the necessary and sufficient condition for claims of land reform to 
emerge and likely be successful. Each of those elements is, however, a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. Prior dispossessions may exist and be strong enough to produce the 
motivation or justification and capacity for claim-making, but they may not be enough to 
promote effective claim-making in the presence of strong repression or in the absence of 
incentives for elites to mobilize potential claim-makers. In turn, political opportunities for 
contentious politics may exist, but claims of land redistribution are not likely to be pushed 
forward in the absence of prior dispossessions generating a motivation or justification and 
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As said, prior comparative studies on the causes of land reform have focused on elite 
splits, at the expense of land claims from below. I contribute thus to existing explanations a 
theory of the conditions under which such claims emerge and push for varied forms of land 
reform legislation when splits open up political opportunities. Diagram 2 (in the Introduction) 
illustrates the focus of my contribution. 
 
The Methodological Strategy: Identifying Critical Eras of Dispossession 
For land dispossessions to engender grievances that turn into radical and successful agrarian 
reform claims, they must not only attack prior rights, but also do so at a significant level. This 
tends to happen at critical eras for the political economy of land in which strong incentives for 
enclosures emerge. I conceptualize these critical eras as triggered by economic or political 
shocks—such as export booms or civil wars—which increase the actual or strategic value of 
land, thereby motivating landed elites, entrepreneurs or other powerful actors to seize them to 
dispossess existent occupants.  
The identification of critical eras of dispossession is a methodological strategy for 
measuring the impact of the latter on land reform claims. Because they are generated by 
exogenous shocks and are time-bounded, the effect of critical eras on land values is not likely to 
affect claims of land redistribution made when those eras are over. Further, because the shocks 
provoke sharp increases in land values, dispossessions are likely to be massive, so their effect 
can be more easily captured, and it may be possible to distinguish the different types of land 
tenure affected by them. Finally, because I argue that dispossessions that target legal rights are 
likely to be carried out through legal manipulation or fraud, with the concept of critical eras I 




institutions, but also the way in which they are applied (or misapplied), which may have long-
lasting or path-dependent effects. Indeed, historical-institutionalism has so far restricted the 
phenomenon of path-dependency to critical junctures, which consist in very short periods of time 
in which key decisions are taken that change formal institutions and thereby set distinct path of 
events (Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2001; Pierson 2000, 2003). In contrast, the critical 
eras that I define are longer periods of time triggered by a structural change, in which formal 
institutions may not change but the way in which they are implemented does. Such 
implementation, especially when biased, manipulative or fraudulent, may change the course of 
events in a long-lasting way, especially by promoting different forms of mobilization from 
below. I thus seek to articulate the historical-institutionalist literature with the literature on 
institutional strength, which has shown the relevance of variation in the level of enforcement of 
formal institutions in general (Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Murillo and Levitsky 2009; Mahoney 
and Thelen 2010) and of property rights institutions in particular (Haber, Razo and Maurer 2003; 
Onoma 2010).  
In the case of land, I argue, when the lands seized as a response to the increase in values 
are owned or possessed by persons with legal rights, enclosures will be carried out mainly 
through fraud or manipulation of the existing property rights legislation. This will entail the 
victims’ attempts to request protection from the state. But only after failure and when political 
conditions allow, will victims try to express their grievances as claims for land reform. As we 
will see next, this pattern seems to have been followed in Latin America.  While an era of 
massive dispossessions occurred during the region’s first export boom (1870-1920s), agrarian 
reform claims were voiced after that period, when elite splits (1910s-60s) opened up 




more likely to generate radical reform outcomes wherever the land rights affected by 
dispossession were more certain—i.e. ownership rights rather than possession rights, and 
possession rights rather than de facto occupations.  
 
The Critical Era of Dispossessions (1870-1920) 
As the classical texts on the enclosure movement in 18th century England point out, the advent of 
commerce was a critical period for the political economy of land. The demand for agricultural 
products generated incentives to convert subsistence economies into productive ones, and hence 
for entrepreneurs to appropriate lands susceptible of exploitation (Locke 1988 [1689]; Marx 
1978 [1845], 2008 [1867]; Moore, 1966). Appropriation was facilitated by liberal legislation, 
which established individual and absolute private property as the unique form of land tenure, and 
thus enabled the privatization of corporate and public holdings.  
A similar period took place in Latin America’s late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the 
region entered the international market. European industrialization generated a significant 
increase in the international demand for agricultural products, which led to a turn away from the 
production of consumption crops towards export agriculture. This turn led to (and was also 
further facilitated by) improvements in the infrastructure necessary to access lands and transport 
produce. Both the increase in the demand for export crops and the development of transport 
infrastructure led to a major increase in land values (Knight 1986; Coatsworth 1981, 2008; 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Adelman 1994; Barsky and Gelman 2001). This 
economic shock generated a strong pull for the enclosure of corporate and public lands through 
the application of liberal laws. The pull faced strong obstacles because many of the coveted lands 




many cases effectively protected by the colonial administration and early post-independence 
governments.  
Indeed, throughout the colonial period (15th–early 19th centuries), the Spanish crown 
granted indigenous groups corporate legal titles over large tracts of land. Such titles could consist 
in colonial land grants or concessions (mercedes), foundation titles, recognitions of ownership 
over possessed lands (composiciones), and land donations, among others. And the corporate or 
collective entities that had rights over them were called, depending on the country: villages 
(pueblos), congregations (congregaciones), protectorates (resguardos), missions (misiones), etc. 
According to Coatsworth (2008) and Prados de la Escosura (2003), indigenous possessed the 
majority of the lands, and they were beneficiaries of special legal protection. This protection was 
strategic, since the crown sought to thus counterbalance the power of local elites. However, the 
protection was also in line with the crown’s segregationist and paternalistic attitude towards the 
Indians, since it was articulated with a settlement policy aimed at congregating natives in 
separate residential spaces (with Indian republics as the ultimate ideal) and to a tutelage policy 
that established special institutions to which indigenous could resort, given their immaturity.  
After independence (early 19th century), even though the equality of indigenous was 
proclaimed and special jurisdictions were abolished, corporate forms of property were 
maintained, in many cases well into the 19th century (Lira 1995; Kourí 2002, 80). By the mid-
19th century, in many contexts indigenous groups no longer had a homogenous ethnic 
composition because of inter-ethnic relations (mestizaje) and their conversion to Catholicism. 
Their ethnic attributes were replaced by the more socioeconomic one of rural (campesino, or 
peasant) belonging. Still, state authorities often recognized and protected the collective rights of 




the other hand, during the early post-colonial period, some lands were occupied by peasants 
under state-sponsored colonization programs that recognized individual ownership or possession 
rights to first occupants.12 The recognition of those rights by state laws also generated a sense of 
legal entitlement and a mechanism of collective action, which led peasants to defend their lands 
in courts and before administrative institutions.13    
Consequently, agricultural producers willing to accumulate lands could not simply apply 
liberal laws to institutionalize appropriations. Indeed, very similar land laws had been adopted in 
all Latin American countries since the late 18th century (under the promotion of the Bourbon 
liberalization policies) and especially in the mid-19th century (under the influence of liberal 
elites) with the purpose of increasing the amount of land available for exploitation. Those laws 
ordered the privatization of public lands through their sale or gratuitous allocation and the 
disentailment (i.e. fragmentation) of church and indigenous corporate property. In the books, the 
laws established that indigenous lands should be distributed among groups’ members and that 
the privatization of public lands should respect the rights of prior possessors. This implied that 
dispossession could not take place without legal manipulation.  
Despite the resistance of prior landholders, many dispossession attempts were successful 
due to the magnitude of economic incentives and to the capacity of elites to influence institutions 
(Knight 1986; LeGrand 1980, 1986). However, in several contexts peasant grievances were 
                                                      
12 On Mexico, see Knight (1986); Holden (1994); Kourí (2002); Haber, Razo and Maurer (2003). On 
Colombia see LeGrand (1980, 1986); Berry, (2002); Kalmanovitz and López (2005); Melo (2007); 
Ocampo et al (2007); Sánchez et al (2010). On Argentina, see Míguez (1986); Adelman (1994); Barsky 
and Gelman (2001); Hora (2001). 
13 On the judicial protection of indigenous property rights during the colonial and early post-independence 
period, see, on Mexico, Womack (1968); Hernández (1993); Lira (1995); Marino (2006). For peasants’ 
requests of judicial protection in Colombia, see Kalmanovitz and López (2005), Melo (2007), Ocampo et 




prevalent because they were based on the notion that enclosures had violated legal and 
enforceable rights, and in many cases they were defended through collective action. Thus, prior 
land rights impeded dispossessions from becoming Marx’s institutionalized theft.  
 
The Legacies of Dispossession: Land Reform Claims (1910s-60s) 
In Latin America, land reform claims emerged in the first decades of the 20th century, at a 
moment when elite splits occurred in all countries. The emergence of an urban bourgeoisie with 
different interests from the landed elites’ led to the appearance of new political parties or intra-
party factions that sought to promote those new interests through political competition or, where 
ineffective, through revolution (Yashar 1997; Collier 1999; Wood 2000). As Albertus 
(forthcoming) has recently noted, apart from the landed/urban split, Latin America also 
evidenced important elite splits due to the quest for autonomy of the armed forces, which 
resulted from the latter’s recruitment of middle and lower class members and/or from their 
professionalization. These two types of elite splits led not only to increased political competition 
or revolutionary outbursts, but also to autocratic regimes with power coalitions that did not 
include the landed elites and that dismissed their interests (Albertus forthcoming). 
In part, land reform may be explained as a result of those inter or intra elite splits, since 
they led to the political mobilization of the lower classes in search for votes or support of 
revolutions or autocracies, which in the case of peasants entailed addressing their land claims 
(Lapp 2004; Albertus forthcoming). Promises of land reform were especially attractive for non-
landed elites willing to promote industrialization and hence to decrease the price of agricultural 




reduced those prices and land values, and also generated urban unemployment that could be 
solved by promoting the return of workers to rural areas (LeGrand 1980, 1986). 
However, on their own, elite splits are not capable of explaining agrarian reforms, since 
the latter were not adopted in all countries where splits occurred (for instance, Argentina and 
Uruguay), and they took quite different shapes and scopes in the countries where they did. In all 
countries, elite splits created new opportunities for peasant grievances to be voiced in the 
political arena, and hence defined the timing of the emergence of agrarian reform claims. But it 
was the extent and content of peasants’ grievances that determined whether agrarian reforms 
would actually be enacted, as well as the level of radicalism they would adopt and the 
beneficiaries they would privilege, at least in their early implementation periods.  
 I argue that such grievances were caused by prior dispossessions and not by land 
inequality alone. This implies that, wherever land reforms were enacted, dispossessions should 
have been significant enough. And the justification of land reforms should more or less explicitly 
address prior dispossessions, and their implementation should preferentially benefit victims of 
dispossession. Moreover, the type of land rights targeted by dispossessions should explain 
variation in the enactment, content and scope of land reform legislation across countries. In the 
following pages I describe the three main trajectories that I hypothesize were followed by Latin 
American countries, depending on the type of land rights that dispossessions targeted during the 
export boom.  
In places where many of the lands coveted during the export boom were collectively 
owned by indigenous groups since the colony (like Mexico, Peru or Bolivia), dispossessions 
generated strong grievances that translated into more organized and radical claims for agrarian 




recognized and previously protected by the state, so dispossessions implied the use of fraud or 
legal manipulation, and they were eagerly resisted by victims through legal means—notably 
claims of rights protection before the courts and administrative institutions. When unsuccessful, 
such resistance generated a greater perception of illegitimacy of the distribution of property 
rights and the triggering of collective action mechanisms, which facilitated their subsequent 
mobilization for agrarian reform to adopt national dimensions. In these contexts, hence, 
mobilization for agrarian reform was stronger and promoted more radical land reforms both in 
terms of the scope of land allocations made on its basis and of the content of the legislation. This 
historical sequence corresponds to trajectory 1 in Table 2 below.  
In contrast, in places where most of the lands seized were public and empty or occupied 
by few and semi-nomadic populations (as in Argentina and Uruguay), dispossessions were not 
massive, and they were mainly carried out through violence, not fraud. Much as what happened 
in the United Sates during the colonization of the western frontier, since indigenous groups were 
treated as outsider communities that had to be submitted to the state’s authority, their claims to 
the lands were not recognized as valid by the state. So there was not a need to manipulate the law 
to carry out dispossessions because brute force (followed by the acquisition of a title) was 
enough to push prior occupiers out (Gaignard 1989; Halperín, 2005; Delrío 2010). Consequently, 
in these contexts, there was less resistance to dispossessions through the use of legal means—
notably claims of rights protection before courts and administrative institutions— even if 
resistance through violence was strong. In a subsequent period, land reform claims were very 
weak, since state violence exterminated or marginalized potential claimants, and their lack of 
entitlements recognized by the state made the new allocation of property rights less contested. 




cases not justified by prior dispossessions. Further, they were not strong enough to promote the 
enactment of land reform legislation, but in the best case scenario only of land colonization 
programs that granted very few lands.  This historical sequence corresponds to trajectory 2 in 
Table 2 below. 
An intermediate situation is provided by contexts in which land enclosures mainly 
targeted public lands that were occupied by a significant number of peasant settlers (colonos) 
whose individual possession rights were recognized by state laws as worthy of protection (as in 
Colombia and Brazil). The dispossession of these lands generated significant grievances 
resulting from the state’s recognition of possession rights, which translated into petitions for 
protection before state authorities. However, the weakness of possession rights made their 
violation easy through a combination of force and legal manipulation.  This led peasants to 
collectively organize make claims of protection before state institutions, but also to adopt de 
facto forms of resistance, such as land seizures. Settlers’ grievances of dispossession were strong 
enough to promote the enactment of land reform legislation and to become the main beneficiaries 
of the land allocations made on their basis; yet, they were not as strong as to make that 
legislation be radical in content or as generous in scope. This historical sequence corresponds to 











Table 2. Hypothesized Relation between Land Rights Targeted by Dispossessions  
and Land Reform Outcomes 
 
As can be seen, Table 2 illustrates the end points of the three hypothesized historical 
trajectories of rural conflict and agrarian reform, which are linked by the mechanisms specified 
in Table 1 above. Note that the table does not contemplate cases in which dispossessions mainly 
targeted individually owned lands, collectively possessed lands or individual de facto 
occupations. This does not mean that such dispossessions did not occur, but rather that, 
according to the secondary literature consulted to create the typology, there do not seem to be 
any Latin American cases where those were the main type of dispossessions. In any case, the 
table captures all variation in terms of the strength or certainty of land rights (ownership, 
possession, occupation) which is hypothesized to be the main variable predicting land reform 
claims and outcomes. Also, it is important to note that the trajectories attempt to capture the 
basic causal sequences occurring in the region in a simplified and stylized way, so it is likely that 
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many actual cases do not fully fit into one category or do not fully comply with the causal links 
established therein. Further, the sequences are mainly intended to explain country trajectories, 
but it is likely that there was important intra-country variation and that the sequences also serve 
to explain it. 
The gist of my argument is not only that massive land dispossessions generated future 
land reform claims but also that the type of rights that those dispossessions targeted defined the 
content and scope of land reform policies that addressed such claims. In turn, those rights had 
been allocated long before the critical era of dispossessions, so it can be said that such allocation 
had enduring effects on rural conflict in Latin America. The fact that the colonial and early post-
independence governments recognized legal land rights to the rural poor implied that their 
exclusion from such rights when lands became valuable would be far from quiet. Because they 
felt legally entitled to their lands and to the protection that the state had once afforded to them, 
peasants resisted to dispossessions and demanded the return of what was theirs. Hence, the land 
rights allocated as early as in the 1600s influenced rural mobilization and agrarian reform 
policies in the 20th century. Indeed, not only did stronger and more certain land rights generate 
greater peasant mobilization for land reform; they also generated particularly radical land reform 
contents.  
In the next chapter, I formulate the specific predictions derived from the theory, and 






Chapter 2: Research Design 
 
In Chapter 1, I offered a theory of the origins of from-below claims of land redistribution, their 
strength, and the scope and content of the legislation they push forth. In a nutshell, I argue that 
the dispossession (or theft) of lands occupied by poor peasants is a key cause of redistributive 
land claims. In countries where dispossessions were massive, we should observe peasant 
mobilization promoting the enactment of redistributive land reforms when political opportunities 
emerge for the voicing of their claims. When enacted, we should further observe those reforms 
rhetorically and practically addressing prior dispossessions, by referring to them in their 
justifications and by privileging victims of dispossession through earlier and more abundant land 
allocations. I also argue that the target of dispossessions is crucial for explaining variation in the 
level of mobilization for land reform and in the enactment, content and scope of land reform 
legislation across countries. The stronger and more certain the rights to the lands occupied by the 
victims of dispossession, the stronger the future mobilization and the more radical the land 
reform legislation it promotes (both in the books and in action).  
 To apply the theory, I proposed a methodological strategy consisting in the identification 
of critical eras for the political economy of land, in which massive dispossessions are likely to 
occur due to the increase in land values and the creation of incentives for their appropriation by 
landed elites or entrepreneurs. I argued that Latin America’s first export boom (1870s-1920s) 
constituted one such era, and that it defined distinct trajectories of rural conflict in the different 
countries, depending on the extent and targets of dispossessions. I further argued that the boom 
had enduring legacies on claims for land redistribution in the different trajectories. In all Latin 




land claims and for their catering by political elites. However, the mobilization for voicing those 
claims and the land reform legislation that it promoted varied depending on the type of land 
rights that had been attacked by dispossessions in the previous period.  
In this chapter I describe the research design that I devised to apply the theory through 
this methodological strategy. I first justify the selection of cases. After that, I identify the 
predictions, methods, indicators and data sources selected for each level of analysis—cross-
country and subnational. I finish by describing the field work that I carried out to gather the data.  
 
Case selection 
In order to explore the theory at the national level, I needed to choose countries that differed in 
the historical trajectories of rural conflict and land redistribution depicted in Tables 1 and 2 of 
Chapter 1. In order to explore it at the subnational level, I needed countries that also evidenced 
the enactment of land reforms in the 20th century, such that I could test the predicted relation 
between the implementation of land reform and prior dispossessions.  
 I selected Mexico and Colombia as my two main cases because they were good 
candidates for both purposes. According to the theory, they belong to trajectories 1 and 2, 
respectively. Hence, they should present variation in the type of land rights mainly targeted by 
dispossessions during the export boom—collective ownership and individual possession, 
respectively, according to the theory. Moreover, one should be able to find data on land 
allocations made on the grounds of agrarian reform policies, since such policies were enacted 
and implemented in both. This enabled me to test the theory at the subnational level by 




The emphasis on Mexico and Colombia does not mean that the predictions for trajectory 
3 were not tested at all. In the final chapter of the dissertation, I contrast the trajectories of the 
two main cases with Argentina, on the basis of secondary sources and legislation. I did not study 
the Argentine case at the same level of detail because, as the theory predicts—and basic evidence 
confirms—in countries that underwent trajectory 3 no agrarian reform legislation was issued, so 
it is not possible to obtain data on agrarian reform land allocations; in the best of cases, one can 
find information about very few allocations made through colonization programs, which offer 







Across countries, my main prediction is that the more dispossessions attacked lands with 
stronger and more certain legal rights during the critical era, the stronger the subsequent 
peasant mobilization for land reform and the more radical the ensuing land reform legislation. 
This prediction requires that the countries that I selected to compare actually comply with the 
characterization of dispossessions and land reform mobilization and legislation that I 
hypothesize, such that they indeed belong to the historical trajectories identified in Table 2 of 
Chapter 1.  
This implies that Mexico, hypothesized to belong to trajectory 1, should exhibit a higher 
number of dispossessions during the first export boom (1870s-1920s), and those dispossessions 
should mainly attack lands owned by indigenous/peasant groups. It further implies that 
mobilization for land reform should be stronger and land reform legislation more radical in 




belong to trajectory 2, should exhibit an important (though lower) amount of dispossessions 
during the boom, and those dispossessions should mainly attack lands possessed by peasant 
settlers of the agrarian frontier. Consequently, later mobilization for land reform should be 
weaker in Colombia than in Mexico, and land reform legislation should be less radical in content 
and less generous in scope. Finally, in Argentina, hypothesized to belong to trajectory 3, 
dispossessions should be fewer and should have mostly attacked lands occupied de facto by 
indigenous groups not incorporated into the nation. As a result, mobilization should be very 
weak, not necessarily connected to prior dispossessions and not strong enough to promote the 
enactment of specific land reform legislation—though some colonization programs could exist.  
Diagram 3 illustrates the expected relation between the type of rights targeted by 
dispossessions and agrarian reform outcomes in the three countries: 
 
Diagram 3. Expected Relation between Dispossessions of Previous Rights  







The theory thus requires that the different countries in Latin America actually fit the 
historical sequences specified in Table 2 (Chapter 1), depending on the scope and main target of 
dispossessions experienced during the export boom. But it moreover requires that, for each 
country, we observe the main causal links specified in Table 1 (Chapter 1) that connect prior 
dispossessions against particular types of rights with the subsequent mobilization for and content 
of land reform.  
Thus, for Mexico, we should observe that dispossessions against collectively owned lands 
were carried out through legal manipulation (more than through force), and that they were 
mainly resisted through legal (versus de facto) means. For Colombia, we should observe that 
dispossessions against public lands possessed by peasant settlers were carried out both through 
legal manipulation and some violence, and that their victims resisted them through both de jure 
and de facto means. Finally, for Argentina, we should observe that the dispossessions targeting 
collectively occupied lands were mainly carried out through violence, and basically resisted 
through force.  
 
Method 
To test these predictions, I decided to develop qualitative case studies, so as to check whether 
countries fit in the predicted sequences and exhibit the causal mechanisms linking them. 
However, such case studies are not only based on secondary literature. The latter is quite good in 
indicating general patterns of dispossessions during the critical era, as well as in offering 
examples or subnational case analyses. But secondary literature rarely provides enough evidence 




Since such information is crucial for testing my theory across countries, recourse to primary data 
found in legislation and original archival sources seemed inevitable.  
 
Data Sources and Indicators 
 
Legislation 
Analysis of legislation allowed me to understand, first, the de jure mechanisms through which 
land dispossessions against legal rights may have been carried out during the export boom. 
According to historians, liberal legislation attempting to fragment corporate ownership and to 
privatize public property was used and abused by landed elites and entrepreneurs, in collusion 
with local state authorities, to bring about and legalize dispossessions. However, as we will see, 
the use of these types of legislation varied significantly across countries.  
Second, analysis of legislation allowed me to establish the level of radicalism of land 
reform legislation at the moment of elite splits (1910s-60s). Numbers of land allocations and 
beneficiaries of land reform programs are relevant to grasp their scope, but not necessarily the 
influence of past grievances on their content. Even if land reforms across countries have similar 
numbers of land allocations or beneficiaries, they may differ significantly in their connection to 
prior dispossessions and in their level of radicalism—which, I argue, results from such 
connection. So it is important to characterize land reform legislation on the basis of its 
radicalism.  
In order to evaluate the level of radicalism of land reforms in the books, I have developed 





(i) The exceptionality of the enactment process: legislations that were enacted 
through revolutionary or populist processes are considered more radical than those 
enacted by democratic or traditional authoritarian ones. 
 
(ii) The type of lands mainly targeted by redistribution: the expropriation of private 
estates is considered more radical than the allocation of public unoccupied lands. 
 
(iii) The procedure through which lands to be redistributed are obtained: the 
confiscation or the expropriation without prior compensation of private lands is 
considered more radical than the expropriation with prior compensation of those 
lands, and the latter is considered more radical than the use of public lands already 
owned by the state. 
 
(iv) The procedure used to allocate lands: short administrative procedures are 
considered more radical than ordinary judicial procedures that protect the right to 
defense and require full evidence. 
 
(v) The land tenure of allocated lands: the allocation of collective and inalienable 
rights is considered more radical than the allocation of individual alienable rights, 
and the latter is considered more radical than the allocation of tenancy rights.   
 
Table 3 depicts the characteristics of land reforms expected in each of the theorized historical 










































































































































Archival Sources  
The law in the books may differ significantly from the law in action. As said in Chapter 1, 
legislation used to fragment and privatize collective and public lands during the export boom 
likely contained clauses protecting occupants, but it was also likely used to carry out 
dispossessions. So it is important to determine through adequate archival sources whether the 
latter actually happened, as well as their extent, location and targets. On the other hand, land 
reforms may be radical in the books but remain poorly implemented, so it is important to also 
determine to what extent they were applied and benefited regions where dispossessions occurred. 
Archival research is also necessary for confirming whether the causal mechanisms connecting 
dispossessions to subsequent land reform claims indeed occurred.  
To achieve these aims, I decided to use as indicator of dispossessions (the independent 
variable) petitions made before state authorities during the export boom, which involve 
land conflicts that depict actual dispossessions or potential threats. This is, most likely, a 
conservative estimate of dispossessions, since it only captures those against which victims 
attempted to defend themselves. But it is, at once, a precise measure of the legal resistance of 
victims to dispossession, since the petitions were the means through which victims claimed 
protection before state institutions. Consequently, this indicator adequately captures the role of 
the state highlighted by my theory, since a relevant factor turning dispossessions into grievances 
is the unsuccessful attempt to obtain state protection. Moreover, these petitions are likely to 
indicate the type of legal rights that petitioners have to the land, which also allows to establish a 
key element of the theory: the target of dispossessions.  
The particular nature of petitions of state protection against dispossession differs from 




were made from throughout the national territory, and hence offer a comprehensive sample. In 
this, the petitions are a better indicator of dispossessions than the reconstruction of land tenure 
patterns before and after the export boom. Such reconstruction requires the use of data found in 
land censuses, cadasters, notaries and public registries. However, these institutions (with the 
exception of notaries) were at their infancy in the period under consideration (1870s-1920s), 
which is acknowledged as the period of state formation in the region. So the data is not always 
available (as with cadasters and registries), and when it is, it is only available at the local level 
and is likely incomplete (as happens with notaries’ archives). Also, the available data at the 
national level (such as that found in censuses) does not specify the types of land tenure.  
In order to comply with the requirement of involving a comprehensive national sample, I 
decided to use petitions made before national-level authorities, and to make sure that the process 
through which petitions were made was simple and not very expensive, so that poor people 
living in faraway areas had access to them. As will be seen in more detail in the following 
chapters, the petitions that comply with these conditions consist in demands of copies of land 
titles made before the Mexican General Archive between 1867 and 1910, in the case of Mexico, 
and correspondence directed to the executive national authorities concerning land conflicts 
between 1827 and 1930, in the case of Colombia.  
 Since petitions of state protection against dispossession are considered a measure not 
only of dispossessions but also of the legal resistance to dispossessions exercised by victims, 
they can be contrasted with de facto forms of resistance against dispossessions. I did so by 
gathering a sample of peasant protests, riots and rebellions during the export boom, reported 
by secondary sources. As will be seen, this allowed me to establish that, as predicted by Table 1 




resistance to them, such that dispossessions attacking stronger rights generated more legal than 
de facto forms of resistance. In turn, this allowed me to show that, in contrast with what the 
existing literature has argued, peasants did not only or mainly make land claims through de facto 
forms of contentious action, but also through legal procedures, which show their sense of 
entitlement and self-acknowledgement as citizens with rights.  
 Finally, petitions of protection against dispossession have the advantage of being at a 
very low level of analysis—the village in the Mexican case, the municipality in the Colombian 
case—so they may be used not only to illustrate the general patterns of dispossession but also—
as argued in the next section—to test their geographical and quantitative relation to land reform 
claims.  
 
On the other hand, I use as indicator of land reform claims (the dependent variable) not 
only the level and location of peasant mobilization before and during the enactment of agrarian 
reform laws—as found in secondary sources—but also the amount of early land allocations 
made on the basis of land reform legislation, and/or the number of their beneficiaries. 
Allocations are a good indicator of land redistribution claims because they are generally made on 
demand, and hence they constitute a response to land claims instead of from-above decisions. 
Further, allocations are found at a very micro level of analysis—villages in the Mexican case, 
municipalities in the Colombian case—so it is possible to use them for quantitative subnational 
analyses as well as for qualitative cross-national ones. Finally, allocations offer a comprehensive 
set of cases at the national level—which is not always the case of land reform claims—which, 




I focus on the first land reform legislation issued in each country after the export boom, 
and to only analyze early land allocations (those made in the first 20 or 30 years of the enactment 
of the land reform). The rationale behind these decisions is that the connection between such 
allocations and prior dispossessions should be especially clear in that period. Indeed, if such 
connection exists, then early land allocations should clearly respond to prior dispossessions by 
privileging the regions where they occurred the most. Further, other political phenomena 
potentially interfering with land reform implementation are less likely to be present in the earlier 
period. In fact, I used as the end date of measurable land allocations relevant political 
phenomena that may have changed the legal or political grounds for land allocations in each 
context.   
In Mexico, the first land reform was enacted in 1915 under the revolutionary government 
of Venustiano Carranza. The end point of its early implementation is the beginning of Lázaro 
Cárdenas’s administration (1934-40), unanimously considered the country’s most progressive 
president, as well as the period in which land reform allocations were most abundant. Historians 
and social scientists explain this as a result of the land reform adopting a political dynamic of its 
own, with local and regional leaders politically mobilizing potential beneficiaries in exchange of 
their support (see, for instance, Falcón 1978). In Colombia, in turn, the first land reform was 
enacted in 1936 under the liberal government of Alfonso López Pumarejo. The end point of its 
implementation was the enactment of a new land reform law with a different justification and 
logic, which took place in 1961. In Argentina, even though a land reform was never enacted, 
legislation promoting the colonization of public empty lands was enacted in 1940 and 








Apart from the general descriptive trends expected to be observed at the macro level, my theory 
predicts, at the subnational level, that the greater the land dispossessions during the export 
boom, the greater the claims for land redistribution in the subsequent period. This implies that, 
within each country, regardless of the type of rights targeted by dispossessions, we should find a 
robust relation between dispossessions—measured through the petitions of state protection 
described above—and land reform allocations—used, as said, as a proxy of claims.  
 
Method 
The method that I chose to test the subnational level prediction consists in a combination of GIS 
geo-referencing and quantitative analyses of the archival data gathered. This combination 
allowed me to test whether the hypothesized relation between dispossessions and subsequent 
land reform claims is both geographically evident and statistically significant.  
Through GIS geo-referencing, I created maps of the location of the export boom, of land 
dispossessions during that period, and of land reform claims in the aftermath. As we will see, 
those maps attest to the geographical coincidence of all those phenomena, and hence to the 
general plausibility of my hypothesis. Further I created maps with additional data on the 
distribution of different forms of land tenure prior to the export boom, peasants’ violent 
resistance to dispossessions and mobilization for land reform. All these maps help illustrate the 
historical sequences followed by each of the cases under study, and thus also provide support to 




Through statistical analysis, in turn, I assessed whether geographical coincidences are not 
spurious. As said, the archival data that I collected is at a micro level of analysis—the municipal 
and even in some cases the sub municipal level. This allowed me to test the correlation between 
land reform claims and prior dispossessions with precision. For that purpose, I first merged the 
datasets corresponding to the independent and dependent variables, which in the Mexican case 
required the use of GIS. Indeed, because each dataset referred to a different time period in which 
political units were different, I merged the datasets using the coordinates of the claimants of 
protection of dispossession, on the one hand, and of the beneficiaries of agrarian reform, on the 
other. I subsequently ran simple OLS models that include a series of control variables—such as 
population, distance to post-colonial institutions, land fertility and suitability, and other historical 
and geographical variables—as well as state level fixed effects.  
On the other hand, when possible, I also used statistical analysis to assess the micro-
foundations of the theory, by testing some of the alternative causal mechanisms that could be 
operating in place of dispossessions—notably the preexistent collective action structure of 
peasants in the Mexican case, and the allocation of public lands in the Colombian case.  
 
Field Research and Data Coding 
The data collection that I carried out for this dissertation took me around 18 months of intense 
field work in Mexico City, Bogotá and Buenos Aires. In each place, I conducted preliminary 
interviews with several historians and archivists—all mentioned in the acknowledgments—who 
helped me identify all the relevant secondary sources and archival data that I could use for the 
purposes described above. I then spent many long days in the National General Archives of the 




documents that I would later use to construct my datasets, as well as of many others that I found 
relevant or interesting. By the end of my field research I had taken more than 100,000 pictures 
(!), probably more than I will ever be able to analyze.  
 
 The data coding was also long and challenging. For each country, I had to code all the 
pictures of documents containing petitions of protection against dispossessions and government 
decisions of land allocations. In many cases those documents were handwritten and difficult to 
read. Moreover, as will be seen in the following chapters, the content of the documents was 
carefully analyzed, so as to be able to extract from them as much qualitative information as 
possible about the characteristics of dispossessions and the claims of protection of victims, as 
well as about the claims of land reform. As mentioned in the acknowledgements, I was very 
fortunate to count on the help of several research assistants to accomplish the task. After 
elaborating the datasets and training the assistants, I supervised and corrected their coding labor 
frequently.  
 There are still a lot of archival documents that I have not finished analyzing. These 
include all those related to the Argentine case—everything that I could find related to land 
appropriations during the export boom and to rural mobilization and land allocations made by the 
government through programs of colonization in the following period—as well as the judicial 
cases concerning land conflicts that reached the Supreme Courts of the three cases—which are 
all coded now but still require cleaning and analysis. I plan to include all these data in the book 






Chapter 3: The Mexican Path 
 
John Womack (1968, 371) recounts that when Emiliano Zapata—the immortal peasant leader of 
the Mexican revolution—departed with his village’s followers to join the revolution, he hid a tin 
can under the floor of the village’s church to keep it from being lost. The can contained the legal 
titles that supported the village’s claim to the collective property of its lands. It had been guarded 
by the elders of the village since they first requested the titles’ copies from the National Archive 
in the middle of the 19th century to protect their lands from estates’ encroachments (Hernández 
1993, 23). And it had been handed on to Zapata when the village council had decided to charge 
him with the mission to defend the village’s lands, which had become more momentous but also 
more difficult than ever because of the systematic encroachments to which the village had been 
submitted since sugar cultivation had become a commercial enterprise and since, hence, land had 
been desperately coveted by large landowners.  
Zapata and his village members decided to join the revolution when they heard that 
Francisco Madero had promised in its launching Plan that the lands that had been arbitrarily 
dispossessed would be restituted to their primordial owners.1 They were soon joined by many 
                                                      
1 According to the Potosí Plan of October 5, 1910:  
“Abusing of the law of public waste lands (baldíos), numerous small owners, mostly indigenous, 
have been despoiled of their terrains, by agreement of the Development Agency (Secretaría de 
Fomento) or by rulings of the Republic’s tribunals. Being in all justice to restitute prior 
possessors the terrains from which they were despoiled in such an arbitrary way, those decisions 
and rulings are declared subject to revision and those who acquired them in such an immoral way, 
or their heirs, will be required to restore them to their primordial owners, who will also be paid 




other peasants from Morelos and other states mainly from the Center-south of the country, who 
also identified themselves as dispossessed villagers. Recovering their lands was the main 
motivation for Zapatistas to join the revolution in 1911; and later to oppose its leaders for not 
fulfilling their original land promises2, which contributed to the civil strife between revolutionary 
factions between 1912 and 1920.  
The land reform that the revolutionary government enacted in 1915 and raised to 
constitutional level in 1917 was explicitly justified as a necessary measure to redress land 
dispossessions carried out during Porfirio Díaz’ dictatorship (1876-1910). Thus, Zapatistas’ 
grievances of dispossession became not only the mythical banner for the peasant revolutionary 
struggle beyond Morelos; they were also adopted as the official rhetoric of the revolutionary land 
reform program.  
The protagonists and ideologues of the revolution were not the only ones to defend the 
connection between dispossessions and the enactment of the land reform. Many renowned 
historians endorsed the notion that the key agrarian grievance that mobilized peasants to join the 
revolution and to later claim land reform was the widespread land dispossessions occurred under 
the Porfirian dictatorship (González Roa 1919; McBride 1923; Tannenbaum 1930; Simpson 
1937; Silva Herzog 1959; González Navarro 1985; Knight 1986). 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Only in case those terrains have passed onto a third person before the issuing of this plan, will 
prior owners receive compensation [instead of the land itself] from those who benefited from the 
usurpation.” 
2 According to the Ayala Plan of November 25, 1911, in which Zapatistas declared themselves in 
rebellion with respect to the revolutionary government: “(…)the villages [pueblos] or citizens who have 
Titles corresponding to the lands, scrublands and waters which landlords [hacendados], scientists 
[científicos], or bosses [caciques] have usurped in the shadow of tyranny and venal justice will of course 
immediately enter into possession of that real estate, of which they have been dispossessed by the bad 
faith of our oppressors, maintaining that possession at all costs, with weapons in hand, and the usurpers 
who consider themselves with a right to them [those properties] will define it before the special tribunals 




However, in recent decades this account has been criticized and disparagingly labeled as 
the official or populist account of the revolution. As Romana Falcón (1987) notes, after the 1968 
Tlatelolco massacre of students by the PRI, the hopes on the revolution faded and many 
historians adopted a revisionist perspective. Under such new framework, the populist account on 
the agrarian component of the revolution was submitted to severe scrutiny. For the critics, 
historians bought the rhetoric of the revolution according to which the latter had addressed the 
peasants’ claims for land restitution, even though revolutionary governments betrayed peasants 
who struggled for the revolution since the beginning, by not fulfilling their land reform promises, 
persecuting Zapata and later withholding substantial land allocation at least until the populist 
government of Cárdenas (1934-40). Further, the official account over-emphasized the role 
played by peasants during the revolution and the relevance of their land claims, which were 
really exceptional and restricted to the Zapatista movement in Morelos.  
The impact of these critiques led Alan Knight to include the following statement in his 
1986 monumental work on the Revolution, which endorses the populist account:“the Mexican 
Revolution found its energies in the villages and the millions who fought were primarily moved 
by the idea of ‘land reform’. This is not quite the platitude it may seem –or would have seemed 
twenty years ago. Recently, historians have been at pains to de-emphasize, sometimes to 
eliminate altogether, the role of autonomous, agrarian revolt in the Revolution of 1910-20.” (p. 
78).  
 I believe Knight is right. Neglecting the causal role of peasants’ claims for land in the 
explanation of the revolution and of the latter’s enactment and implementation of the land reform 
seems at odds with key facts and narratives. However, the classical account has not provided 




Further, at times the classical account has not fully spelled out the mechanisms that led land 
dispossessions under the Porfiriato to engender claims for agrarian reform during the revolution. 
While more recent studies by Sanderson (1984) and Dell (2012) have empirically shown a link 
between revolutionary insurgency and agrarian reform land allocations, they have not examined 
the role of prior dispossessions in explaining such link. This is another way of challenging the 
revisionist’s view, insofar as it allows to show that the Revolution did address the land claims of 
peasants, at least in its early stages.  
This chapter and the following one attempt to do so, hence offering more solid empirical 
grounds and a more fine-grained theoretical explanation to the populist story. Applying the 
theory and research design formulated in Chapters 1 and 2 to the Mexican case, I explore the 
causal relation between the revolutionary land reform and prior dispossessions. In this chapter, 
through an in-depth revision of secondary literature and archival sources, I qualitatively show 
that the period of 1877-1910 was a critical era of export agriculture and land dispossessions, that 
most dispossessions targeted lands collectively owned by indigenous/peasant groups3, and that 
such dispossessions drove the peasant mobilization that supported the Mexican revolution and 
pushed for the latter’s enactment and early implementation of the land reform. In the following 
chapter, using a novel dataset of threats of dispossession during the export boom and of early 
                                                      
3 As mentioned in the Glossary, I use the expression indigenous/peasant groups to refer to groups with 
indigenous antecedents and collective ownership that may have become more distinctively peasants with 
the passage of time. In the Mexican case, as we will see, those groups received collective land allocations 
during the colony as indigenous villages (pueblos de indios). But with the passage of time they became 
less distinctively ethnic than peasant, due to cross/breeding and their conversion to Catholicism. After 
Independence, they retained a special status as distinct political units with certain autonomy and 






agrarian reform land allocations, I quantitatively show that the latter are strongly correlated with 
the former at the subnational level.  
 
The Export Boom Era (1877-1907) 
As a result of the international demand for agricultural products, commercial agriculture 
expanded dramatically in Mexico in the late 19th century. Production exhibited a sustained 
tendency to grow since 1877, which was particularly marked between 1892 and 1907, when it 
began to decline. This pattern was driven by export crops, notably sugar, cotton, coffee, vanilla, 
henequen, which as a whole increased their annual value by 6% between 1895 and 1910. Exports 
also promoted a surge in consumption agriculture, with domestic products like corn and beans 
increasing by 3% (Kuntz 2010, 329-31).  
As Map 1 illustrates, agricultural products at the height of the boom (1900) were 
concentrated in the central and southern regions, while cattle was more predominant in the north. 
The expansion of commercial agriculture was facilitated by the development of the railroad 












Map 1. Agricultural and Cattle Exports in Mexico (1900) 




Map 2. Railroad System in Mexico (1910) 






Liberal Land Legislation 
According to many historians, the economic changes promoted by the export boom greatly 
influenced the government’s decision to eagerly implement the policies of disentailment 
(fragmentation) of corporate lands and privatization of public lands, which would enable the 
lands’ conversion into individual, private and transferable property, and hence their commercial 
exploitation. Although these policies had been enacted since the mid-19th century (1856 and 
1863, respectively), they had not been evenly implemented. But the pull for lands during the 
export boom and the strengthening of the state under Porfirio Díaz’s dictatorship (1876-1910) 
generated both the incentives and the capacity to implement the laws. Further, the incentives 
generated by land values and export demand promoted the manipulative application of liberal 
land laws by local and national officials for the benefit of estates (haciendas) which could, 
through dispossessions, engross their properties and obtain labor supply from the dispossessed 
(Tannenbaum 1930; Knight 1986). 
 
Disentailment of Corporate Lands 
This policy was ordered by the Law of 25 June, 1856 under Juárez’s liberal government. It had 
the main purpose of putting into the market the lands of the church, which were considered 
unproductive (“dead hands” assets); but its absolute prohibition of corporate ownership covered 
other civil corporations, i.e. indigenous groups that had received collective land titles under the 
colony—deeds, concessions, compositions, among others (Kourí 2002, 79).  
As noted in Chapter 1, according to Coatsworth (2008) and Prados de la Escosura (2003), 
during the colonial period (15th to early 19th century) the Spanish crown allocated great amounts 




Latin America. This protection had the strategic purpose of counterbalancing the power of local 
elites. But it also obeyed a segregationist and paternalistic ideology that entailed the seclusion of 
Indians in separate spaces and their submission to the tutelage of special authorities. In Mexico, 
such seclusion had Indian Republics as its ultimate ideal (Lira 1995); it mainly consisted in 
indigenous villages (pueblos), and to a lesser extent in other types of indigenous corporate 
organizations, such as congregations (congregaciones), hamlets (rancherías) and tribes 
(cacicazgos). All these corporations found their antecedents in pre-colonial forms of collective 
organization, notably the calpulli (McBride 1923). They were territorial units that did not only 
own the lands collectively, but also had political authority and collective legal personality. 
Indeed, pueblos could elect their own representatives, decide local matters autonomously and 
ordinarily pool resources to achieve their collective aims (Hernández 1993; Escobar 1993; Kourí 
2011). They related to the colonial authorities as collectives, not individuals, which implied, 
among other things, that they sought the protection of special tutelage authorities (mainly the 
Courts of Indians) as collective legal personas (Lira 1995; Kourí 2002). 
With the proclamation of independence (1810), the equality of indigenous was 
proclaimed and special jurisdictions were abolished. However, corporate forms of property were 
maintained, in many cases well into the 19th century (Lira 1995, 21; Kourí 2002, 80). Indeed, 
local governments continued to apply colonial laws for a long period of time and, even when 
they were replaced by laws that established the equality of indigenous, their collective 
organization was maintained de facto. By the mid-19th century, indigenous groups no longer had 
a homogenous ethnic composition due to inter-ethnic relations (mestizaje) and their conversion 
to Catholicism. Their ethnic attribute began to fade and was replaced by the more socioeconomic 




political standing were still recognized and protected on the basis of colonial titles and laws (see 
Womack 1968; Knight 1986; Hernández 1993; Kourí 2002).  
The law of disentailment implied that both the collective ownership and the legal and 
political standing of indigenous/peasant corporations were to be abolished. While the law 
disposed that corporate assets should be offered in sale to their tenants, or else auctioned, its later 
regulations specified that in the case of indigenous corporations whose lands cost less than 200 
pesos, the lands should be equally distributed among members at no cost other than those of the 
division process. Further, the law excluded from disentailment the lands used for public purposes 
(population centers or fundos legales) and those cultivated in common (ejidos). 
Church property was actively seized and sold to tenants by the central government since 
the enactment of the law, but the disentailment of indigenous lands was a slower and more 
irregular process. The 1856 law gave the states jurisdiction to enact and implement the 
regulations, but many did not enact them immediately and those that did only implemented them 
in a few cases. However, as the export boom began, so did disentailment processes. By 1868 
most states had enacted regulations, but many excluded communal lands from the requirement, 
so in 1890 the federal government ordered their immediate disentailment (Marino 2001, 41). 
According to historians, state authorities, allied with neighboring landowners, issued and applied 
disentailment laws in abusive ways, which enabled them to seize most of the disentailed lands.4 
Indigenous groups (in some or many cases, depending on the source) resisted disentailment not 
                                                      
4  The abuses could include: the de facto appropriation of lands susceptible of disentailment by non-group 
members (especially neighboring haciendas) by challenging the validity or boundaries of village titles; 
the disentailment of ejido lands before this was authorized; the disentailment of population centers despite 
the prohibition; the unequal distribution of disentailed lands among corporation members or their 
allocation to non-members, and the pressure from individual beneficiaries of the allocation of disentailed 





only through rebellions but also through appeals to the national government and to courts 
requesting their recognition as collective right-bearers. They also adopted legal strategies to 
retain corporate property under different legal pretexts.5 However, these strategies eventually 
became inefficacious in the face of hacienda pressure. In part, this was the result of authorities’ 
siding with landowners and legalizing their abuses; but it was also the result of the lands’ regular 
entrance into the market.6   
Because of the decentralized nature of the disentailment policy, to date there is no general 
knowledge about its overall impact: it is not clear how many lands were fragmented, when 
precisely were they fragmented, which groups benefitted the most from the process, or to what 
extent disentailment entailed dispossessions (Kourí 2002, 73; Knight 1986, 97).7 But we do 
know where most indigenous collective ownership existed in 1800, which is a good proxy for the 
places where disentailment was likely to happen the most. Map 3 shows the location of 
indigenous villages (pueblos), the most prominent form of indigenous corporations owning land.   
As can be seen, pueblos were predominant in Mexico’s central and central-southern 
regions. In contrast, in most of the north and the mountainous regions, indigenous groups were 
fewer, scattered and often nomad, so the lands they occupied were rarely recognized as collective 
                                                      
5 Such as continuing a de facto corporate administration of their lands, or creating cooperatives or 
anonymous societies to retain their legal standing as corporations. See, among others, Knowlton (1998); 
Escobar (1993), Marino (2001).  
6 According to Molina Enríquez (2001 [1909], 106), even in the absence of abuses, which certainly 
happened, disentailed lands were doomed to be acquired by haciendas because the elimination of 
corporate ownership’s inalienability led villagers to sell their individual plots for very cheap prices or 
even for “a few pitchers of pulque”. Knight (1986, 419) validates Molina’s view. 
7 Recent historical studies have been devoted to the analysis of the disentailment process at the regional 
level, attempting to unravel the concrete ways in which it operated, the resistances it faced and the 




property. Disentailment processes are thus likely to have happened mostly in the central and 
central-southern states.  
 
Map 3. Indigenous Collective Lands before Disentailment in Mexico (1800) 




Privatization of Public Lands 
In contrast with the disentailment policy, the privatization of public vacant lands (baldíos) was a 
federal effort promoted by the Development Agency. It had the concurrent objectives of 
enhancing economic growth and increasing the state’s revenue by surveying and subsequently 
alienating public lands.8 The Law of July 20, 1863 established that individuals could request the 
allocation of public lands of no more than 2,500 hectares by incurring in the costs of surveying 
                                                      
8 Surveying the lands was necessary since the state did not know how much it owned or where it was 
located. As in many other countries, the rule since the colony was that all lands that were not privately 
owned belonged to the state, but colonial titles were often unreliable because they did not clearly 




them and paying the established prices. But not many lands were thus allocated until the late 
1870s when “the rush for public land commence[d]” (Holden 1994, 9). Of the total 45.7 million 
hectares of public land transferred from 1867 to 1905, only 1.6 were so between 1867 and 1877; 
in the remaining years, 17.3 more were allocated through the 1863 law. In order to speed up the 
process of public land alienation, the government sponsored the December 15, 1883 Law. The 
law authorized the federal government to grant concessions to survey companies, which were to 
identify and demarcate public vacant lands over which there were no private titles, and would in 
exchange receive one-third of them.9 As a result, privatization sharply augmented, peaking in the 
1883-93 decade, in which companies received 18,484,964 hectares in compensation for the 
performed surveys.10 In total, companies received 47% of the transferred public lands, another 
40% were transferred via the claims process established by the 1863 Law, and the rest were 
already surveyed lands that the state sold.  
According to many historians, the application of baldíos laws promoted land speculation 
and massive dispossessions (see, among others, Orozco 1895; Molina 2001 [1909]; González 
Roa 1919; Tannennbaum 1930; Knight 1986, 95). Surveying companies (mostly foreign) had an 
incentive to declare as public vacant lands all those with imperfect or inexistent entitlements, 
even if they were occupied. And powerful individuals who knew the law could denounce such 
lands and demand their allocation. Occupied lands with fragile rights included those held by 
                                                      
9 The other two-thirds were auctioned by the government. See Knight (1986, 95); Holden (1994, 8, 12, 
83). This was an effective mechanism to overcome landlord resistance to surveying, since it encouraged 
companies to identify and demarcate as much public lands as possible. It also forced landholders to 
regularize their possessions; if they did not want to lose them to companies, they had to file a claim under 
the 1863 Law before a concession was granted. To avoid abuses, the law established that companies had 
to be authorized by federal district judges to initiate the survey procedure, and that those judges would 
also review oppositions. 
10 Which means that they must have surveyed more than 55 million hectares, corresponding to almost 




custom by indigenous groups since “times immemorial”. These groups could be victims of the 
baldíos laws even when they had sufficient land titles, since in the face of a denunciation, they 
had to defend in trial, and be submitted to judges’ biases in favor of economic and political 
influences.11 Consequently, the process of public land surveys contributed to corporate land 
dispossession; it also increased land concentration by allocating to survey companies an 
important amount of public lands, while selling the rest to landowners. 
Now, the magnitude of land dispossessions carried out by survey companies has been 
questioned by Holden. In his 1994 study, he confirmed that the process was sparked by land 
valorization and led to “the largest program of public land transfers in the nation’s history” 
(Holden 1994, 22). But, contrary to the “black legend” of the attack on communal property, 
overall survey companies tended to respect land that was titled or untitled but productively 
occupied.12 Indeed, companies did not need to recur to “piratic behavior” against communal 
property because there were plenty of truly vacant lands to survey, and surveying possibly 
private property was costly and risked engaging in uncertain judicial disputes (Holden 1994, 87-
90).   
As Map 4 illustrates, the great majority of public lands transferred by survey companies 
belonged to the northern and southern frontier states of Mexico: Baja California, Chihuahua, 
Sinaloa, Sonora, Campeche, Chiapas, Tabasco and Nayarit. If we compare Map 4 with Map 3, 
we can see that the survey of public lands occurred in areas of very low indigenous concentration 
                                                      
11 What Knight (1986, 95) calls the “vagaries of Porfirian justice”.  
12 Holden reviewed the records of six states where privatization via survey companies occurred the most 
and found that there were only 133 protests, while there were “vastly more numerous” instances of 




where, as Holden claims, there were incentives to appropriate lands but not as many to 
dispossess pre-existent owners or possessors.   
 
Map 4. Public Land Transfers by Survey Companies in Mexico (1867-1900) 













The fact that the operation of survey companies did not imply significant dispossessions 
does not mean that the latter did not take place; it rather indicates that, if they indeed occurred, 
they did so in areas of dense indigenous corporate ownership. Also, dispossessions must have 
occurred mainly through processes different from the survey of public lands by companies. Such 
processes may include disentailment, as well as other de jure processes, such as fraudulent or 
forced sales at low prices. But they could also include the procedure for the privatization of 




small patches of public lands adjacent to private ones. As said, almost half of the public lands 
were privatized through this process. And this was the process through which haciendas 
dispossessed neighboring pueblos in some of the most well-known cases—notably Morelos, the 
state of Zapata, where many villages complained that haciendas were claiming their adjacent 
lands as public, ignoring villages’ ancient titles or arguing that they did not cover requested 
lands.  
 
In conclusion, on the basis of historical studies, we expect dispossessions occurring 
during the export boom to have mainly attacked lands collectively owned by indigenous/peasant 
groups. Indeed, historians refer to the manipulative use of the legislation on the privatization of 
public lands as one of the main ways through which dispossessions were carried out. But this 
does not seem to have been the case of the procedures involving the survey of public lands by 
companies—which mainly took place in areas of low population density and low presence of 
indigenous/peasant groups. So, if the privatization of public lands was used to dispossess, it was 
so through the procedure of private claims of neighboring public lands, which was mostly carried 
out in places with high levels of private ownership where public lands did not constitute large 
land extensions but were the land remnants in-between different properties. A similar reasoning 
applies to the other processes through which dispossessions were likely carried out: 
disentailment and fraudulent sales. As said, these were also likely carried out in places where 
indigenous/peasant collective ownership was high. Historians do not report dispossessions 







To get a sense of the magnitude of dispossessions during this period and the type of rights that 
they targeted, I analyzed the so far unexplored Mexican Archivo de Buscas, which contains all 
petitions for certified copies of land titles that were made before the National Archive since 
1867—when the Archive was created.13 This archive was a centralized repository of titles in 
Mexico city to which people could recur either to search for titles—mainly colonial and post-
colonial grants kept by the government—or to donate a copy and obtain a certificate of 
authenticity. Even though people could claim land title copies for a variety of reasons, it is 
plausible to assume that they mainly did so to protect their property from actual or potential 
encroachments, or to encroach upon other lands. Indeed, the majority of reviewed petitions that 
spelled out the reasons for requesting titles indicated that the motivation was to defend or protect 
land rights.14 Hence, the petitions may be used as an indicator of conflicts over the property or 
possession of lands, and more precisely of threats of dispossession whenever the requested titles 
were made by indigenous/peasants. 
This indicator provides an approximate illustration of the extent and regional distribution 
of land conflicts, since petitions were easy to make and not prohibitively expensive. According 
                                                      
13 The research on the Archivo de Buscas made possible thanks to the fantastic assistance of Valentín 
Figueroa, who helped me code all the petitions appearing in the catalog, as well as the petitions’ files for 
six selected states from pictures that I took in the Mexican General Archive between June and July of 
2012. I thank Aurora Gómez, director of the Archive, and Guillermo Sierra, responsible of the 
Certification Area, for telling me about this unexplored source of data. 
14 In the in-depth study of the Archive’s files for six states, I found that, of the total 796 files, 324 spelled 
out the reasons for requesting the titles; of them, 71% (231) indicated their wish to justify, defend, protect 
or guarantee their land rights. Other reasons could also be related to land conflicts, but are not precise 
enough to know, such as that they had lost copies of their titles (11%), that they wanted information about 
the titles (5%), or that they wanted to correct or clarify the titles (7%). If we only consider claims 
referring to pueblos (503 files, of which 214 expressed reasons), the percentage motivated by the need to 




to the internal rules of the Archive, petitions by poor indigenous/peasants could be made 
personally—without the need of a representative—and in case of using a representative no power 
of attorney was needed. Further, the cost of the stamps entailed by the copies were exonerated to 
the poor.15 As picture 1 illustrates, petitions had a pretty simple format, and they could be made 
by people who could not write, by orally making the petition before a public servant who 
transcribed it and witnessed to the poverty of the claimant.  
The costs of making a claim were restricted to traveling to the capital of the country 
which, although non negligible, seem to have been affordable for many indigenous/peasants, 
especially when they could pool resources for only one person to do so in the name of several. 
This was particularly easy for indigenous/peasant groups who had existed for a long time and 
had held collective titles since, as said, their local collective organization included elected 
representatives, procedures for decision-making and common funds for ordinary and 
extraordinary costs. Historians recount that villages wishing to protect their lands from hacienda 






                                                      
15 The file of June 8, 1877 in the Archivo de Buscas specifies these rules.  
16 For instance, well before the Revolution, Anenecuilco, Zapata’s village, sent a mission of 
representatives accompanied by a lawyer to look for their titles in two opportunities, when the village was 
facing conflict with neighboring haciendas encroaching upon its lands (Hernández 1993). For the use of 





Picture 1. Land Title Petition  
made by a Poor Illiterate Village in the State of Oaxaca, Mexico (1881) 
(Obtained from Archivo de Buscas, AGN) 
 
 
                             
The text reads thus in English: “José Isidro Pacheco, Casimiro Huerta and Rosario Huerta, neighbors of 
the village of Ayuquila in the District of Huajuapam de León of the State of Oaxaca, respectfully say 
before you: that our referred village, which was  formerly called Cuquila, owned certain terrains with the 
same name. Due to causes unknown to us, we have been unable to find the documents relative to the act 
of possession of April 21, 1732; but since the originals exist in tome 535, pages 13 and 14, of the National 
General Archive, we beg you to issue a certified copy of the document, with 5 cent stamps paper, taking 
into account our notorious poverty, in conformity with fractions f and g of article 4, number 58, of the 
Law of Stamps. We do not doubt that we will obtain this grace. Mexico, April 12, 1881. Signed by 
Casimiro Huerta and R. Cicero (public officer) “on behalf of citizens José Isidro Pacheco and Rosario 
Huerta, who do not know how to write. I legally certify that I have seen the petitioners in a notorious 
state of poverty”. 
 
Even though I will quantitatively analyze the Archivo de Buscas data in the following 
section, some basic information seems relevant to illustrate the extent and shape that 
dispossessions may have taken. Title claims were considerable and mainly involved 




Between 1867 and 1910, 2,849 claims were made. As Chart 1 shows, more than half 
(59%, equivalent to 1,677) concerned the lands of indigenous/peasant groups. The vast majority 
of this type of claims (92%) referred to pueblos; the rest referred to congregations, tribes and 
other forms of corporation. These were the main type of lands belonging to poor sectors of the 
population, since individual terrains could be owned not only by poor ranchers but also by rich 
landlords. The percentage of claims made by indigenous/peasant groups was likely higher than 
that reflecting the claims referring to their collective lands, since in the face of a land conflict or 
dispossession threat those groups could also request the titles of the landholdings with which 
they had a conflict—haciendas, ranchos, or other pueblos. 
  
Chart 1. Dispossession Threats by Terrain Type in Mexico (1867-1910) 




The Archive also shows that dispossession threats were likely spurred by the export 




between 1892 and 1907. As Graph 2 illustrates, the increase in the number of claims concerning 
pueblos appears to have followed a similar behavior. While between 1867 and 1877 only 138 
claims were made, in 1877 alone 62 claims were made, and from then until 1890, 528 petitions 
can be found. The year 1890 exhibited the highest peak of claims (82), followed by a total of 729 
until 1907.  
 
Graph 2. Pueblos’ Land Title Petitions per Year in Mexico (1867-1910) 




In turn, the regional distribution of conflict claims coincides with places where export 
crops were grown and the railroad developed, as well as where indigenous collective ownership 
predominated, i.e. the central and central southern states. This can be seen by comparing Map 5, 
which illustrates the location of each claim and the type of claimant, with Maps 1 through 3 
above. Together, pueblos’ claims coming from the central and central-southern states correspond 
to 86% of the total 1,665 claims made by pueblos. With one exception (Guanajuato), the ten 
states that exhibit the highest number of petitions are located in the central and central-southern 























































































occupies the 12th place. This suggests that the export boom generated land conflicts mainly in 
areas where indigenous corporate property concentrated. 
 
Map 5. Dispossession Threats by type of Claimant in Mexico (1867-1910) 




Land conflicts that prompted pueblos to request their titles seem to have been, in the 
majority of cases, threats of de jure dispossessions carried out by neighboring haciendas. In 
addition to the fact that the majority of claims expressing a motivation referred to the need to 
protect or defend land rights17, those claims only involved a conflict with another pueblo or a 
rancho in 11% of the cases. Several files specifically indicate that pueblos were threatened by 
neighboring haciendas encroaching upon their lands. Thus, for instance, the pueblo of 
Xochihuehuetlan referred to the “thousand and thousand dangers to which the pueblos’ titles are 
subject”; the pueblo of Acapantzingo accused the hacienda of Atlacomulco of progressively 
                                                      




despoiling its villagers from their lands; the pueblo of Totolcingo claimed that villagers had been 
despoiled of all their lands, and the Panuco Cantón in Veracruz expressed that its members were 
“despoiled from the terrains that our ancestors legitimately acquired”. 
On the other hand, in the majority of cases pueblos demanded copies of ownership rights, 
whose precise types they knew and mentioned;18 also, in the majority of cases those titles existed 
and copies were provided.19 This indicates that the threats against their lands entailed attempts to 
deny or ignore pueblos’ rights, and were thus instances of legal manipulation. We cannot be sure 
of what pueblos did with their titles when they obtained them. But we may assume that they 
attempted to use them before the judiciary or administrative authorities in order to hinder 
encroachment threats, as they mentioned in a few of their petitions.20 This illustrates that pueblos 
had a strong sense of entitlement, which made them conscious of their rights and willing to 
defend them despite the costs and difficulties.  
Pueblos’ active defense of their land rights also evidences a collective action structure 
that enabled them to surmount such costs and difficulties. An example of that is the fact that, 
even though it was not required, in the great majority of cases pueblos requested their titles 
                                                      
18 Of the 503 pueblos’ petitions from the in-depth study of 6 states, only 2% (10 petitions) referred to 
completely unspecified titles. Instead, more than half (52%, or 263 petitions) referred to titles that clearly 
acknowledged pueblos’  land ownership, including property titles or deeds (180 petitions), royal or vice-
royal mercedes (which were property concessions made by the crown, and which were requested in 49 
opportunities); compositions (which were titles given by the colonial and early post-independence 
administrations to recognize ownership over lands previously possessed, and which were requested in 12 
opportunities); the foundation titles of a village (which were considered the property title of the fundo 
legal or population center, and which were requested in 20 cases); landholding donations (2 petitions). If 
we add less specific title petitions that nonetheless refer to ownership rights (174 petitions), the 
percentage raises to 87%.  
19 We do not know the decision made by the Archive in 38% of the cases, but for the ones we know (478 
out of 796 cases), 87% (417) of the petitions culminated in the granting of the requested titles. 




through local representatives (agents who had traditionally been in charge of collective 
representation outside villages, in 34% of the cases) or through a third party to whom they gave 
powers of representation (non-graduated lawyers, or tinterillos, in 64% of the cases).21 This 
indicates that pueblos had a capacity to collectively organize to defend their rights, by giving a 
mandate to their representatives or by using pooled resources to give it to a third party.  
That collective action capacity does not seem to have only been an artifact of 
circumstances, but something that pueblos had carried with them for a long time. In 83% of the 
cases, pueblos that made land title claims had existed since 1800, as could be concluded by 
comparing their name and location with the database of pueblos constructed by Tanck (2005).22 
Furthermore, pueblos’ claims concentrated in the regions of the center and center-south where 
not only was collective ownership more predominant, but also indigenous/peasant protests—
often related to land—had also clustered in the previous centuries. Map 6 illustrates the 
distribution of those protests, constructed by consulting several secondary sources.  
 
                                                      
21 According to historians, representatives of pueblos generally were not graduated lawyers (the fact that 
only one appears as such in the Buscas is telling), but rather villagers or external actors who had some 
knowledge of the law and charged pueblos for their representation. These characters—also common in 
other countries—were disparagingly called by elites tinterillos, huizacheros or busca pleitos (conflict 
seekers) because of their attempts to bring the causes of the poor to justice without having the legal 
preparation to do so (see Lira 1984, 375-87). Some of these lawyers gained fame in rural areas by 
promoting the cases of several pueblos at once, and thus gaining expertise in the defense of land rights. 
And pueblos apparently considered their services important in achieving such protection. Indeed, by 
coding the names of the pueblos’ representatives, we were able to observe that in around 20% of the 370 
petitions that pueblos made through a representative other than their municipal agent, the representative 
had made at least two other title petitions before the Archive, with some having representatives that made 
up to 12 other petitions. The hiring of these representatives, which we can consider frequent litigants or 
repeat players, illustrates that pueblos were intent on carrying out a thorough legal strategy in defense of 
their rights, and that they used their collective resources to make that possible.  
22 To ascertain this, I compared the name of the pueblos that claimed the land title with the database of all 
pueblos that existed in 1800 constructed by Tanck (2005). Their name and location matched precisely 





Map 6. Peasant Protests in Mexico (1629-1896) 23 




Protests were not, however, the main strategy chosen by pueblos to defend their rights 
during the export boom. Instead of increasing in that era, protests exhibited similar numbers 
throughout the decades of the 18th and 19th centuries.24 This was in part probably the case 
because of the more repressive environment faced under the Porfiriato (Coatsworth 1988). 
However, this does not mean that pueblos did not resist dispossessions, but rather that they chose 
                                                      
23 The map was constructed on the basis of secondary sources, which report 245 protests during the 17th, 
18th and 19th centuries. Of the protests for which we know the motivation (74), almost half (34) were 
related to land issues—31 concern defenses against encroachment, and 3 concern demands for 
redistribution—and a third (26) implied land invasions.  
24 Of the 245 protests found in secondary sources, 21 occurred in the 17th century, 112 in the 18th, and 





the institutional channels to do so. And that choice indicates that pueblos had both the sense of 
entitlement and the collective action capacity to defend their rights strategically. 
 
We do not know the extent to which pueblos’ strategies for land protection were 
successful, but historians argue that they had an ever harder time as the export boom developed 
and haciendas pressed. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that, as the export boom 
advanced, pueblos did not only make more frequent petitions of their titles before the Archive; 
they also made claims before courts and administrative institutions (Knowlton 1998; Marino 
2001).25 Even though the problem of dispossessions was not solved during this period, pueblos’ 
defense of their land rights seems to have increased their collective action capacity, which they 
boisterously expressed in the following years, when the Mexican revolution broke out.  
 
The Legacies of Agrarian Reform (1910-1934) 
 
The Revolution and its Agrarian Roots 
As it is well known, in 1910 the Mexican Revolution erupted, with Madero’s call for deposing 
Porfirio Díaz’s 34 year-long dictatorship after one more rigged election had been followed by the 
repression of the opposition. Even though Madero’s revolutionary program (the Potosí Plan) 
focused on political reform, it included the promise that the lands that had been arbitrarily 
                                                      
25 Those claims even reached the President, who in a few cases gave hearings to disgruntled pueblos and 
promised that action would be taken (see, for instance, Womack 1968; Holden 1994). Some legislative 
bills were also promoted to address the issue of rural discontent prompted by dispossessions, although 




dispossessed would be restituted to their primordial owners.26 This, according to many 
historians, was the spark that ignited the flame of a social revolution, since it led the rural masses 
to join the cause and made them a determinant actor in the years to come.27 Hence, peasants’ 
grievances, and especially those related to dispossessions, were a key cause of the revolution.  
Now, those grievances were not homogeneous across the country; they mainly emerged 
in the central and central-southern regions. This does not mean that revolutionary action occurred 
only in those areas, but rather that only there did such activity have an explicit land motivation.28 
The paradigmatic case of peasant revolutionary action is Zapata’s “Liberating Army of the 
Center and South”, which emerged in the state of Morelos and propagated into the neighboring 
states of Tlaxcala, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Puebla, Mexico City and Mexico State. Historians explain 
the focus of agrarian grievances in these states as a result of conflicts generated by haciendas’ 
                                                      
26 See supra footnote 1.  
27 See, among others, González Roa (1919); McBride (1923); Tannenbaum (1930); Simpson (1937); Silva 
Herzog (1959); González Navarro (1985); Knight (1986). For Knight (1986, 78), the Revolution’s social 
character “derived from mass participation and from its expression of genuine popular grievances…There 
was no clear, chronological distinction (as has often been posited) between initial ‘political revolt and 
subsequent ‘social’ revolution;…the two were coeval”.  
28 The South of the country (which includes the states of Yucatán, Chiapas, Campeche, Quintana Roo, 
Tabasco) evidenced almost no insurgent participation in the early stages of the revolution, which is 
attributed to the land tenure and labor relations existing therein. According to historians, in the Southern 
states, the export boom took the form of large plantations (including henequen, coffee and bananas), 
which subdued the local indigenous, as well as many peasants deported from the north and center of the 
country to slave-like conditions. The predominance of forced labor, as well as the workers’ lack of land 
and common origins, have been identified as the factors explaining the passivity of the South during the 
revolution (Joseph 1982, 45-7; Sanderson 1984, 30-1; Katz 2004, 18-9. In contrast, the Northern states 
(including Chihuahua, Coahuila, Sonora, Sinaloa, Durango Zacatecas, Potosí) exhibited strong insurgent 
action since the beginning, but the grievances that motivated it were more diverse than in the Center. In 
some regions—like the Laguna plains—grievances were also related to land dispossessions. However, in 
most regions—especially the sierra, which produced many revolutionary leaders—grievances had to do 
with the loss of autonomy and influence experienced by local political elites as a result of Porfirio’s 
centralization policies. See Knight (1986). For an argument linking labor relations (especially scarcity) to 




encroachments upon village lands during the export boom. Let us remember that these and some 
other states of the central and central-southern region are the places where conflict claims by 
pueblos concentrated.  
 Revolutionary leaders acknowledged dispossessions as a cause that the revolution should 
deal with not only in their political plans29 but also, and more importantly, in an early and quite 
radical land reform program enacted first by decree in 1915, and later by the new constitution of 
1917. The reform was adopted after peasant revolutionaries had ceased to support Madero for 
betraying his land promises and at a moment in which they opposed Carranza’s government and 
denounced it also for not satisfying their land claims. It was explicitly justified as a necessary 
measure to redress peasants’ dispossession and thereby correct injustice and foster peace.30 The 
reform recognized as its only beneficiaries pueblos and other forms of corporations31, and it 
established that they would receive collective land entitlements.32 It included measures that 
sought to return the lands that had been dispossessed in the pre-revolutionary period and, when 
restitution was not possible, it ordered land grants based on need. All these measures would be 
carried out on demand by Local Agrarian Commissions that would recommend a decision to the 
                                                      
29 Besides the Potosí Plan, we also find explicit references to dispossessions and a promise of restitution 
in Zapatistas’ Ayala Plan of 1911 (see supra footnote 2) and in Orozco’s Empacadora Plan of 1912.  
30 According to rationale of the January 6, 1915 Decree: “(…)the need to return to the villages the lands 
from which they have been dispossessed is palpable as an elemental act of justice and as the only 
effective means of assuring peace and promoting the well-being and improvement of our poor classes, 
and this cannot be hindered by the interests created in favor of the current possessors, since those interests 
have no legal grounding”.  
31 Corporations had to have political standing and a minimum number of inhabitants; in subsequent years 
this requirement was lifted to allow other peasant groups, including hacienda residents, to request land.  
32 The initial formulation of the land reform established that collective lands would be subsequently 
divided among beneficiaries. However, during the 20s and 30s, the aim of dividing ejidos was left aside, 




governor, which would then be reviewed by the National Agrarian Commission that would 
recommend a final decision to the President. The decisions that these organs could make 
included confiscations (in the case of restitutions) and expropriations without immediate 
compensation (in the case of grants), and they could only be reviewed by judges in the following 
year—this was prohibited later.   
 
 As said in the introduction, historians have recently criticized the classic (also labeled 
populist) account of the revolution according to which it had both agrarian roots and aims, the 
legislation’s explicit rationale of corrective justice notwithstanding. For that reason, 
meaningfully establishing a causal link between prior dispossessions and the land reform 
requires going beyond the law in the books. A couple of studies have shown that the land reform 
was responsive to peasant discontent not only in the books but also in action.  
In a seminal study, Sanderson (1984, 81-2, 102-3) showed that the areas where agrarian 
reform evidenced early peaks of land allocations coincide with the heart of peasant land-related 
rebellion. While the reform’s allocations experienced their highest peak during the presidency of 
Cárdenas—unanimously considered the most radical president in Mexico’s history—(1934-40), 
most of the central and central-southern states exhibited earlier peaks of allocations33, and most 
of the total amount of allocations that they received  throughout the implementation of the 
reform (1916-93) took place before 1935. To illustrate, land allocations before 1935 as a 
percentage of total allocations amounted to 95% in Mexico City, 83% in Mexico State, 80% in 
Morelos, 78% in Puebla, 71% in Hidalgo, and 63% in Tlaxcala (Sanderson 1984, 86). 
                                                      
33 Between 1916 and 1925 Federal District and Tlaxcala, and between 1926 and 1935 Morelos, Hidalgo, 
Puebla and México state; the remaining states—Oaxaca, Veracruz, Michoacán and Guerrero—peaked 




In a more recent study, Dell (2012) showed that the municipalities that faced insurgent 
activity between 1910 and 1918 were likely to receive more land allocations via agrarian reform 
not only in the early years but throughout the latter’s implementation (until 1993). She identified 
such municipalities on the basis of several archival sources on the revolutionary period 
indicating the use of force by local residents against the government between 1910 and 1918. 
She then created an instrumental variable of insurgency based on rainfall, and notably the impact 
of the 1907 draught—which according to some Mexican historians was a relevant factor igniting 
the revolution, and which in her results is highly correlated to insurgent activity. And she tested 
its causal impact on the total surface of ejidal lands allocated through the agrarian reform 
program between 1916 and today, showing that the municipalities that faced insurgency had 
approximately 22% more of their surface redistributed through agrarian reform.34 
The former studies do not theoretically or empirically connect peasant insurgency to prior 
dispossessions, even though these were not only the main justification of peasant revolutionary 
action but also, as we will see, a key predictor of agrarian reform land allocations in the early 
years of the reform. Establishing a relation between agrarian reform land allocations and prior 
dispossessions is an important way of proving the revisionists wrong, since it would indicate that 





                                                      
34 Dell also showed that such percentage increased to 31 when only including the municipalities where 
participation in agriculture was above the median by 1900, and that the impact of insurgency was not 




Agrarian Reform Land Allocations (1916-34) 
Early agrarian reform land allocations were made not only in places of peasant agitation during 
the revolution but also in places where land dispossession threats—the main cause of such 
agitation according to historians—had taken place. To ascertain this, I created a dataset of the 
reform’s land allocations made between 1916 and 1934.35 Allocations are a good indicator of 
land redistribution claims because in the vast majority of cases decisions were made as a 
response to claims (not as from above decisions), and most decisions were positive.36 So 
allocations only minimally sub-estimate land reform claims.  
I only consider the period 1916-34 because, for several reasons, we should observe in it a 
clearer connection between land reform claims and prior dispossessions, if indeed such 
connection exists. First, if claims based on dispossessions were the initial motor of the land 
reform, then we should see the latter privileging those claim-makers both in timing and quantity. 
Second, even if the effect of those claims lasted longer, it should be stronger in the first 20 years 
of the reform, when the history of dispossession was still close in time and its narrative of 
injustice could mobilize and be kept alive. Third, analysts agree that in 1934—when Cárdenas 
                                                      
35 The research on agrarian reform decisions was made possible thanks to the outstanding assistance of 
Santiago Jove and Valentín Figueroa, who helped me code the information on agrarian reform allocations 
between 1916 and 1934 that can be found online in the Padrón de Núcleos Agrarios of the Registro 
Agrario Nacional. With Santiago’s help, I am also currently finishing a dataset of agrarian reform claims, 
which can be found in the Mexican Diario Oficial, only available at the National General Archive. This 
will allow me to include in the dataset negative decisions given to agrarian reform claims, as well as other 
relevant details of the decision-making process, such as the way in which claims were modified by 
authorities or by claimants themselves in the middle of the process, the haciendas that were expropriated 
to allocate the lands, among others.  
36 By looking at the whole decision-making process for the years 1916-20, found in the Diario Oficial at 
the National General Archive, I could conclude that only 2% (9 out of 437) of the agrarian reform 
decisions were made from above, i.e. without a claim initiating them; and also that only 15% of the first 
instance decisions were negative, while 21% of the national level ones were negative. However, 
Sanderson (1984) noted that the former pattern was inverted in the late 1920s and 30s, when national 




assumed power—the mobilization for agrarian reform adopted a logic of its own, which had less 
to do with prior dispossessions than with a populist agrarianism nurtured by the implementation 
of the reform (see, for instance, Falcón 1978). Hence, we should observe dispossessions mainly 
shaping land allocations before 1934.  
Even though the next chapter presents the results of the quantitative study carried out, I 
briefly describe here the general trends of early agrarian reform land allocations and their 
connection to prior dispossessions. Map 7 illustrates the geographical distribution of allocations 
between 1916 and 1934. 
 
Map 7. Agrarian Reform Land Allocations in Mexico (1916-1934) 




As can be seen, most allocations concentrated in the central and central-southern states of 




9 of the 10 states where the reform peaked before 1935 were in the top ten of title petitions made 
during the export boom.37 This is true not only for states where peasant rebellion was strong—as 
Sanderson (1984) and Dell (2012) argued—but also for states where rebellion was quite mild 
during the revolution— such as Michoacán and Oaxaca.  
However, agrarian reform land allocations were also numerous in states other than the 
central and central-southern ones—such as the northern states of Coahuila and San Luis Potosí 
and the southern state of Yucatán—where conflict claims in the prior period were not so 
frequent. Those allocations happened tardier, and they may be explained either as a result of the 
strong presence of revolutionary leaders willing to compensate their followers and consolidate 
local control—as was common in the north (Sanderson 1984; González Navarro 1985; Katz 
2004)—or as a decision from above to bring the revolution to areas where agitation was almost 
non-existent—which was the case of Yucatán (Joseph 1982). Their importance notwithstanding, 
these allocations do not take away the alleged impact of prior dispossessions on land allocations, 
which, as we will see in the following chapter, exhibit a significant correlation at the municipal 
and sub-municipal levels after controlling for a series of variables. 
Early agrarian reform land allocations did not only concentrate in the areas of 
dispossession; they were actually made to victims of dispossession in many cases. Indeed, of the 
total 1,677 pueblos for which titles were requested during the export boom, 46% (771) received 
an agrarian reform allocation in the subsequent period.38 This shows not only that land reform 
                                                      
37 And the 10th (Tlaxcala) was number 12.  
38 This result is noteworthy, since pueblos that made title petitions during the export boom could 
disappear or disaggregate between then and the beginning of the reform (Kourí 2011). The result may 
also be underestimating the link between dispossessions and land reform claims since I only consider 




claims were clearly motivated by grievances of dispossession, but also that they were brought 
forward thanks to pueblos’ capacity to organize and collectively act. Further evidence of this 
capacity and its strength is provided by the fact that the vast majority of pueblos (81% or 626 
pueblos) who demanded titles during the export boom and also land reform allocations were 
pueblos in 1800. This means that their collective action structure predated and survived land 
dispossessions, becoming even stronger in their aftermath.  
In contrast with prior dispossessions, there does not seem to be a clear geographical 
relation between land inequality and early agrarian reform land allocations. Map 8 illustrates the 
state-level variation in land inequality for some Mexican states for which the data is available for 
1910.  
If this map is compared to Map 7, we can see that there are some states where land 
inequality was extremely high but few land allocations were made—like Sonora in the north-
west, in red in Map 8—and others where the same level of inequality existed but allocations 
were quite high—like Morelos in the center, also in red in Map 8. In addition, there are states 
with middle levels of inequality and high levels of allocations—like Veracruz in the center-east, 
in dark yellow in Map 8—and states with similar levels of inequality but low levels of 




                                                                                                                                                                           
but were denied allocations under the reform. The pueblos for which titles were requested during the 
export boom and that demanded land allocations under the agrarian reform increased in number as the 
years passed until we reach 1930, when they decreased significantly. While the increase in the first 14 
years may be a product of the total increase in allocation claims, the latter decrease—which contrasts with 
a sharp increase in overall allocation decisions in that period—suggests that many pueblos aggrieved by 
dispossessions satisfied their claims early in time, and that in subsequent years the agrarian reform 




Map 8. Land Gini Coefficient in some Mexican States (1910) 
(Constructed using INEGI 1956 as source, and Mares’ calculation of the Gini formula) 
 
 
These trends may be explained by the role of land dispossessions which, as hypothesized, 
seem to have acted as a determinant of the land inequality that became relevant for redistributive 
claims to emerge. Indeed, both in states with high and middle levels of inequality where 
numerous land allocations were made, high amounts of conflict claims were brought forward 
during the export boom—for high levels of inequality we have Morelos, but also Guerrero and 
Michoacán in the south, and for middle levels we have Veracruz, but also the State of Mexico 
and Jalisco in the center. This suggests that land inequality became a motor of redistributive 
claims mainly when it had been the result of prior dispossessions, which generated land 
concentration in the hands of a few. Although this is impossible to confirm because we do not 




inequality did increase overall with the export boom: while between 1850 and 1889 2% of 
holdings were family farms, the percentage dropped to 1 in 1890 (Vanhanen 1997).39 
  
In the next chapter, I provide further empirical support to the notion that dispossessions 
are causally connected to land reform claims and allocations, by studying the statistical 
correlation between these two variables.  
                                                      
39 Vanhanen (1997). This data is incomplete since it does not explain the place occupied by corporate 
landholdings. Tannenbaum (1923) acknowledged that there was no available data for the distribution of 
land among the different types of rural settlements before 1910; however, on the basis of 1923 data on the 
different sizes of landholdings—which, he argued, could be used because patterns in 1910 could only 
have been worse—he concluded that, despite comprising more than half of the rural population, “free 
villages” owned much less than half of the privately held lands. Indeed, of the total number of private 
land holdings in the country (622, 213), the 2% that measured more than 1,000 hectares covered more 
land than the other 98%. Since he assumed that “free villages” were composed by (individual) land 
holdings that typically measured 10 hectares and very rarely more than 100 hectares, villages constituted 
the great majority of land holdings (568,507, or 91%) but owned much less than half of the total land 
privately held. Tannenbaum attributed this result to the fact that haciendas had encroached upon the lands 
of villages to the point of confining them within their boundaries and making them dependent. Although 





Chapter 4: Quantitative Study of Mexico 
 
Let us remember that the testable hypotheses that we derived from the theory for the Mexican 
case in Chapter 2 were: At the macro-level, that land dispossessions occurred at a significant 
level during the export boom, that dispossessions mainly targeted lands collectively owned by 
indigenous/peasant groups, that those dispossessions were mainly carried out through legal 
manipulation, that their victims resisted them first through legal means, and that the grievances 
derived from the dispossessions translated into strong claims of agrarian reform that resulted in 
the enactment of radical legislation. In turn, at the subnational level, I predicted that the more 
dispossessions occurred during the export boom, the more agrarian reform claims and early land 
allocations took place in the subsequent period.  
In the previous chapter, I showed that, in fact, the predicted macro-level patterns may be 
observed in the Mexican case, and moreover, that at the state level there is a geographical 
coincidence between dispossession threats during the export boom (1877-1907) and agrarian 
reform claims and early allocations in the subsequent period (1916-34). Now, to show that such 
relation is not coincidental or spurious but that it may actually have causal leverage, in this 
chapter I use quantitative analysis at the subnational level.  
As we will see, this analysis indicates that dispossessions during the export boom are 
indeed a powerful predictor of ensuing agrarian reform land allocations in Mexico. It is more 
likely to find numerous land reform allocations in municipalities where dispossession threats—
measured as petitions of legal titles for protection against dispossession—occurred. This relation 




Population density and distance to the closest head municipality also appear to have 
influenced agrarian reform land allocations, but they do not significantly diminish the effect of 
prior dispossessions. What is more, the influence of the distance to the main municipality 
operates in an opposite direction to what could be expected. Other indicators measuring 
population growth, distance to the state capital, land quality and geography do not have leverage 
in explaining agrarian reform land allocations. 
More importantly, the impact of prior dispossession threats on land reform allocations is 
more significant than that of other variables that could operate as alternative mechanisms for 
explaining claims of land redistribution, such as measures of land values and the enduring 
collective action structure of indigenous/peasant groups. As said, in Chapter 3, I argued that the 
main target of dispossessions during the export boom were the lands collectively owned by those 
groups, and that such form of ownership was accompanied by a structure of political and legal 
organization that likely facilitated collective action. So it could be that structure which explained 
the link between land reform allocations and the past experience of indigenous/peasant groups. I 
show that even though the preexistent collective action structure of these groups mattered for 
land claim-making, dispossessions during the export boom also did, and did more so than such 
structure. This provides support to the theory, developed in Chapter 1, that the sense of 
entitlement ensuing from ownership rights to the land and the grievances derived from their 




The found relation between dispossession threats and land reform allocations persists 
after introducing state level fixed effects. And it can also be found at the sub-municipal53, with 
dispossession threats operating as a significant predictor of the number of beneficiaries of land 
reform allocations made to peasant groups. However, the fit of sub-municipal models is not as 
good as that of municipal level ones.  
 In what follows, I explain in detail the indicators and data sources used for measuring the 
dependent and independent variables, as well as the controls. I then describe the strategy used for 
analyzing the data, and present the results.  
 
Indicators and Data 
 
Dependent Variable: Agrarian Reform Claims 
 
As proposed in Chapter 2, I operationalize the dependent variable, which is land reform claims, 
with early agrarian reform land allocations. This is a good indicator of agrarian reform claims for 
the Mexican case because, as said in Chapter 3, land allocation decisions were mainly demand-
driven and in the majority of cases claims were positively decided.  
The data on land reform allocations was obtained from the Mexican National Agrarian 
Registry online archive, and it was coded with the help of Santiago Jove and Valentín Figueroa 
during a twelve-month period. We gathered a total of 5,683 agrarian reform allocation decisions 
made between 1916—when the land reform was first implemented by the revolutionary 
                                                      
53 A municipality may comprise several villages (pueblos) or ejidos. These are the main units at the sub-
national level—villages and other corporations for the data on dispossession threats, and ejidos and 




government of Venustiano Carranza—and 1934—when Lázaro Cárdenas assumed power and 
when the implementation of the land reform adopted a political logic of its own. This is 
incontestably considered the first or early period of the Mexican land reform. The dataset 
includes information about the name and type of collective petitioner, its geographical 
coordinates, the number of beneficiaries and allocated hectares, the type of decision on the basis 
of which the land was allocated.  
In order to make sure that I could use the data on allocations as indicator of land reform 
claims, I also analyzed in detail the whole process of allocation—from the claim to the final 
decision—for the first five years of the land reform—1916-20—which I obtained by taking 
pictures from the Diario Oficial in the Mexican National Archive, and which I coded with 
Santiago Jove’s help. Of the 432 analyzed processes, only 9 were allocations made without prior 
claims, so we can assume that allocations are in general a good proxy for claims. Further, 24% of 
the claims were negatively decided in the second and final instance, but those negative decisions 
are distributed across most states. So land allocations underestimate claims but they do not seem 
to do so in a biased way. In future iterations of this work I plan to include the data from the 
Diario Oficial for all analyzed years to study negative decisions as well. Land allocations are in 
any case useful for comparative purposes since, as we will see in Chapter 6, the only available 
data in Colombia concerning land reform implementation are allocations.  
Land reform allocations in Mexico are found at the sub-municipal level, i.e. the collective 
petitioner making the claim and receiving the allocation. Until the late 1920s, only political 
entities like villages or congregations could make such claims; this was later extended to other 




Throughout the implementation of the agrarian reform, lands were also received collectively by 
peasants, either in the form of ejidos (common lands) or comunidades (communities).  
However, the sub-municipal level is not ideal for carrying out the quantitative analysis. 
Using as unit of analysis the ejidos or communities that received land allocations implies that 
one can only use as indicator of the dependent variable the number of beneficiaries or hectares of 
each allocation—not the allocation itself. But those are not very precise measures of land reform 
claims. Since the latter were made collectively, the number of beneficiaries does not capture the 
magnitude of the claims, but is more a proxy of the size of the group making the claim. In turn, 
the number of allocated hectares seems to be very strongly related to land scarcity at the state 
and municipal levels, so even very strong and radical claims could receive very few lands in 
densely populated areas.   
For those reasons, I decided to focus the analysis mainly on the municipal level. This is 
also convenient for the purpose of comparing the Mexican and Colombian cases, given that—as 
we will also see in Chapter 6—the Colombian data can only be found at the municipal level. 
Consequently, I aggregated the land reform allocations data at the municipal level. This allowed 
me to use as indicator of the dependent variable the number of land allocations, which is the 
most precise way of capturing the number of claims of land redistribution. 
As an additional test, I also carried out the analysis at the sub-municipal level, using as 
indicator of the dependent variable the number of beneficiaries of agrarian reform land 
allocation. Even though, as we will see, the results seem to be similar to the municipal level 
ones, the fit of the models is much weaker, which supports the notion that the municipal level is 





Independent Variable: Land Dispossessions during the Export Boom 
 
As said in Chapter 2, I operationalize the independent variable—land dispossessions during the 
export boom—with petitions of protection against dispossession before national authorities 
during that period. For Mexico, as mentioned in Chapter 3, I took as source of those petitions the 
requests of land titles made before the National General Archive between 1867 and 1910. Such 
requests may be found in the Archivo de Buscas which, to the best of my knowledge, has not 
been systematically analyzed before. With the help of Valentín Figueroa, during a period of eight 
months, I coded a total of 2,849 petitions, using the Archive’s catalog—which was provided to 
me by Guillermo Sierra, head of the Title Certification Area, during my time at the Archive. The 
catalog contains basic information about the petitions, including the date and place, the name of 
the petitioner and the type of terrain for which the titles are requested.  
In order to make sure that I could use this data as an indicator of dispossessions, I also 
took pictures of and analyzed in detail the files of all the petitions for six selected states. Such 
files provide more information about the petitioners, the type of title that they request, the 
conflict in which they are involved and, in some cases, the reasons for making the claim and the 
decision of the Archive. Chapter 3 discussed some of the qualitative findings of the analysis of 
those files. All in all, the analysis allowed me to conclude that I could comfortably use the basic 
data found in the catalog to characterize title petitions—especially the type of land involved in 
them--and that I could indeed take them as proxy of dispossession threats.  
Indeed, after the reading of the files for the six states I could conclude that in the majority 
of cases title petitions were made in the face of a land conflict in which the petitioner was either 
defending herself from an encroachment, or attempting to encroach upon another’s land. As seen 




collective ownership rights to the land which, according to historians, were the main victims of 
dispossession during the export boom. Therefore, it is likely that many of the threats of 
dispossession resulted in actual dispossessions. 
However, I use the whole universe of petitions and not only those made with respect to 
indigenous/peasant groups because petitions related to other lands may also involve 
indigenous/peasants—as in the case of ranchos or individual landholdings that formerly 
belonged to indigenous villages but that were owned by individual villagers after disentailment, 
or as in the case of titles of haciendas requested by villages due to encroachments initiated by 
haciendas.  
Although land titles petitions may not capture all dispossessions occurred during the 
export boom because petitioners had to travel to the country’s capital to make them, they are 
important for gathering a complete sample of the whole country, and hence for making 
subnational comparisons. Further, the bias introduced by only looking at this source is not a 
serious issue, since claims could be made without a representative and by analphabets, and there 
were no costs involved other than those related to travel. As said in Chapter 3, land title petitions 
before the Archive could be made by anyone, with no formality required and at no charge in the 
case of poor people. Finally, the fact that more than half of those petitions were made by 
indigenous/peasant groups indicates that the costs could be afforded by these groups in many 
instances.  
Just like the dependent variable indicator, these petitions are coded at the sub-municipal 
level, i.e. the village, estate, or other landholding for which titles were claimed. In the dataset of 
agrarian reform land allocations described in the previous section, I coded these petitions as a 




export boom, i.e. whether she suffered a dispossession threat in that period (in which case the 
dummy received the value of 1). However, I also aggregated this variable at the municipal level 
in order to be able to use the best indicator of the dependent variable which, as said above, is the 




The models at the municipal and sub-municipal levels include, first, a municipal-level population 
control for 1910 (before land allocations began). This control seeks to show that, if it exists, the 
predicted relation between prior dispossessions and agrarian reform allocations is not a sheer 
artifact of population density. Indeed, the central and central-southern states identified in Chapter 
3 as those where most early land allocations were made (and also where most prior 
dispossessions happened) are also historically the regions most densely populated by 
indigenous/peasants, so the predicted effect could be spurious. The data for this indicator was 
obtained from the Mexican 1910 census, made available by the National Institute for Statistics 
and Geography (INEGI) online. 
Second, the models include the rate of growth of population from 1910 to 1921 (when the 
agrarian reform had already started its implementation). This control is intended to inquire 
whether agrarian reform claims mainly responded to the need of land based on an increase of 
population rather than to prior grievances. The data source for this indicator is the same as for the 
previous one.  
Third, the models include two basic measures of distance to state institutions: distance to 
the petitioner’s state capital and to the closest head municipality (cabecera). These controls have 




potential petitioners to reach the institutions in charge of land redistribution. As said in Chapter 
3, these institutions functioned at the state level, and were therefore likely to have their main 
headquarters in the capital of the state, and to carry out their tasks in head municipalities, which 
were more densely populated and had greater institutional responsibilities and resources than 
their surrounding subject municipalities (Kourí 2011). I constructed these indicators using GIS 
geo-referencing tools, which allowed me to obtain the distance of each land allocation (for which 
I have precise coordinates, as shown by Map 7 in Chapter 3) to its nearest state capital or head 
cabecera. 
Finally, the models include a measure of elevation, also constructed using GIS, which 
may be a rough proxy of distance to institutions, but also of land fertility and of other 




Apart from establishing the impact of dispossessions on agrarian reform land allocations 
controlling for a series of basic variables, I also seek to establish if, indeed, the dispossession of 
lands legally owned by indigenous/peasants was the relevant mechanism through which that 
impact was produced. For that purpose, I propose two different exercises aimed at evaluating the 
operation of alternative mechanisms.  
 First, I propose to assess the autonomous effects of the two main indicators of the value 
of land foreseen by the theory, i.e. the presence of agricultural commodities and of the railroad. 
In Chapter 1, I argued that the increase in the value of land during the export boom was an 




relevant mechanism producing agrarian reform claims, their effect should remain significant 
even when controlling for indicators of the value of land.  
The significance of the impact of dispossessions would also indicate that the measures of 
land values used may have been relevant for dispossessions but not for agrarian reform land 
allocations in the subsequent period. Indeed, one alternative hypothesis could be that agrarian 
reform allocations did not respond so much to peasants’ demands based on prior dispossessions 
as to elites’ preferences. If so, then we should expect allocations to occur in places where land 
was not so valuable and where, hence, it was not so problematic to expropriate big landowners to 
provide lands to claimants.  
 To measure land values, I use two indicators. On the one hand, the distance to the 
railroad. The railroad was the main transportation mechanism used for agricultural commodities 
during the export boom and, according to historians, it increased the value of land in all the 
regions that it reached. I constructed this indicator using GIS geo-referencing as tool and 
Coatsworth’s map on the reach of the railroad at the time as source (see Map 2 in Chapter 3). On 
the other hand, I use as indicator of the increased value of the land resulting from its suitability 
for producing commercial crops, the potential rain-fed yield of the land for the main agricultural 
commodities. I constructed this indicator using FAO’s online data on Global Agro-Ecological 
Zones. It includes an average of cocoa, coffee, cotton, sugar and tobacco as export commodities, 
and maize as a non-export commodity that, according to historians, also impacted the value of 
land during the export boom.  
The second proposed exercise is to assess the autonomous and the interaction effects of 
the preexistent structure of collective action that land claimants had. As explained in Chapter 3, 




colony, a political organization that entailed their recognition as legal and political entities with 
special institutions for the protection of their rights, elected local authorities that represented 
them, a tradition of resource-pooling for community activities, among others. Such political 
organization very likely facilitated collective action, so it is plausible that the observed collective 
action of peasants when making land reform claims is not mainly or only the result of the 
grievance experienced by the loss of land ownership but rather of their preexistent structure of 
collective action. 
In order to test whether that is the only mechanism operating, I use as indicator of the 
preexistent corporate organization and collective action capacity of peasant land claimants a 
dummy establishing whether the petitioner of land redistribution via agrarian reform was an old 
indigenous village existing since 1800, based on Tanck (2005)’s comprehensive maps of 
Mexican indigenous villages. I propose to use that indicator first as a control, with the purpose of 
establishing whether dispossession threats remain significant with its introduction. Later, I 
introduce that indicator as part of an interaction term, with the purpose of establishing whether 




The last specification in all models consists in state-level fixed effects, which seek to make sure 
that the observed effects are not just the product of specific state characteristics.  
 





I use simple OLS regression analysis to study the relation between the independent and 
dependent variables. As explained above, I chose to focus on the municipal level of analysis 
(Tables 4 and 5), although I also offer the results at sub-municipal level to see if they hold at a 
more micro level (Tables 6 and 7). In all cases, I first present the simple impact of the 
independent variable or of the interaction term and its components, and then successively include 
the basic controls, the controls that seek to capture alternative mechanisms, and state-level fixed 
effects. As we will see, the effect of land dispossessions on agrarian reform allocations remains 
significant and robust under all the different specifications.  
 Table 4 studies that effect at the municipal level, using the sum of land allocations as 
indicator of the dependent variable and a sum of the dummy of dispossession threats as indicator 
of the independent variable.54 The latter is a very significant and robust predictor of land reform 
allocations, and it remains so after introducing all the proposed controls and fixed effects. For a 
one unit increase in dispossession threats at the municipal level, there is a 1.2 unit increase in 
land allocations when all controls and fixed effects are introduced (model 5). This effect seems 
substantively quite strong. To provide a frame of reference, although with a large standard 
deviation (4.8), the mean number of land allocations per municipality throughout the country 
was 4.4.  
The Old pueblo dummy—which, as said, seeks to capture the impact of the preexistent 
collective action structure of indigenous/peasant groups—is also a strong predictor of land 
reform allocations, although less so than dispossessions. For a one unit increase in the Old 
pueblo dummy at the municipal level, there is a 0.7 increase in land reform allocations. This 
                                                      
54 Every claim from a village was aggregated to the level of the municipality to which it belonged. 
Accordingly, if there were not any claims made by villages within a given municipality, the value of the 




suggests that, even though the enduring collective action structure of indigenous/peasant groups 
did likely facilitate their land claim-making, such was not the only or main mechanism through 
which land claims emerged. Dispossession threats were, in themselves, a relevant mechanism 
producing claims.  
 This conclusion is further supported by the results in Table 5, which studies the impact of 
the interaction between dispossessions and claimants being old pueblos on land reform 
allocations. As can be seen, these two variables do not seem to interact in a way that would 
suggest that a mechanism other than dispossessions is mainly explaining the observed outcomes. 
The interaction term has a negative sign and, although it is significant, its effect is lower than 
that of dispossession threats. This indicates that the effect of the latter on land reform allocations 
was not reinforced nor mediated by the preexistent collective action capacity of claimants. Even 
though such capacity did facilitate land claims, so did prior dispossessions which, in accordance 
with the theory, produced a motivation or justification for claim-making, and might have also 
created or strengthened the collective action capacity of victims of dispossession whenever they 
resisted those dispossessions through legal means.  
 In a similar vein, though much more markedly, dispossessions alone seem to be a much 
stronger predictor of land reform allocations than the increase in land values. Table 4 shows not 
only that dispossessions maintain their significance once the controls for land values are 
introduced, but also that the latter controls do not produce a significant impact on land reform 
allocations. This implies that the alternative potential hypothesis according to which land 
allocations were mainly driven by the interests of landed elites, such that they were made in 




Apart from the alternative mechanisms assessed, several of the basic controls have 
significant effects on the dependent variable under the different models, and thus merit a brief 
commentary. Population is a strong predictor of land allocations at the municipal level, with a 
1,000 increase of inhabitants producing almost one more land allocation per municipality. As 
said before, we know that land conflicts and dispossessions also happened in places with greater 
population under the export boom, so dispossessions could be masking population density. 
However, the effect of population density does not render the impact of dispossessions less 
significant or robust. Dispossessions maintain their significance in all models that include the 
population control; further, dispossessions maintain the magnitude of their coefficient after the 
population control is introduced in Table 4. In contrast, the rate of growth of population between 
1910 and 1921 is not a significant variable in any of the tests and models, which suggests that 
population increases were irrelevant for defining land reform decisions in the early stages of the 
legislation.  
 In turn, the indicator of distance to head municipalities also has a significant and robust 
effect on land reform allocations. But the effect does not conform to the potential alternative 
hypothesis according to which land allocations were greater in places closer to the municipalities 
where institutions in charge of implementing the agrarian reform were more likely to operate, 
due to facility of access. The coefficients of the distance to head municipalities always exhibit a 
positive sign, indicating that the greater the distance to the closest head municipality, the more 
the land allocations in a given municipality.  
This suggests that early agrarian reform decisions tended to privilege areas which were 
far from head municipalities, and hence, that the distance of agrarian reform petitioners to state 




sign of the sense of entitlement and collective action capacity of early petitioners of agrarian 
reform. In contrast, the variable measuring the distance to state capitals does not produce any 
significant result, which means that, for the purposes of land reform allocations, it was irrelevant 
whether municipalities were close or far away from the state capital. 
  
Most of the former results hold at the sub-municipal level, though the models have a 
much poorer fit than the municipal-level ones. As explained above, at this level of analysis, I use 
as indicator of the dependent variable the number of beneficiaries of each agrarian reform land 
allocation and as indicator of the independent variable the dummy of dispossession threats. As 
Tables 6 and 7 indicate, the dispossession threats dummy has quite a significant and robust effect 
on the beneficiaries of agrarian reform, which remains thus after introducing the different 
controls and fixed effects.  
Table 6 indicates that, if a land claimant faced a dispossession threat during the export 
boom, there is a 44 increase in the number of beneficiaries of the posterior land allocation made 
to that claimant on the grounds of the revolutionary land reform. That effect remains significant 
and robust after introducing the different controls and fixed effects. Just like in the municipal 
level analysis, the two indicators of the increase in the value of land are not significant.  
In contrast, the impact of the old village dummy seems to be greater on the number of 
beneficiaries than that of the dispossession threats dummy. Because this indicator of the 
dependent variable is a less precise measure of land claim-making, we cannot be sure that it 
indicates that the preexistent and enduring collective action structure of indigenous/peasant 
groups has more leverage on land claims than dispossessions. It could also be the case that this 




helping them maintain high numbers of members, and consequently having more beneficiaries of 
the land reform allocations they received.  
What is clear, just as in the municipal level, is that dispossessions and the collective 
action structure of peasants have an autonomous and not an interaction effect on land reform 
beneficiaries. As Table 7 indicates, the coefficient for both dummies is significant and large, but 
their interaction is not significant and has a negative sign.  
At the subnational level, some of the basic controls also behave differently than at the 
municipal level. Because there is no precise population at the sub-municipal level, I use the 
municipal population as control, and it is not a significant predictor of the number of 
beneficiaries of a given land reform allocation. This is expectable, since there is likely a lot of 
variation in the population numbers of different sub-municipal units within a municipality, and 
hence the latter’s population density may not predict the former’s population, nor the number of 
people that would be beneficiaries of a land reform allocation—which is likely not dependent on 
population density alone.  
In turn, the indicator for the distance to the main head municipality is very significant and 
has a very strong magnitude, but it behaves in the opposite way than at the municipal level one. 
The reason for this is not clear, but again there does not seem to be a straightforward relation 
between this distance and the number of beneficiaries of a given land reform allocation, while 
such relation is more clear for the number of land reform allocations—the dependent variable 
indicator used at the municipal level. In any case, because the result is very strong and absolutely 





On the other hand, the elevation indicator is significant in some sub-municipal level 
models, showing that the greater the elevation of a sub-municipal unit, the fewer the 
beneficiaries of a land reform allocation. Since more elevated areas are likely more far away 
from state institutions and less fertile, this could suggest that at the sub-municipal level there is a 
similar relation between land allocations and distance to state institutions, and a negative relation 
between allocations and land fertility. But since elevation’s effect is not significant in all models, 
this cannot be taken as a firm conclusion.  
All in all, both at the municipal and sub-municipal levels, dispossession threats are a 
strong and significant predictor of agrarian reform outcomes, measured as number of land 
allocations and as beneficiaries of those allocations, respectively. That relation remains 
significant and robust after introducing fixed effects and a series of controls, including controls 
that attempt to capture the operation of a mechanism different from the grievances derived from 
the dispossession of lands with legal titles.  
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter and the previous one, I showed that the path of rural conflict and agrarian reform 
traversed by Mexico was one of numerous dispossessions during the export boom that mainly 
attacked lands collectively owned by indigenous/peasants, which led to revolutionary claims of 
agrarian reform that were rapidly addressed through radical legislation. Such legislation was 
responsive to peasants’ claims not only rhetorically but also in practice. Indeed, early land 
allocations made on the basis of the 1915 Mexican agrarian reform coincided geographically 
with regions of prior dispossession threats; there also exists a significant and robust statistical 




powerful predictor of subsequent agrarian land reform allocations at the municipal level, and of 
the number of their beneficiaries at the sub-municipal level.  
The great amount of indigenous/peasant groups that faced dispossessions during the 
export boom, and that later demanded agrarian reform allocations during the Revolution shows 
that, to an important extent, the Mexican agrarian reform was pushed by demands from below, at 
least in its early stages. This provides empirical support to the classical or populist account of 
Mexican historians, against the challenges of revisionists. It also provides a more fine-grained 
theoretical explanation of the link between prior dispossessions and claims of land redistribution, 
since it shows that the sense of entitlement by land ownership and the collective action promoted 
by its dispossession were an important mechanism producing land claims.  
This demand side of the Mexican agrarian reform may be hidden or neglected by 
aggregate analyses that focus on the reform’s implementation in the long term, and especially on 
its use by elites to clientelistically mobilize but also control peasant organizations (see, for 
instance, Magaloni et al. 2012). Pueblos that had owned corporate lands, in many cases for more 
than a century, felt entitled to those lands. When they suffered encroachments upon them, they 
had the motivation and justification to resist them legally and, when that did not work, through 
their support to the revolution. Their legal resistance to dispossessions is evidenced by their 
requests of copies of their land titles, which were likely later used before tribunals. And it 
possibly generated or strengthened their collective action capacity, which enabled them to 
request lands as soon as the agrarian reform was enacted, without needing to be mobilized by 





Appendix 1. Regression Analysis Tables for Mexico 
 
 
Table 4. Regression of Agrarian Reform Land Allocations  
on Dispossession Threats at Municipal Level in Mexico 
 
 
     *** p<.001, **p<.01, *<.05 
     Standard errors in parentheses 
      +Includes cocoa, coffee, cotton, sugar, tobacco, maize.  
DV: AR Land Allocations  
at Municipal Level (1916-34) 
       
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
 
Model 4 Model 5 
Dispossession Threats 1.9*** 1.8***  1.8***  
 
1.3*** 1.2***  
Dummy (sum) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) 
Population 1910  .1*** .09*** 
 
.1*** .09*** 
(in thousands) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Population Growth 1910-21  .003 .003 
 
.003 .003 
  (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Elevation   .0002  .00008 
 
-.000001 -.001 
(in hundreds of thousands of m) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) 
Distance State Capital  -.3  -.2  
 
.03 .01  
(in hundreds of km)  (.2) (.2) (.2) (.2) 
Distance Head Municipality 15.8*** 16.2*** 
 
16.4*** 13.8*** 
(in hundreds of km)  (1.8) (1.9) (1.8) (2) 
Distance Railroad -.2   
 
-.1 -.5  
(in hundreds of km)   (.2) (.2) (.4) 
Land Suitability Agricultural   6 
 
7 6 
Crops+ ( index from 0 to 1)   (5) (5) (5) 
 
Old Pueblo Dummy (sum)    
 
.5*** .7*** 
    (.08) (.08) 
Fixed Effects No No No 
 
No Yes  
CONSTANT 3.2 1.5 1.6 
 
1.07 17.8 
N 1304 1048 1048 1048 1048 




Table 5. Regression of Agrarian Reform Land Allocations on Interaction of Dispossession 
Threats and Old Pueblos at Municipal Level in Mexico 
 
 
    *** p<.001, **p<.01, *<.05 
    Standard errors in parentheses 
      +Includes cocoa, coffee, cotton, sugar, tobacco, maize. 
  
DV: AR Land Allocations  
at Municipal Level (1916-34) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dispossession Threats Dummy (sum) 1.6*** 1.6*** 1.6*** 
 (.2) (.2) (.2) 
Old Pueblo Dummy (sum) .7*** .7*** 1*** 
 (.1) (.1) (.1) 
Dispossessions*Old Pueblo -.08** -.08** -.1*** 
 (.3) (.3) (.2) 
Population 1910 .09*** .1*** 
(in thousands)  (.01) (.01) 
Population Growth 1910-21 .002  .003 
  (.002) (.001) 
Elevation -.00001* -.0001* 
(in hundreds of m)  (.0006) (.0006) 
Distance State Capital .08  -.04 
(in hundreds of km)  (.2) (.2) 
Distance Head  Municipality  16.3*** 13.3*** 
(in hundreds of km)  (1.8) (1.9) 
Distance Railroad  -.05 -.4 
(in hundreds of km)  (.2) (.4) 
Land Suitability Agricultural Crops+  7 5 
(index from 0 to 1)  (5) (5) 
Fixed Effects No No Yes 
CONSTANT 2.8 .8 17.3 
N 1304 1048 1048 





Table 6. Regression of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries on  
Dispossession Threats in Mexico 
 
 
*** p<.001, **p<.01, *<.05 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+Includes coffee, cotton, cocoa, sugar, tobacco, maize. 
  
DV: AR Beneficiaries  
(1916-34) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 















Mun. Population 1910  -.01 .0005 
 
.3* .2 
(in thousands)  (.1) (.1) (.1) (.2) 
Mun. Population Growth 





  (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Elevation -.02*  -.02* 
 
-.02** -.002 
(in hundreds of m)  (.007) (.007) (.007) (.008) 
Distance State Capital -.7  -1.4 
 
7.9* 7 
(in hundreds of km)  (3.4) (3.5) (3.4) (4) 
Distance Head 
Municipality  -359.8*** -364.4*** 
 
-271.3*** -333.6*** 
(in hundreds of km)  (25.6) (25.8) (25.4) (286.1) 
Distance Railroad 35.1   
 
70 -.2 
(in hundreds of km)   (4.4) (4.3) (8.6) 
Land Suitability Main 
Crops+   -100  
 
-70 -100 
(index from 0 to 1)   (80) (80) (80) 
Old Pueblo Dummy     
 
101.2*** 93.8*** 
    (5.3) (5.7) 
Fixed Effects No No No 
 
No Yes  
CONSTANT 132.3 185 183.8 140.3 271.9 
N 5683 4857 4857 4857 4857 





Table 7. Regression of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries on Interaction of  
Dispossession Threats and Old Pueblos in Mexico 
 
  *** p<.001, **p<.01, *<.05 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
  + Includes cocoa, coffee, cotton, sugar, tobacco, maize.  
  
DV:  AR beneficiaries  
(1916-34) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dispossession Threats Dummy  54.1*** 48.5*** 51.9*** 
 (9.9) (10.4) (10.4) 
Old Pueblo Dummy  107.3*** 104.9*** 96.6*** 
 (5.2) (5.8) (6.2) 
Dispossessions*Old Pueblo -14.1 -21.1 -15.6 
 (12.8) (13.4) (13.4) 
Population 1910 .3* .2 
(in thousands)  (.1) (.2) 
Population Growth 1910-21 -.05  -.04 
  (.03) (.03) 
Elevation -.02** -.003** 
(in hundreds of m)  (.007) (.008) 
Distance State Capital 7.9* 7 
(in hundreds of km)  (3.4) (4) 
Distance Head  Municipality  -270.4*** -332.7*** 
(in hundreds of km)  (25.4) (28.6) 
Distance Railroad  7.1 -.1 
(in hundreds of km)  (4.3) (8.6) 
Land Suitability Agricultural Crops+  -70 -100 
(index from 0 to 1)  (80) (80) 
Fixed Effects No No Yes 
CONSTANT 109.1 139.7 271.5 
N 5683 4857 4857 





Chapter 5: The Colombian Path55 
“The rights of the poor, conquered through labor and hardships, are worth nothing if 
interest is opposed to them, as happens with the concept and practice of a few men who 
work hard to be recognized as Colombian liberals but nothing other than antipatriotic and 
exclusionary. It is easy to understand that the poor man has hardships to produce even a 
simple evidence, if it brushes against people of influence…” (Baldíos Correspondence 
Archive, AGN Vol. 4, No. 9). 
 
Thus reads a fragment of an 1882 petition of protection against dispossession made by a 
group of peasant settlers in Guayabal, Tolima, who had occupied and cultivated public lands for 
several years, and whose possession rights had been recognized by the national government but 
had later been ignored by a decision to allocate the lands to a mining company.  
The ordeal of Colombian peasants during the export boom was different from that of 
Mexicans in that, while the latter had ownership titles to face the encroachments of neighboring 
haciendas, the former only had rights of possession over public lands—in most cases with no 
piece of paper to support them. Hence, even when those rights had been recognized by 
authorities, they could still be trumped by newly (and in many cases violently and fraudulently 
acquired) written titles of encroacher hacendados or land entrepreneurs. As I will show, that 
situation significantly weakened the capacity of Colombian peasants to push for a radical land 
                                                      
55 This and the following chapter offer the basis of a paper that I am co-writing with Fabio Sánchez, in 
which, on the grounds of my theory and methodology, we use an instrumental variable approach to 




reform in the following years. Even though their possession rights created a noteworthy sense of 
entitlement and collective action capacity, these were not strong enough to push for a land 
reform that—like in the Mexican case—recognized explicitly the injustice of dispossessions and 
that sought to redress them through wide restitution or redistribution measures.  
The 1936 Colombian land reform legislation was enacted in the context of elite splits, and 
it had the purpose of catering to peasants who claimed to have been dispossessed. However, in 
contrast with earlier bills, its main measures sought to clarify the legal titles over disputed lands. 
Such clarification tended to be favorable to the perpetrators rather than the victims of 
dispossession, given the latter’s lack of strong and certain titles and the law’s reticence to invert 
the burden of proof in their favor. For that reason, analysts frequently point out that the 1936 
legislation was a lost opportunity to bring about a meaningful land reform in the country that 
could have transformed the structure of agrarian relations (see, for instance, Berry 2002).  
Despite the moderate nature of the 1936 land reform, its implementation seems to have 
clearly addressed dispossessions. As I will show in this and the following Chapter, land 
allocations made on the grounds of the reform coincide geographically and are statistically 
correlated with prior dispossessions, even when control for many other variables. This indicates 
that—just like in the Mexican case—dispossessions were indeed a key cause of land reform 
claims and of the legislation that they pushed forth. But because of the target of dispossessions—
mainly public lands possessed by peasant settlers—their victims did not have the capacity to 
influence the content of such legislation in order to make sure that it contained  more radical and 
transformative measures.  
The literature tends to agree with the statement that dispossessions carried out during the 




Berry 2002; Palacios 2011).56 However, systematic empirical studies showing the relation are 
exceptional (LeGrand 1980, 1986), and they do not engage in geographical or statistical analysis 
at the municipal level. With this and the following chapter I hence hope to contribute to existent 
studies by offering more solid empirical evidence to the link between the 1936 land reform and 
prior dispossessions.  
To do so, I once again apply the theory and research design formulated in Chapters 1 and 
2, this time to the study of Colombia. In this chapter, I use the existent secondary literature and 
the archival data that I gathered to qualitatively show that the period between 1880 and 1930 was 
a critical era of export agriculture and land dispossessions, that most dispossessions targeted 
public lands possessed by individual settlers (colonos) of the agricultural frontier, that such 
dispossessions were carried out by a combination of violence and fraud, that they were resisted 
through both de iure and de facto mechanisms, and that they led to the peasant mobilization to 
which factions of the liberal party catered by promising land reform in the 1930s. Even though 
the content of the legislation enacted in 1936 was different from what peasants’ leaders wished 
for, its implementation did primarily benefit the areas where dispossessions had occurred. In this 
chapter I show this through maps indicating the geographical coincidence of regions of 
dispossession and agrarian reform land allocations. In the following chapter I do so through 




                                                      
56 A few authors, like Hermes Tovar, are more skeptical about this relationship, and try to reclaim the 
positive effects that the colonization of public lands carried out during the export boom had on peasants. 




The Export Boom Era (1880-1930) 
The international demand for export crops and the development of transportation infrastructure 
activated commercial agriculture in Colombia intensely. The expansion began incipiently in the 
1850s, but really took force in the 1880s and reached its peak in the 1920s. Export crops 
included coffee, tobacco, cocoa, sugar, quinine, indigo, leather, cinchona bark, cattle, bananas 
and oil (LeGrand 1980, 82-4, 92; Sánchez, López-Uribe and Fazio 2010, 380). However, coffee 
was the main agricultural export product, and the sole to become sustainable over time. It rose as 
a share of exports from 12% in 1885 to 50% in 1900 and to 79% in 1929.57 Coffee was therefore 
the main driver of commercial agriculture, and other crops were located in the places where 
coffee grew.  
As Map 9 shows, crops grew along the Andean mountain range, which goes from the 
southwest to the northeast of the country. Their production was facilitated by the development of 
transport infrastructure, especially the railroad system, which was inexistent in 1880 but reached 







                                                      
57 According to LeGrand (1986, 80), “Coffee, which spread west from the slopes of the Santanders and 
Cundinamarca to Antioquia and Caldas, was almost wholly responsible for an increase of 450 percent in 
Colombian export earnings in the years 1870-1918”. 
58 Vega Cantor (2002) has shown that coffee constituted the large majority of the freight carried by the 




Map 9. Agricultural Exports in Colombia (1893) 
(Elaborated using Ministerio de Fomento 1893) 
 
 
Map 10. Railroad System in Colombia (1920) 






Liberal Land Legislation 
The Colombian republican and liberal governments of the early and mid-19th century enacted 
land policies for the disentailment (fragmentation) of corporate lands and the privatization of 
public lands with the purpose of facilitating their entry into commerce (the first laws were 
enacted as early as in 1821 and 1820, respectively). These policies had been more or less 
consistently applied to divide corporate lands and transfer public lands to private hands, but the 
export boom generated incentives to apply them more eagerly and in ways that would entail 
dispossessions. This was especially the case of the public lands policy.  
 
Disentailment of corporate lands 
The disentailment process was regulated by different laws depending on whether the lands in 
question were Church or indigenous property. In the first case, disentailment was ordered in 
1861 under the Liberal government of Mosquera, in part to fulfill the liberal ideology of putting 
unproductive lands in commerce, in part as retaliation for the support the Church had given to 
conservatives during the previous civil conflict. The law was immediately and effectively 
applied. By 1884, most Church property had been confiscated and auctioned by the state, and 
some was divided and sold to individuals under credit. A total of 1,721 square kilometers of land 
were disentailed (Fazio and Sánchez 2010, 452). The process produced severe criticism from the 
conservatives, but it was not resisted or reversed in the following decades.  
 In contrast, the disentailment of indigenous lands was a longer and uncertain process, but 
overall it affected much less lands. It formally began in 1821, when the declaration of 
independence was accompanied by the assertion not only of the legal equality of indigenous, but 




among group members the lands allocated collectively by the Crown in the form of resguardos.59 
However, the Crown had already dissolved many resguardos during the 18th century because of 
the significant reduction of indigenous population and the Bourbons’ pro-commerce orientation 
(Bonnett 2002, 25-6; Melo 2007). So when disentailment was ordered in 1821, lands under 
indigenous corporate ownership were not likely many (Tovar 2007). Still, some indigenous—
especially those located in the southwestern departments of Cauca and Nariño—actively opposed 
resguardo disentailment. This led to the introduction of qualifications in the policy, such as the 
prohibition to sell land once it was disentailed, and to its weak or uneven enforcement in some 
areas. There were regions of the country—like the central departments of Boyacá and 
Cundinamarca—where resguardos were completely disentailed; yet, there were others where 
they subsisted until the late 19th century, and even after.  
At the eve of the export boom, still-existing resguardos experienced pressure over their 
lands by neighboring haciendas, and in 1863, the liberal constitution lifted the restriction to sell 
fragmented resguardos, which offered an incentive for disentailment. In 1890, the Conservative 
government (in office since 1886) halted the policy by ordering the protection of resguardos as a 
means to assure the survival of indigenous groups under the market’s pressures. However, the 
protection did not last long; as the export boom reached its peak, new laws were issued in the 
early 20th century, which ordered either the annexation of remaining resguardos to municipalities 
or their parceling.60 Parceling led to the lands’ absorption by haciendas in regions like Tolima 
(Castrillón 1973). And, as we will see, it generated localized protests.  
                                                      
59 The first resguardos were created in the 1600s with the purpose of protecting indigenous from over-
exploitation (Bonnett 2002, 27). 




The impact of indigenous disentailment during the export boom seems to have been low, 
if compared to other land policies, as well as to its impact in countries like Mexico. Though 
precise data on tenure during this period is not available, Map 11 gives a rough idea of where 
private, corporate and public property were located before the export boom.  
 
Map 11. Types of Land Tenure in Colombia (circa 1865) 
                                               (Elaborated using LeGrand, 1980, p. 35) 
 
   
 
If Map 11 is compared to Map 9, we can see that the areas where export crops were 
grown were dominated by public lands, which were interspersed with private or indigenous 
holdings. Because the latter were significantly fewer than the former, while both were fertile, the 




additionally so since the indigenous population was not numerous61, and part of it was not 
located on resguardos but was nomadic in the southern uncultivated areas of the country. So 
incentives to appropriate land to obtain labor supply from possessors were not nearly as 
important as they were concerning occupiers of public lands. 
 
Privatization of public lands 
Because the development of export agriculture took place mainly on public lands, the policy for 
privatizing them was the main mechanism through which land appropriation for commercial 
purposes took place in Colombia’s late 19th and early 20th centuries. The impact of exports on the 
titling of public lands was quite direct: as Sánchez et al. (2010, 383-4) showed, the booms of 
export prices were followed by dramatic increases in titling activity, especially in the 1870s, 
1890s and 1920s.  
Further, as Graph 3 illustrates, the leading departments of coffee production—Antioquia, 
Cundinamarca, Tolima, Valle, Risaralda, Santander, Norte de Santander, and Caldas—observed 
the highest levels of public land allocations. This explains that, although the policy of public land 
privatization began much earlier than the export boom, its content and implementation changed 










                                                      




Graph 3. Public Land Allocations and Coffee Production in Colombia (up to 1925) 




As LeGrand (1980) notes, the policy had two main periods, corresponding to the before 
and after of the export boom. During the first (1820-1870), the policy had the objective of 
covering the public debt left by the War of Independence, by issuing public bonds that could be 
redeemed in state-owned lands.62 Since it did not impose limits on the number or size of holdings 
and since land acquisition required capital, most of the privatized lands went to the hands of a 
few businessmen and speculators.63 Until the 1870s, privatized lands were rarely exploited by 
                                                      
62 LeGrand (1980, 38-43). See also Kalmanovitz and López (2006, 55); Melo (2007, 152). The early 
public lands legislation had the secondary aim of officially fostering the colonization of the agricultural 
frontier by cultivators (especially foreigners), but it had very scarce results. Foreign immigration never 
became significant and settlers did not legalize their holdings due to the costs and complexity of the 
process. A few corporate lands were granted to organized peasant communities for the creation of 
population settlements with farming lands (poblaciones) in the Antioquia and Santander regions, but they 
accounted for less than one tenth of the public lands allocated between 1827 and 1936 (LeGrand 1980, 
44-53, 100). For a detailed analysis of poblaciones, see Tovar (1995). 
63 In 1905, the emission of land bonds was halted, but those already issued continued to circulate, and 
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their owners, so they often came to be occupied by settlers who spontaneously migrated to the 
agricultural frontier in search for new economic opportunities (Tóvar 1995; Kalmanovitz and 
López 2006, 54; Berry 2002, 27-8).  
During the second period (1870-1930), the policy was reoriented; its priority became to 
stimulate the exploitation of the agricultural frontier, by promising titles to those who had 
cultivated public lands for more than five years and by establishing that allocated but unexploited 
lands should return to the state.64 The policy also protected settlers who had not yet obtained 
titles, or who were occupying private properties, establishing that occupied public lands could 
not be allocated, and that settlers were presumed to be “good faith possessors”, so they could not 
be expelled without a judicial ruling and compensation for the improvements made on the land.65 
These measures were justified by an explicitly liberal ideology, which conceived unproductive 
latifundia as a hindrance to development and democracy, and sought to promote the creation of a 
middle class of independent farmers (LeGrand 1980, 56-7).  
However, those aims do not seem to have materialized in practice, as the implementation 
of the policy tended to favor big landowners much more than small cultivators. Of all public 
lands allocated between 1827 and 1931, only 20% were smaller than 1,000 hectares, while grants 
of less than 200 hectares (equivalent to family farms) accounted for less than 5% (LeGrand 1980, 
103). Further, most of those lands were allocated to bond-buyers even after the legislation 
                                                                                                                                                                           
railroads and wharves, as well as to reward war veterans. In many cases, the bonds were sold to 
speculators, thereby increasing large landholdings in the frontier (LeGrand 1980, 43). 
64 Laws 61 of 1874 and 48 of 1882. Law 48 established that at least 40% of the grants of less than 200 
hectares were exploited, while only 10% of the grants between 3,000 and 5,000 hectares were. Lands 
would be confiscated if they remained unexploited for more than 10 years. Maximum tenure thresholds 
were established for future allocations (LeGrand 1980, 64-5). 




favoring small cultivators was issued (Sánchez, López-Uribe and Fazio 2010, 384-5).66 This 
seems to have been the result of landowners’ manipulative use of the legislation at the expense of 
settlers.  
Indeed, in the last three decades of the 19th century, land values in the agricultural frontier 
rose by more than 200% (Sánchez López-Uribe and Fazio 2010, 380). This led absentee 
landowners to attempt to recover lands occupied by settlers, as well as to extend their borders by 
buying or encroaching upon neighboring (and in many cases also occupied) lands. Settlers had a 
hard time demanding the titles for the lands they occupied, since the process was costly and 
landowners used their local influences to prevent them from doing so. Further, through a 
plurality of legal stratagems and the use of political influences, landowners attempted to request 
the allocation of public lands to surpass maximum thresholds and to usurp such lands, especially 
when they were occupied and cultivated by colonos (LeGrand 1980, 104-5, 118-36).  
Cultivated lands were targeted because lands were only valuable and ready for production 
after they had been cleaned from shrubs and tilled, and because seizing them from cultivators 
was the only way of ensuring their labor.67 Thus, the strategy of land entrepreneurs was to wait 
until colonos prepared the land for cultivation and thereby increased its value; then claim it as 
                                                      
66 While colono cultivators represented a greater percentage of the beneficiaries of public land 
allocations—61% until 1873, 68% until 1892, 82% until 1917, and 68% until 1930—they received a 
smaller percentage of the average amount of allocated lands during the same periods, with the exception 
of the last one—33%, 35%, 39.73%, and 62%, respectively. 
67 LeGrand (1980, 187-91); see also López (1927, 42). In this, the Colombian frontier was significantly 
different from frontiers like the Argentine, where the soil was almost immediately ready for commercial 
agriculture and little labor was needed to exploit it. The success of commercial agriculture in Colombia 
was dependent on labor abundance, especially because of the roughness of the terrain and the 




their own through legal ruses68 and force settlers to become hacienda tenants under the threat 
that they would otherwise be evicted without compensation.69 The strategy was successful 
because landowners had influence over local authorities, who depended on their patronage to 
maintain their posts and advance in their carriers;70 and also because the national government 
was incapable of (or unwilling to) putting a stop to them.71 Indeed, as the export boom advanced, 
the government enacted a few ad hoc measures to deal with dispossessions, which were largely 
ineffective.72 And, at the height of the boom, it also adopted a measure that severely affected 
colonos, which established an abbreviated procedure to evict without appeal occupiers of private 
property. Although the law established that the procedure was only meant for possessors that 
knew the lands were titled, it was used against good faith colonos (LeGrand 1980, 215-6).  
 
                                                      
68 Landowners pressured surveyors to avoid mentioning the presence of cultivators; ensured the perjury of 
witnesses required to testify that there were no settlers; pressured local officials in charge of notifying 
potential objectors to not do so, and even to refuse to admit objections when they were presented, etc. 
LeGrand (1980, 197-9), based on the Baldíos Correspondence Archive. 
69 The threat was illegal since, according to the 1870s pro-settlers legislation, landowners seeking to evict 
colonos had to do so before courts by exhibiting their titles and, if the latter were sufficient, by paying the 
value of the improvements (mejoras) that they had made to the lands. But since landowners often had 
deficient or fabricated titles and the mejoras in many cases surpassed the value of the lands, they recurred 
to intimidation with local officials’ support. And, when that proved insufficient, they destroyed or burned 
their tools and huts, or had officials fine or arrest them (LeGrand 1980, 202-5, 210-5, again based on the 
Baldíos Correspondence). 
70 This was especially the case of mayors, who were appointed by the central government but financially 
dependent on municipal councils that were largely controlled by landowners (LeGrand 1980, 199-201). 
71 LeGrand (1980, 136-8) argues the government tried to intervene but was unsuccessful because it lacked 
information about the exact location and boundaries of public lands and it did not exercise full control at 
the local level. 
72 Measures included: offering rewards to denunciators of appropriations; carrying out state-led litigation 
processes to recover usurped lands; examining the titles of certain conflicts to verify if there were 
usurpations; occasionally refusing to approve grants on occupied lands; conceding writs of possession to 





We know that landowners carried out the aforementioned dispossession strategies because of an 
invaluable archival source, first used by LeGrand (1980): the Baldíos Correspondence of the 
National General Archive, which contains all communications sent to national authorities 
between 1827 and 1930 requesting protection of land tenure in conflict situations.73 This is a 
straightforward indicator of dispossessions, since in many cases the correspondence specifies the 
details of the conflict, and we can hence know whether it was a dispossession. We can moreover 
know the process through which it was carried out, its victims, authors and accomplices and (in 
fewer cases), the solution given to it by the state.  
Further, because the Baldíos Correspondence does not only contain formal and well 
elaborated petitions to the government, but also informal ones—even many telegrams—it 
provides a pretty accurate estimate of the extent and regional distribution of land conflicts. 
Indeed, petitions were quite easy and inexpensive to make. As picture 2 illustrates, they could 
consist in very brief telegrams that did not require traveling to distant places—certainly not to 
the capital of the country, as in Mexico, but likely not to a capital city either. Although they had 
to be written and hence minimum literacy was required, only one of the petitioners in what (as 
we will see below) often were group claims had to be literate. What is more, the petitions were 
not regulated by any special procedure of claim-making, so they implied minimum legal 
information or knowledge from the petitioners, and they certainly did not require the assistance 
of a legal expert.  
 
                                                      
73 I constructed the dataset of the Baldíos Correspondence jointly with Fabio Sánchez, and for that 
purpose we received the assistance of Alba Carolina Gómez (who helped us to take the pictures) and Ana 




Picture 2. Telegram Requesting Land Protection  
 in the Municipality of Barrancabermeja, Colombia (1922) 




The text reads in English: “Employees of the Tropical Oil Company daily violate national colonos’ 
rights; currently they trample on our legally acquired properties. All requests of protection before this 
authority are nugatory. In the face of ambitions of mentioned company Police Inspector wastes 
unspeakable leniency”.  
 
This implied that many poor peasants made this type of claims, in several cases expressly 
highlighting their dire condition. Thus, for instance, apart from the fragment cited at the 
beginning of this chapter, the peasants of Guayabal, Tolima also said in their 1882 claim: “We 
are ignorant and indigent and consequently in outlining our request we only stamp the occurred 
facts without using first class terms…”. Also, in an 1894 claim made by a group of neighbors in 
the municipality of Victoria, department of Tolima, against the allocations of public lands made 




our poor and underprivileged class, and which moans oppressed under the weight of misery 
without any support other than that which your Honor can give it in this case”. 
The Baldíos Correspondence will be quantitatively analyzed in the following chapter. 
However, I offer here some basic data that illustrates the nature, extent and timing of 
dispossessions. The Baldíos Correspondence indicates that dispossessions were significant and 
mainly targeted settlers (colonos) of public lands who had weak legal claims over them. 
Between 1827 and 1930, we found a total of 619 land protection petitions. Of those 
petitions, an impressive 96% (575) claimed that a dispossession (despojo) had occurred—in 89% 
of the cases, the claim of dispossession was explicit, and in the rest implied.  As Chart 2 shows, 
an important majority of those petitions (73%) referred to public lands susceptible of 
privatization (baldíos); 95% of them (416) were specifically made by settlers. In contrast, only 
5% of the petitions referred to indigenous collective terrains.  Hence, as foreseen, the main form 
that dispossessions took in Colombia was that of peasant settlers who possessed and cultivated 
public lands, and hence had precarious yet existent legal rights over them.  
Despite the difference in their main target, just like in Mexico, dispossessions coincided 
with the export boom in both timing and location. While only one petition was reported between 
1827 and 1869, and three until 1880, the number rose to 131 between 1881 and 1900, then again 
to 202 between 1901 and 1919, and up to 259 between 1920 and 1930. These increases 
responded quite directly to the behavior of export agriculture, which—as we saw—experienced 







Chart 2. Dispossessions by Terrain Type in Colombia (1827-1930) 




Graph 4. Petitions of Land Protection per Year in Colombia (1827-1930) 
(Constructed using own dataset of Baldíos Correspondence, AGN) 
 




















What is more, the regional distribution of dispossessions coincides quite precisely with 
places where export crops were grown and the railroad developed, as can be seen by comparing 
Map 12—dispossessions by type of tenure—to Maps 9 and 10.  
 
        Map 12. Dispossessions by Type of Land Tenure in Colombia (1827-1930) 
                                  (Constructed using own dataset of Baldíos Correspondence, AGN) 
 
 
The departments with the highest concentration of dispossessions were all located in 
regions where public lands interspersed with private or indigenous lands (Map 11) and 
experienced high levels of public land allocations (Graph 3). This implies that dispossessions did 
not occur in the open agrarian frontier where most of the lands were not only public but also 
vacant and ill-communicated, but rather in the latifundia frontier where large tracts of public 




handful of settlers migrating from those settlements, as well as encroached upon by nearby 
haciendas or land entrepreneurs.74 Thus, as LeGrand (1980) argued, land dispossessions were 
used by perpetrators not only to appropriate land but also the labor of prior settlers.  
Of the 575 claimants that alleged dispossession, only 24% claimed to have a property title 
over the land. However, 65% argued that the dispossession was carried out through a de jure 
mechanism—i.e. abusing a law or making irregular use of a legal procedure—while 26% 
claimed to have experienced violence or threats against property, and 17% violence or threats 
against their life or integrity. As predicted in Chapter 1, this combination of force and fraud was 
the result of colonos having weak and uncertain, but still existent and recognized, legal rights to 
their lands. As mentioned above, colonos had possession rights to the lands they occupied and 
cultivated, which implied that they could stay on the land and profit from its production, and that 
they had the preferential right to obtain its allocation by the state. Hence, even if dispossessors 
used force to push colonos out of the lands they coveted, they could not successfully request 
their allocation to the state unless they used a legal stratagem to show that the land was not 
occupied or that they had a better right over it.  
In a majority of cases, the people accused by claimants of being their dispossessors were 
either landowners or entrepreneurs (54%), and in some cases (11%) state authorities—especially 
from the municipal level—actively participated in the dispossession. Even though their main 
target were individual settlers of public lands, dispossessions also affected a few indigenous 
groups also likely occupying public lands. Of the 30 petitions (5%) made with respect to 
collective indigenous lands, only one requested protection from the disentailment of resguardos; 
                                                      




all the rest for which we know the content (23) claimed that their terrains were being claimed as 
public lands by neighboring landowners.  
Indigenous petitions are concentrated in departments where collective indigenous lands 
existed (see Map 11) and where indigenous agitation was strong under the leadership of Quintín 
Lame. Map 13 illustrates the places where protests by indigenous took place, mainly between 
1914 and 1922. As can be seen, indigenous mobilization occurred in some regions of 
dispossession, but it was quite focalized. 
 
Map 13. Indigenous Protests under Quintín Lame in Colombia (1867-1922) 







Despite the weak and uncertain nature of their rights, 73% of settler petitions were made 
by groups (304 out of 416). This indicates an outstanding capacity for collective action, 
comparable to that of Mexican pueblos despite colonos’ lack of collective land rights and the 
preexistent political organization derived from them. Such capacity seems to have resulted 
mainly from colonos’ perceiving a common injustice and attempting to struggle against it. 
Indeed, only 25% of the petitions made by groups of settlers exhibit some communal feature 
facilitating collective action, such as settlers calling themselves neighbors, or members of a 
community, village or municipality. In all other cases, collective petitions simply consist in 
settlers who had possessed and cultivated adjoining lands for many years, and who were 
suddenly dispossessed by the same commercial company or landowner. In several cases, the 
latter attempted to charge them rent fees, buy the constructions made on the land, or force them 
to work as peons or day laborers. Even though dispossessed settlers did not have a preexistent 
collective organization, their sense of entitlement to the lands and the consequent perception of 
injustice derived from their loss led them to surpass the difficulties of collective action.  
That does not mean however, that colonos were successful in their quest for protection. 
We know that at least 288 (48%) petitions were decided by the central state; of them, only 16% 
were decided favorably and ordered a concrete measure to address the conflict in question; 
another 9% were favorable to the claimant but did not order any redress, and the majority (61%) 
did not make a decision but simply referred the case to another authority with jurisdiction to 
decide it—usually a local authority, and hence possibly under the influence of the dispossessor. 
37 petitions (12.8%) were negatively decided. It is hence very likely that, despite their requests 





The Legacies of Agrarian Reform (1928-1960) 
 
Peasant Mobilization and the Government’s Response 
According to LeGrand (1980, 218, 275, 280-1), the result of dispossessions was that thousands 
of settlers lost their lands and were transformed into tenants, or else evicted and pushed further 
into the frontier or towards urban settlements. As said, at first dispossessed settlers reacted 
against attempts to their lands through multiple petitions to national authorities requesting 
protection; but in the late 20s and 30s, dispossessed settlers complemented their defensive and de 
jure strategy with an offensive and de facto strategy consisting in the occupation of private 
latifundia under the claim that they were public lands that had been illegally appropriated by 
landowners. This strategy was enabled by economic and political changes that opened 
opportunities for contestation. As agricultural exports increased, the interests of commercial 
elites expanded to industry, which led to a shift in the government’s policy towards the 
encouragement of cheap agricultural production for internal consumption, and hence to the 
adoption of a more unequivocal pro-colono stance.75 Further, dispossessed settlers were 
                                                      
75 LeGrand (1986, 290-303). The policy change was justified on the grounds that large landholdings had 
led to the ruin of the economy and that colonos were the true key actors of economic development. This 
implied renewed efforts to recover usurped lands, the reinforcement of colonos’ protections against 
dispossessions and the promotion of official colonization programs in certain areas, like Sumapaz. The 
first two goals were facilitated by a crucial decision issued by the Supreme Court of Justice in 1926, 
which established that the burden of proof of the existence and legitimacy of private land titles relied on 
the alleged owners. The ruling, to which landowners referred as the “diabolical proof”, changed the 
balance of power between landowners and colonos. Moreover, the ruling paved the way for the issuance 
of laws intended to recover the lands for which large landowners did not exhibit valid titles (Law 84 of 
1927), to facilitate the procedure for granting small plots to cultivators (Law 47 of 1926) and to require 
that eviction procedures only be started if titles were exhibited (Decree 992 of 1930). All these measures 
strengthened the legal standing of colonos and provided grounds to their vindication of usurped lands. See 




influenced by the labor movement that saw its birth in the 20s, which provided new strategies of 
contentious action and leadership..76  
 In the new climate of a friendlier national government and a combative ally, land 
occupations began in the early 1920s and became generalized after 1928. They were carried out 
by two different types of colonos: on the one hand, tenants of large estates (many of them prior 
settlers) who refused to pay their rents, arguing not only that the latter were exacting77, but also 
that landowners’ titles were based on prior dispossessions. On the other hand, heterogeneous 
groups of peasants—including former settlers but also other rural and urban workers—who 
occupied and rapidly cultivated unexploited estates and then requested protection as cultivators 
(LeGrand 1980, 322-4). Map 14 shows the location of occupations, which, if compared with 







                                                      
76 This influence was suffered both by dispossessed colonos who migrated to urban areas, and by colonos 
who converted into tenants or rural wage laborers. The former mainly found work opportunities in the 
government’s public works projects where labor organizations concentrated; and, when the world 
depression generated high unemployment rates and the government promoted their return to rural areas, 
they refused to accept low wages and assumed leadership roles in land occupation movements. In turn, 
colono tenants either faced the direct contact of labor organizations that emerged in certain areas (like the 
banana enclaves), or began to make labor claims that appealed to the labor movement, which catered to 
them as it began to enter party politics. See LeGrand (1986, 306-18). 
77 Especially due to landowners’ practice of prohibiting the cultivation of coffee in rented parcels. See 




Map 14. Land Occupations by Colonos in Colombia (1928-33) 
                                         (Elaborated using LeGrand 1980) 
    
 
The more aggressive mobilization of settlers led the liberal party to attempt to cater to 
their demands and thus mobilize their votes. After more than 40 years in the opposition, liberals 
won office in 1930, and saw incipient communist movements as their main competitors (Palacios 
2011, 157-60). Further, they evidenced an internal split led by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán—the utmost 
populist leader in Colombian politics—who broke from the party between 1933 and 1935 to 
promote a more radical agenda under the UNIR movement. Before and during his divorce from 
liberalism, Gaitán put the situation of settlers at the center of the political debate: he acted as 
lawyer of some colonos who disputed the lands of important haciendas, and helped uncover the 
irregularity of their titles; in his speeches in Congress, he denounced colonos’ harassment by 




agrarian reform policy to integrally solve the situation of colonos. In doing so, Gaitán managed 
to take almost all peasant support away from communists78, but also forced the liberal 
mainstream to focus on the “agrarian question”. In many of these activities, Gaitán allied with 
Erasmo Valencia, a former communist leader in the Sumapaz region who published until 1937 
the influential magazine Claridad, the main means of communication and political mobilization 
of colonos (Londoño 2011, 312). After Gaitán’s reincorporation to the liberal party, Valencia 
founded the short-lived National Agrarian Party, which never obtained much electoral support.  
In response to peasant mobilization and to Gaitán’s insistence in the issue, between 1930 
and 1934, Olaya’s Liberal government addressed the conflict between colonos and landowners 
through various measures, including: the promotion of the judicial review of titles of disputed 
terrains; the intervention of the National Labor Bureau in all conflicts through fact-finding 
missions and mediation; the creation of officially sponsored peasant unions (ligas campesinas) 
with direct channels of communication with the government; the expropriation, division and 
distribution among occupant colonos of a few haciendas where the squatting movement had 
become most prominent; and, when the latter option was found financially unviable, the attempt 
to sell divided estates to colonos, which was severely criticized by the opposition and resisted by 
colonos who refused to pay for lands they considered public (Sánchez 1977; LeGrand 1980, 331-
3, 363, 394-7).  
Despite these measures, and in part because of the political prominence that they had 
given to it, rural unrest reached its zenith in 1933. And governing elites came to the realization 
                                                      
78 Communists lost peasant support because of their recalcitrance to enter into alliances with Gaitán and 
their neglect of the public lands problem—they only retained support in areas where the main problem 





that, as Gaitán claimed, an agrarian reform program was needed to adequately address the 
problem.79 While discussed in Congress, the different agrarian reform bills were based on the 
idea that the main problem at stake was the conflict between colonos who cultivated public lands 
and “other persons who claim[ed] them as their own”, as President Olaya put it in his address to 
Congress in 1933. The reform was adopted by the incoming Liberal government of López 
Pumarejo (1934-8) as Law 200 of 1936.  
The law established that the lands for which legal titles could not be exhibited would be 
reputed baldíos, and hence susceptible of allocation to occupants; but it contemplated as 
acceptable titles not only the original grants given by the state but also private titles that could 
show a consecutive chain of transfers extending over a thirty-year period (art. 3).80 The 
introduction of this clause, which opened the way for the legalization of land dispossessions 
carried out through abusive applications of the law, was openly justified by the government as a 
mechanism for mollifying the elite’s fear of a socialist agrarian reform.81 The law also 
                                                      
79 For instance, in 1934 the Ministry of Industries declared: “(…) [T]he various agrarian disputes have 
begun to assume a common dynamic, signaling the emergence of a collective consciousness of the land 
problem (…) The persistence of the conflicts (…) has generated an intense concern among the Colombian 
people. The land question now is considered to be one of the most important and pressing national issues. 
(…) [A] healthy agitation is stirring which anxiously seeks to find an appropriate solution to the land 
struggles in progress” (cited in LeGrand 1980, 391).  
80 The clause was not applicable to lands that had been occupied for more than two years before the 
issuance of the law by settlers who claimed they were public, in which cases the only admissible proofs of 
ownership were original grants conferred by the state or private titles prior to 1821 (art. 4). 
81 In his 1935 address to Congress, López said: “Because the great majority of private landholdings in 
Colombia lack perfect titles, in the light of abstract jurisprudence they should return to the public domain. 
Technically, then, we find ourselves faced with the juridical alternative of directing this country towards a 
socialist orientation or of revalidating such property titles, purifying them of imperfections. My 
government has chosen the second path” (quoted in LeGrand 1980, 431).  
The law also established that, even if landowners exhibited proof of titles, they would have to pay colono 




established that colonos located on private property could become owners if they proved to have 
possessed it for more than five years and to have acted in “good faith”, i.e. without knowledge 
that it was private. It thus excluded tenant squatters who had ceased to pay their rents and 
challenged landowners’ illegitimate titles. These colonos could be evicted through administrative 
measures and could be imprisoned for recurrence. Finally, the law established that all private 
land left unexploited for more than ten years would be recovered by the state, with the exception 
of landholdings of less than 300 hectares (art. 6).  
For the implementation of these rules, the law foresaw the creation of land tribunals, in 
charge of addressing preexistent conflicts by determining who had better titles or claims to 
disputed lands. However, lands could also be allocated through the same administrative 
procedure that until then had been used for the allocation of public lands; this could be the case 
not only of lands that the government still held as public, but also of the disputed lands that were 
considered public by the land tribunals, and of the unexploited large tracts of land that would be 
expropriated. 
Thus, Law 200 introduced several important changes, which aimed to placate the conflict 
between colonos and landowners and to impose some limitations to ownership based on effective 
exploitation—what the liberal doctrine of the time called the “social function of property”. 
However, in contrast with other bills discussed82, it only protected the rights of colonos who had 
                                                                                                                                                                           
landowners would have to allow colonos to buy the lands if more than 90 days passed after the law was 
issued and they did not initiate a judicial claim, or if they did not pay for the improvements after 30 days 
of a judicial ruling in their favor. 
82 The first bill was presented by a group of Congressmen under the leadership of Liberal Lleras Restrepo, 
and it proposed to expropriate and redistribute all the lands cultivated by colonos and tenants through an 
expedite procedure, on the grounds that the value of labor of an “uncountable number of workers” is 
“incorporated in lands of private property”. The second bill was drafted by a special commission 
established by President Olaya in 1933, which included several ministers and Gaitán as acting 




not openly attacked the rights of landowners and that had been strong enough to successfully 
occupy uncultivated lands for an extended period of time. With regards to the rest, the law 
generated incentives for landowners to rapidly evict them, in order to avoid property claims on 
their behalf. Moreover, the law enabled landowners to legalize much of the usurpations of public 
lands that they had carried out in the past, and provided them with incentives to continue 
appropriations, since from then on they were allowed to claim the lands that they occupied and 
economically exploited. Landowners could continue the practice of allowing colonos to cultivate 
lands for a short period of time (less than 5 years now) and then claiming them as their own.  
In sum, the law mainly aimed at clarifying the titles to the lands that were being disputed, 
but not so much at carrying out wider redistributive measures. Although it contemplated the 
expropriation of large estates, this measure was rarely put in practice, and most of the allocated 
lands in the future were public (Londoño 2011, 311). Further, the law allowed landowners to 
continue taking advantage of complicated procedures and burdens of proof to hinder colonos’ 
claims over their lands, and to assert their claims, even if they had an illegal origin. Also, the law 
did not establish many mechanisms to rebalance power relations between colonos and 
landowners, since it only foresaw individual and alienable land allocations—which could be 
                                                                                                                                                                           
private property, by endorsing the Supreme Court’s view that all land had to be presumed public unless 
titles were exhibited that proved the contrary. Such titles could not consist in private legal transfers that 
did not have a transfer from the state to a private person at their origin. The implementation of the bill 
would have likely allowed the state to recover most of the land held as private property in the country, 
given that, as the introduction to the bill pointed out, “the great majority of those who consider 
themselves landowners are unable to trace their titles back to the original grant of land”.  Further, the bill 
established that for those tracts of land for which no clear titles existed, the state would grant titles to 
those who economically exploited them, which implied “the presumption of rightful domain in favor of 
squatters”. Finally, the bill created abbreviated administrative and judicial procedures for solving 





threatened by the future avarice of landowners through pressures to sell at low prices, and which 
inhibited collective action.  
For all these reasons, Law 200 was criticized by promoters of agrarian reform as a failed 
opportunity to bring about a deep change in the rural structure. Its enactment (instead of that of 
its competing and more transformative bills) was explained in the following way by Juan de la 
Cruz Varela, a colono leader from Sumapaz: “Comrades Valencia and Jorge Eliécer Gaitán 
discovered that there was not a single legal title in Colombia because they had all been 
adulterated. (…) [However,] because Congress was made up of landowners and oligarchs, they 
defeated Gaitán’s plan, elaborated with comrade Valencia, and they imposed Law 200, and we 
will now have to face evictions” (Autobiographical Narrative, cited in Londoño 2011, 308).  
Analysts have explained this outcome as the result of the gradual erosion of colono 
political pressure, and of the consequent capacity of landowners to obtain greater influence in 
national policy in the years 1934-6. Though 1933 was a turbulent year, in 1934 rural agitations 
began to cede, and 1935 was relatively tranquil in terms of rural unrest. This resulted in part 
from hacienda subdivisions, which mollified some of the most combatant colonos, and in part 
from the dilution of the leftist political leadership’s defense of the colono cause. In 1935, after 
losing the Presidential election against López, Gaitán reran for Congress under the Liberal Party 
ticket, and hence disbanded his short-lived party UNIR. The Communist Party took a similar turn 
by adopting a collaborative stance with the government. The appeal of López’s agenda to these 
factions notwithstanding, the leftists’ turn away from the colonos’ cause seems to be explained 
by the fact that, as their squatting threat subsided, they stopped being a relevant source of 
political mobilization. Gaitán’s leadership, as well as López’s agenda, focused almost entirely on 




threatening agrarian reform bills, by accusing them of fostering a “Bolshevik” attack on private 
property, something that appealed to the broader constituencies of industrial entrepreneurs and 
middle class professionals. This led López to take a more nuanced stance towards the agrarian 
issue by reassuring landowners in their rights.   
All in all, what this explanation reveals is that colono mobilization was strong enough to 
achieve the enactment of a land reform policy, but not as strong as to push for a sufficiently 
transformative one. For a short period of time, it was able to profit from elite splits in order to 
attract the attention of some political leaders, to have its situation discussed in the national arena, 
and to force national authorities to make specific interventions in their conflict with landowners. 
But colono pressure faded rapidly, and so did the interest of elites in catering to their needs, 
which brought a land reform that attempted to solve the discontent of peasants wherever it was 
more salient, but in the long-term maintained the predominance of latifundia and left the way 
open for landowners to continue their dispossession practices. 
 
Agrarian Reform Land Allocations (1937-1960) 
Despite its limitations, Law 200 did address prior dispossessions suffered by colonos, 
especially by primarily benefitting in its implementation the regions where dispossessions had 
occurred.  Map 15 shows land reform allocations made between 1937 and 1960—the year before 
a new land reform was issued. As can be seen, land reform allocations were concentrated in the 
same regions where dispossessions occurred between 1827 and 1930 (compare to Map 12), and 
they were particularly abundant in areas where peasant occupations were carried out between 





Map 15. Agrarian Reform Land Allocations in Colombia (1937-60) 
                                      (Elaborated using own dataset of Incoder) 
 
    
 In 80% of the 600 municipalities where dispossession claims were made during the 
export boom, at least one agrarian reform allocation was made exactly there (in 394 of the cases), 
or very close by (in 86 of the cases). Further, 10 out of the 15 departments where land reform 
allocations ranked highest also had the highest amount of land conflicts and dispossession claims 
during the export boom—Valle, Nariño, Huila, Tolima, Santander, Caldas, Antioquia, Quindío, 
Cundinamarca, Cesar.  
 
In the next chapter I will show that the geographical coincidence between land reform 







Chapter 6: Quantitative Study of Colombia83 
In Chapter 2, I derived two types of hypotheses for the Colombian case, depending on the level 
of analysis. At the macro-level, I predicted that land dispossessions occurred at a significant level 
during the export boom, that dispossessions mainly targeted public lands legally possessed by 
settlers, that dispossessions were carried out through both violence and legal manipulation, that 
the victims of dispossession resisted through both legal and de facto means, and that their 
grievances translated into claims of agrarian reform that were strong to push for the enactment of 
a policy, but not strong enough to ensure its radical content. Further, at the subnational level, I 
predicted that the more land dispossessions during the export boom, the more agrarian reform 
claims and land allocations in the subsequent period.  
In the previous chapter, I showed that the foreseen macro-level patterns took place in the 
Colombian case. I also showed that at the departmental (state) level, land dispossessions during 
the export boom (1880-1930) and agrarian reform claims during the following period (1936-60) 
coincide geographically.  In this chapter, I take up the task of providing further support to that 
coincidence, by carrying out a statistical study of the relation between dispossessions and 
subsequent land reform allocations at the level of Colombian municipalities.  
                                                      
83 This and the previous chapter offer the basis of a paper that I am co-writing with Fabio Sánchez, in 
which, on the grounds of my theory and methodology, we use an instrumental variable approach to 
examine the relation between dispossessions and land reform. All the data used in this chapter were 
gathered and analyzed with Fabio Sánchez’s collaboration, as well as with the assistance of Alba Carolina 




Through OLS regression analysis, I show that such relation is significant and robust. The 
more dispossessions—measured as petitions of protection against land conflict made before the 
government—occurred in a given municipality during the Colombian export boom, the more 
land reform allocations were made during the period of implementation of the 1936 land reform 
legislation. The relation persists after controlling for several variables.  In contrast with Mexico, 
neither population nor distance to institutions influenced agrarian reform land allocations. But 
both elevation and the size of the municipality did: the greater the municipal elevation, the fewer 
the land reform allocations; and the greater the municipality area, the more the allocations. These 
effects, however, do not diminish the impact of dispossessions.  
On the other hand, I show that the relation between dispossessions and land reform 
claims is more significant and robust than that of other variables that capture the potential impact 
of mechanisms alternative to the one I theorize. Those variables include—just like in Mexico—
the value of land, but also the existence of old settlements and the allocation of public lands. As 
argued in Chapter 5, most land dispossessions in Colombia took place in frontier regions, so if 
indeed dispossessions were a relevant factor of land reform allocations, the presence of old 
settlements should not have an impact on the latter.  Further, I argued that dispossessions were 
spurred by the government policy of allocating lands to peasant settlers but also to land-buyers, 
who in many cases forcedly and fraudulently claimed those that settlers had cultivated. Now, it 
could be public land allocations per se—rather than the dispossessions that it spurred—which 
mainly drove posterior land claims. If that were the case, then dispossessions of possessed public 
lands would not be as relevant a mechanism producing land reform claims. To discard this 
possibility, I evaluate both the autonomous and interaction effects of public land allocations, and 




land allocations, and that the effect of dispossessions was not multiplied by land public land 
allocations. This implies that, as theorized, the sense of entitlement provided by legal possession 
and the sense of injustice provoked by its loss promoted peasants land claims.  
Finally, I show that the relation between dispossessions and land reform allocations 
persists after introducing department-level state effects, and that it can also be observed when 
using the number of hectares of agrarian reform land allocations—not just the number of the 
latter.  
In the following sections, I explain the indicators and data sources that I used for 
measuring the dependent, independent and control variables. Later, I describe the strategy used 
for analyzing the data, and present the results. 
 
Indicators and Data 
 
Dependent Variable: Agrarian Reform Land Allocations 
 
Just as in the Mexican case, and following the research design proposed in Chapter 2, I 
operationalize the dependent variable—land reform claims—with early agrarian reform land 
allocations. Allocations are a good proxy for claims in the Colombian case because they were 
entirely demand driven. Moreover, they are the only data that is comprehensively available 
concerning the implementation of the 1936 land reform.  
Indeed, as explained in Chapter 5, on the basis of Law 200 of 1936, land tribunals were 
established to resolve preexistent conflicts and determine whether the land was private or 
public—which in the former case required the existence of legal titles. However, on the grounds 




the public lands that still remained in the hands of the state, the disputed lands for which alleged 
owners could not exhibit titles, and the private large landholdings expropriated because of being 
uncultivated. As far as I know, the rulings of the land tribunals cannot be found in their entirety. 
More importantly, since those rulings did not redistribute land, but rather solved land conflicts, 
they are perhaps not the best indicator of land reform allocations. The decisions of land tribunals 
quite obviously addressed the conflicts related to dispossessions, but for those conflicts to be 
relevant for redistributive land claims, they should also have an impact on the allocation of lands 
via agrarian reform beyond the solution of those conflicts.  
For those reasons, I use the government’s data on the allocation of public lands since the 
enactment of Law 200 of 1936 as the main measure of agrarian reform land allocations. As said, 
that data is likely to include not only the allocation of undisputed public lands, but also of 
disputed lands that were considered public by land tribunals, as well as of private expropriated 
lands. Therefore, if indeed prior dispossessions had an impact on agrarian reform allocations, 
such impact should be observed not only in the rulings of land tribunals, but also in the land 
allocations made by the government since Law 200 was issued.   
 The historical data on public land allocations is not public, but the Colombian Institute 
for Rural Development (Incoder, for its Spanish initials) made it available for Fabio Sánchez and 
me for research purposes. The data was compiled by the Institute on the grounds of all the 
decisions (resolutions) that the national government has made concerning the allocation of public 
lands. The data only includes the yearly number of decisions and hectares made in each 
municipality since 1901. It does not include the claims on the basis of which land allocations 
were made, nor any details about the procedure that would allow to distinguish disputed from 




decisions had to be made on demand, they are a good proxy of the claims, since, for each claim, 
there should be one allocation unless the decision was negative.  
 With Fabio Sánchez’ collaboration, I included the land allocations data in a municipality 
dataset that contains several other variables described below. I also obtained the geographical 
coordinates for each of the allocations, which enabled me to create the Maps found in Chapter 5. 
As in the Mexican case, in this chapter I use as the main indicator of land reform claims 
the number of allocations at the municipal level, which in this case are reported as such and 
hence do not need to be aggregated. I also use the number of hectares entailed in those 
allocations to see whether the predicted correlation is sustained. However, the number of 
hectares is a less precise indicator of land reform claims, since it may obey to other factors like 
the quality, availability and value of the land. Moreover, the number of hectares is less capable 
of capturing the effect of prior dispossessions on land claims, since very strong claims could be 
based on small extensions if that was the object of dispossession. Therefore, the number of 
hectares is just a way of checking the robustness of the results.  
 As said in Chapter 5, I only consider the agrarian reform land allocations made between 
the years 1937 to 1960. 1937 was the first year of implementation of Law 200, and strictly 
speaking, 1960 was its last year of implementation, since a new land reform law responding to 
different political dynamics  was enacted in 1961 (Law 135).  
 
Independent Variable: Land Dispossessions during the Export Boom 
 
Following Chapter 2, land dispossessions during the export boom—the independent variable 
identified in my theory—are operationalized through petitions of state protection against 




Colombian case, those petitions consist in the communications of different formats found in the 
Baldíos Correspondence at the National General Archive. The common characteristic of those 
petitions is that they request the intervention of the national executive in conflicts over land.  
 This archival source was first analyzed systematically by Catherine LeGrand (1980, 
1986). However, because it contains very rich and detailed information about the characteristics 
of the conflict, I decided to revise it thoroughly once again. With Fabio Sánchez’s collaboration, 
and with the assistance of Alba Carolina Gómez and Ana María Castro, I obtained the pictures of 
all the Baldíos archive and coded each of the petitions, including information about their date 
and place, the type of claimant and adversary, the decision given to the claim (if any), as well as 
details of the claim’s content, such as whether a dispossession was alleged, whether it was a de 
facto or a de iure dispossession, whether it involved violence, legal manipulation or the abuse of 
a state authority, and whether the claimant had a formal legal title to the land. Most of these 
details were described in Chapter 5.  
These petitions are a direct indicator of dispossessions since, as seen in Chapter 5, the 
vast majority (96%) describe the conflict in question as a dispossession, and the few that do not 
refer to similar conflicts. These petitions could be made in a very informal and inexpensive 
format that did not require claimants traveling to the country’s capital or to a nearby city, such as 
telegrams. And, as we saw in Chapter 5, they were in many cases (almost 70%) made by poor 
peasant settlers. Therefore, we can take this to be a proxy of the extent and regional distribution 
of dispossessions.   
 For this chapter’s analysis, I created a dummy of dispossessions based on whether there 
had been a Baldíos Correspondence petition in a given municipality between 1880 and 1930. As 




originally reported by LeGrand (1980, 1986). The earliest date of the petitions is 1827, but only 
three were reported before 1880, the start point of the export boom. I constructed the dummy 
excluding those 3 petitions to focus on the export boom years, but as may be expected the results 
do not change if they are included.   
   
Basic Controls 
 
Several controls were included in the models, which were shared with me by Fabio Sánchez. The 
first control is the 1930 municipal population, obtained from the Colombian Statistics Agency, 
DANE. In contrast with the Mexican case, population density is not as likely to drive 
dispossessions since, as we saw, these took place mainly in agrarian frontier areas that were not 
the mostly populated. In any case, population levels right before the implementation of the 
agrarian reform could explain land allocations if the latter were motivated by elites’ preferences 
or interests, which could for instance consist in allocating lands in populated areas where they 
could receive votes in return, or in populating less populated regions.  
 The second control is the municipality elevation, obtained from the Colombian 
Geographical Institute IGAC. As in the case of Mexico, this variable seeks to capture 
geographical characteristics such as land quality, as well as a rough measure of the distance to 
state institutions. It is normally the case that the higher a municipality, the lower the quality of 
the land and the further big cities are. So if land reform decisions were taken mainly by 
maximizing economic elites, land allocations would be made more on low quality lands where 
landowners’ interests would not be affected, and the effect of the elevation variable should be 




demands were based on prior dispossessions, since the latter could and would likely occur in 
fertile areas.  
The third control is a more precise measure of the distance to institutions: the distance to 
Bogotá, the country’s capital, also obtained from DANE. Colombia was a centralized country 
both at the time of the export boom and when the 1936 land reform was implemented—it has in 
fact been centralized for most of its independence history except in a brief period of the 19th 
century—so the distance to the capital captures the most important distance to state institutions, 
since the main political, judicial and administrative institutions were there. Moreover, the capital 
in Colombia is located in the center of the country and, as we saw in Chapter 5, frontier areas 
where less population and institutions existed were located outside of its peripheral surroundings. 
Finally but most importantly, the capital was the place in which land reform allocations were 
made, and it was also the place where the addressees of petitions of protection against 
dispossession were during the export boom. So if indeed those decisions were driven by the 
distance to the relevant institutions, the further municipalities were, the less likely it was for 
them to obtain land allocations. Thus, as the elevation measure, the impact of the distance to the 
capital on land allocations should be negative, if any.   
The last basic control is the area of municipalities, also obtained from IGAC. This is a 
variable probably affecting the Colombian land reform, which, as seen in Chapter 5, mostly 
distributed public lands. Given that the larger the municipality, the more likely it is for there to 









In addition to the former controls, the models include certain variables that capture the potential 
operation of mechanisms different from the theorized impact of dispossessions on the dependent 
variable.  
First, the models include a variable that measures the presence of indigenous in 1560. 
This variable seeks to establish whether municipalities were old settlements and likely had 
colonial institutions. Indeed, as known, colonizers tended to settle and establish institutions 
wherever there were indigenous whose labor they could use. This can be considered a measure of 
institutional strength or state capacity, since the longer the presence of institutions the stronger 
they are likely to be. If the control were to have an impact on land allocations, it would be such 
that the places with stronger institutions would receive greater allocations as a result of the 
capacity of institutions to implement the land reform. This would to some extent question the 
theory and findings of Chapter 5, since we said that dispossessions mainly occurred in 
agricultural frontier areas—different from old settlements—so if dispossessions were the main 
causal factor of land reforms, then old settlements should have an inexistent or negative impact 
on them. The variable was constructed on the basis of Tovar (1987), and it takes a value of 1 if a 
given municipality had indigenous there or close by (in less of 100 kilometers) or of 0 otherwise. 
Second, like in the Mexican case, the models include two indicators of the value of land:  
the presence of agricultural commodities and the distance of municipalities to the main markets. 
As said in Chapter 4, including these variables in the models has the purpose of determining 
whether indeed dispossessions were a relevant factor producing agrarian reform claims, or 
whether their effect just masks that of the increase in land values during the export boom.  




values affected land reform allocations by informing elites’ decisions from above. If the latter 
were the case, we would expect land values to negatively impact allocations, as elites would be 
interested in allocating less valuable lands. If, in contrast, dispossessions indeed targeted 
valuable lands during the export boom and had a significant impact on land reform allocations, 
then the values of land could positively affect allocations or not produce a significant impact on 
them.  
The first indicator of land values is, just like in the Mexican case, the average potential 
rain-fed yield of the land for the main agricultural commodities, constructed using FAO’s online 
data on Global Agro-Ecological Zones. In the Colombian case, the commodities included in the 
index are coffee, sugar, cocoa and tobacco. The second indicator of land values is the distance to 
the main markets, which seeks to proxy for the access to markets granted by transport 
infrastructure. This indicator was calculated using DANE’s data on the distance of each 
municipality to the four cities where the most important markets existed—Bogotá, Cali, 
Medellín, Barranquilla.  
Finally, the models include a log measure of the total amount of public lands (baldíos) 
allocated between 1827 and 1930, obtained from the National General Archive. With this 
variable I seek to establish whether the observed impact of dispossessions on land reform 
allocations is, for some reason, merely masking the effect of prior public land allocations. If this 
were the case, then the dispossessions of possessed public lands would not be the relevant 
mechanism generating agrarian reform claims, but rather the general process of public land 
allocations—regardless of whether it produced dispossessions or not. Now, it could also be the 
case that neither dispossessions nor public land allocations generated more agrarian reform land 




allocations because it was not necessary to allocate more lands in the places where allocations 
had already occurred. If that were the case, then the theory about the conflictive nature of land 
allocations during the export boom would be challenged.  
I do not only use the baldíos allocations as a control. I also interact it with the 
dispossessions dummy to determine whether the impact of the latter was multiplied by such 
allocations. In both cases, I use the log of the variable, but the results are not much different 




Finally, the models include department-level fixed effects, with the purpose of excluding the 
possibility that the observed effects are the product of specific departamental characteristics.  
 
Empirical strategy and results 
 
I examine the relation between land dispossessions during the export boom and agrarian reform 
land allocations in the aftermath using OLS regression analysis. Tables 8 and 9 present the 
results using the number of land allocations as indicator of the dependent variable, and Tables 10 
and 11 present the results using as indicator of the latter the number of hectares allocated via 
agrarian reform. As said above, the first indicator is a much more precise measure of land reform 
claims, but the second is used as a robustness check. As will be seen, the effect of dispossessions 
on both indicators is very significant and robust. In all tables, I start by presenting a model that 
only contains the effect of the independent variable (or the interaction) on the dependent one, and 




mechanisms, and department-level fixed effects. The effect of dispossessions remains significant 
and robust after introducing all such specifications.   
 As Table 8 shows, the dummy of dispossessions during the export boom is a very strong 
predictor of post-1936 land reform allocations. If at least one dispossession occurred during the 
export boom in a given municipality, such municipality obtained 171 land allocations more, 
taking into account the intervention of all control variables and fixed effects (model 4). Apart 
from dispossessions, elevation, municipal size and distance to the main markets also seem to 
have an impact on land reform allocations, although the magnitude of the coefficients is much 
smaller in all those cases.  
Elevation and municipal size produce an impact in the expected direction, with 
municipalities located higher above the sea level receiving less land allocations and with larger 
municipalities receiving more allocations. As argued above, the first effect may roughly capture 
municipalities distance to state institutions, though other variables attempting to do that—
distance to the capital and to old indigenous settlements—do not produce any effects. More 
importantly perhaps, elevation captures municipalities’ land quality, and the direction of its 
impact indicates that the worse the land quality, the less the land allocations. This suggests that 
decisions about the latter were not likely made by elites attempting to put peasants on bad lands 
and to shield expensive lands from land reform; rather, agrarian reform land allocations were 
likely made on fertile lands that were the object of dispute during the export boom.  
In turn, the size of the municipality very likely captures the availability of public land 
susceptible of being allocated via agrarian reform. The more a municipality had available public 
lands to allocate, the more agrarian reform land allocations took place therein. This effect does 




in small municipalities, it was still very likely that agrarian reform land allocations were made 
therein. 
All other basic control variables do not produce any significant effect on land reform 
allocations. Concerning the variables attempting to measure potential alternative mechanisms, 
only one of the two indicators of land values—the distance to the main markets—is significant. 
For a one unit (kilometer) increase in the distance to the main markets, there is a 0.2 increase in 
land allocations, controlling for all other variables and with fixed effects. This entails that, the 
further the municipality to the main markets, the more allocations it received, which suggests 
that perhaps land reform allocations were to some extent made on less accessible—and hence 
less valuable— lands. However, this effect does not hold in analyses that take the number of 
hectares of land reform allocations as indicator of the dependent variable (Tables 10 and 11).  
The other measure of land values, the suitability of the land for commercial crops, does not 
produce any significant effect on land reform allocations. But in this case the direction of the 
effect does operate as predicted, with municipalities with more suitable—and hence more 
valuable—lands receiving more land reform allocations. The sign of the direction is inverted, 
nonetheless, in other regression analyses (Tables 9 through 11).  
The conclusion is that the measures of land values do not take away the effect of 
dispossessions on land reform allocations, and that they do not have a very stable impact on the 
latter. When that impact is significant, it does not seem to operate in the predicted direction as 
municipalities with more valuable lands appear to have received less land reform allocations.  
As for the other two variables attempting to capture alternative mechanisms, neither 1560 
indigenous settlements nor public land allocations during the export boom have a significant 




variable operates in the foreseen direction. Indeed, the variable that measures the distance to 
1560 indigenous settlements has a negative sign, which suggests that land reform allocations 
occurred more in places further from very old settlements—i.e. in what was likely the 
agricultural frontier during the export boom. In turn, the variable measuring public lands 
(baldíos) allocations during the export boom has a low but positive effect on land reform 
allocations, which suggests that the places where former allocations were made were also the 
places where land reform allocations were granted after 1936.  
Now, since such allocations alone are not significant, while dispossessions are, we can 
conclude that it was not any form of public land allocations made during the export boom which 
produced land reform claims; rather, it was those allocations that generated dispossessions of 
peasant settlers with possession rights to public lands. These were, as we saw in Chapter 5, the 
main claimants in petitions of state protection before dispossession, which are the source of the 
dispossession dummy.  
This conclusion finds further support in Table 9’s analysis, which measures the interaction 
effect of the dispossessions dummy and the baldíos allocations variable. Such interaction does 
not produce a significant effect on land reform allocations. This implies that it was clearly the 
dispossessions of public lands, made through the manipulation of baldíos laws, which generated 
land reform claims. As in Table 8, the only controls that are significant when testing for this 
interaction are elevation and municipality size, and the distance to the main markets. 
 The former results are very much confirmed by the analyses that measure the dependent 
variable with the number of hectares allocated via agrarian reform. As Table 10 shows, if at least 
one dispossession occurred during the export boom in a given municipality, such municipality 




and fixed effects (model 4). The magnitude of that coefficient is even greater (9,820) in Table 
11’s models, which measure not only the impact of the dispossessions dummy but also its 
interaction with allocated baldíos, even though such interaction is not significant. In these 
analyses, the elevation and municipality area controls are also significant, but none of the other 
variables is.   
 
Conclusions 
In this and the previous chapter, I argued and showed that the trajectory of rural conflict and 
agrarian reform traversed by Colombia was one of abundant dispossessions during the export 
boom that mainly attacked public lands cultivated by peasant settlers (colonos) in the agrarian 
frontier, who had legal claims to the lands based on their possession. The grievances derived 
from those dispossessions led to an important mobilization for land reform, which was however 
limited in strength and hence ensued in the moderate legislation. Despite its limitations, the 
Colombian 1936 agrarian reform law was quite responsive to prior dispossessions. As shown in 
Chapter 5, land allocations made on its basis geographically coincide with regions of prior 
dispossession claims. And, as this chapter has shown, statistically, those dispossessions are a 
significant and robust predictor of those claims—measured both in terms of the number of land 
reform allocations and of hectares allocated thereby.  
The Colombian story indicates that dispossessions against legal rights are indeed an 
important source of motivation and organization for land redistributive claims. Given that they 
attacked individual peasant settlers who did not hold formal titles to their lands, we could have 
expected that dispossessions did not produce more than the resignation of peasants. However, 




possessors with the expectation of becoming owners, peasant settlers overcame the difficulties of 
collective action. They acted in coordination first to request the protection of their lands, and 
later, when they had been dispossessed, to invade them and to request the enactment of land 
reform legislation.  
Even though the legislation that they pushed forth was not as radical as they would have 
wished, it still responded to their land claims in its implementation. This indicates that the 
Colombian land reform was, to an important extent, promoted by claims from below. It thus 
complements explanations (such as Lapp 2004’s), which focus on elites’ strategies for obtaining 
peasant votes. Of course the elite splits between parties and within the liberal party were a key 
factor producing the enactment of the 1936 land reform legislation; but those splits led to a focus 
on land reform because of the preexisting land conflicts resulting from dispossessions, and of 
peasants’ demands to solve them through land redistribution. Only this explains that the 
justification of the land reform specifically appealed to the need to solve those conflicts, and that 






Appendix 2. Regression Analysis Tables for Colombia 
 
Table 8. Regression of Agrarian Reform Land Allocations  
on Dispossessions at Municipal Level in Colombia 
 
 
   *** p<.001, **p<.01, *<.05 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
  +Includes coffee, tobacco, cocoa, sugar, banana  
DV: AR Land Allocations  














Population 1930  .5 1.2 
 
1.4 
(in thousands)  (1.08) (1.04) (1.4) 
Elevation   -.03**  .003 
 
-.07** 
(in meters)  (.01) (.02) (.02) 
Distance Capital .14  .3  
 
.2 
(in km)  (.1) (.1) (.1) 
Municipal Area  .05*** .07*** .07*** 
(in sq. km)  (.008) (.01) (.02) 
 
Distance Indigenous Settlement 1560   7.7 
 
-25.8 
(1 if closer than 100 km)   (26.5) (27) 
Distance Markets .15   
 
.6* 
(in km)   (.1) (.3) 
Land Suitability Agricultural Crops+   83 
 
121.8 
(index from 0 to 1)   (66) (70.5) 
Allocated Baldíos   .4 
 
.2 
(log of km)   (1.7) (1.8) 
Fixed Effects No No No 
 
Yes 
CONSTANT 103.4 107.5 -69.5 
 
16.6 
N 1142 1007 697 697 
R-Squared 0.08 0.1 0.2 0.3 





Table 9. Regression of Agrarian Reform Land Allocations  
on Interaction of Dispossessions and Baldíos Allocations at Municipal Level in Colombia 
 
 
      *** p<.001, **p<.01, *<.05 
      Standard errors in parentheses 




DV: Number of AR land allocations  
at municipal level (1937-60) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 




 (27.8) (30.3) (32.7) (33.8)  
Allocated Baldíos .6 -.08 1.1 1.04  
(log of k) (1.6) (1.7) (2) (2)  
Dispossessions*Baldíos -6.2 -6.8 -5.6 -3.4  
 (3.7) (3.8) (3.9) (3.9)  
Population 1930  .4 1.1 1.4  
(in thousands)  (1.01) (1) (1.4)  
Elevation   -.04** .002 -.07** 
 
(in meters)  (.01) (.02) (.02)  
Distance Capital  .1 .3 .2 
 
(in km)  (.1) (.1) (.1)  
Municipal Area .04*** .08*** .07***  
(in sq. km)  (.0008) (.01) (.02)  
 
Distance Indigenous Settlement 1560   8.5 -24.6 
 
(1 if closer than 100 km)   (26.4) (27.1)  
Distance Markets   .2 .6** 
 
(in km)   (.1) (.3)  
Land Suitability Agricultural Crops+   80.7 -121.6 
 
(index from 0 to 1)   (65.5) (70.6)  
Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
 
CONSTANT 100.3 109.5 -76.8 14.3 
 
N 1129 1007 697 697 
 





Table 10. Regression of Hectares of Agrarian Reform Allocations on  
Dispossessions at Municipal Level in Colombia 
*** p<.001, **p<.01, *<.05  
Standard errors in parentheses 
+Includes coffee, tobacco, cocoa, sugar, banana  
DV: Hectares of AR Allocations  















Population 1930  -80.7 -9.8 
 
1.9 
(in thousands)  (69.5) (54.3) (72) 
Elevation -2.8** -1.8 
 
-4.1** 
(in meters)  (.8) (.9) (1.3) 
Distance Capital  -12.2  3.9  
 
-2.8 
(in km)  (7.5) (7.6) (7.6) 
Municipal Area  5.5*** 4.3*** 
 
4.5*** 
(in sq. km)  (.5) (.7) (.8) 
Distance Indigenous Settlement 1560   -1076.7 
-1559.2 
(1 if closer than 100 km)   (1382.2) (1398.3) 
Distance Markets -2.4   
 
12.2 
(in km)   (5.9) (14.1) 
Land Suitability Agricultural Crops+   432.7 
 
-5408.5 
(index from 0 to 1)   (3421.2) (3642.3) 
Allocated Baldíos   -25.9 
 
-46 
(log of km)   (90) (93.1) 
Fixed Effects No No No 
 
No 
CONSTANT 4571 7074.4 4458.4 
 
1942.3 
N 1142 1007 697 697 
R-Squared 0.05 0.2 0.2 0.3 




Table 11. Regression of Hectares of Agrarian Reform Allocations on  
Interaction of Dispossessions and Baldío Allocations at Municipal Level in Colombia 
 
*** p<.001, **p<.01, *<.05 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+Includes coffee, tobacco, cocoa, sugar, banana 
DV:  Hectares of AR Allocations  
at Municipal Level (1937-60) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Dispossessions Dummy  15771.*** 11104.8*** 10381.2*** 9820.3** 
 
 (1944) (1951.5) (1703.4) (1742.7)  
Allocated Baldíos 146.9 79.7 79.9 41.3  
(log of km) (110.6) (109.4) (104.3) (104.4)  
Dispossessions*Baldíos -567.1* -550.9* -411.3* -369.4 
 
 (258.6) (244.6) (205.8) (201.6)  
Population 1930 -84.9 -13.4 7 
 
(in thousands)  (.7) (.05) (71.9)  
Elevation  2.8***  -1.8 -4.1** 
 
(in meters)  (.8) (.9) (1.2)  
Distance Capital  -12.1  3.9 -3.2 
 
(in km)  (7.5) (7.6) (7.6)  
Municipal Area 5.5*** 4.4*** 4.6*** 
 
(in sq. km)  (.5) (.7) (.8)  
Distance Indigenous Settlement 1560   -1018.9 -1424.2 
 
(1 if closer than 100 km)   (1379) (1397.7)  
Distance Markets   -1.7 10.8 
 
(in km)   (5.9) (14.1)  
Land Suitability Agricultural Crops+   276.7 -5390.7  
(index from 0 to 1)   (3414.6) (3635.9)  
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
 
CONSTANT 3899 6873.4 3953.9 1700.1  
N 1129 1007 697 697  





Chapter 7: Comparing the Paths and Beyond 
 
In the previous four chapters, I showed that the extent and targets of prior land dispossessions 
played a crucial causal role in the emergence and strength of claims for agrarian reform, as well 
as in the way in which early 20th century agrarian reforms were enacted and implemented in the 
Mexican and Colombian cases. To do so, I focused on the impact of dispossessions during Latin 
America’s first export boom (1870s-1920s) which, as argued in Chapter 1, was a critical era for 
the political economy of land, as the entrance into the international market led to an increase in 
the value of land that generated strong incentives for land appropriation. As hypothesized, I 
showed that, in each country, land dispossessions were numerous during that period, that they 
concentrated in areas where export crops were grown and transport infrastructure developed, and 
that they had a strong geographical and statistical relation with subsequent agrarian reform 
claims and land allocations.  
Also as hypothesized, I showed that the two countries varied in the type of land tenure 
that was mainly attacked by dispossessions, which had repercussions for the level of radicalism 
and influence of peasants’ agrarian reform claims. In Mexico, the main target of dispossessions 
were lands owned by indigenous/peasant corporations (notably pueblos), while in Colombia it 
was lands possessed by settlers of the agricultural frontier. As a result, mobilization for agrarian 
reform and peasants’ influence in the political arena were greater in Mexico, and so was the level 
of radicalism of the measures through which land was redistributed.  
In this chapter I offer a brief comparison of the two cases that seeks to show that their 




legislation but also in their numbers: both dispossessions and land reform allocations were more 
numerous in absolute and relative terms in Mexico. This provides further support to the notion 
that dispossessions are a key causal factor of land reform claims. I also compare the trajectories 
of these two cases with that of Argentina which, as argued in Chapters 1 and 2, was quite 
different due to the low amount of dispossessions during the export boom and to the type of 
lands that they attacked, which led to weak claims of land reform and to very few measures of 
land redistribution that were not based on agrarian reform legislation. In the second part of the 
chapter, I offer some reflections about the potential of my arguments and findings to be 
expanded and generalized to other cases.  
 
Mexico and Colombia in Comparative Perspective 
The paths of rural conflict and agrarian reform traversed by Mexico did not only differ in the 
lands that were targeted by dispossessions during the export boom and in the level of radicalism 
of peasants’ claims for agrarian reform and of the ensuing legislation. Sheer numbers also 
demonstrate that dispossessions were more intense in Mexico and that, in consequence, so were 
subsequent land reform allocations.  
As Table 12 shows, the number of dispossessions during the export boom—measured, as 
seen in Chapters 2 through 6 with petitions of protection before national administrative 
authorities—was more than four times greater in Mexico than in Colombia. Now, given the 
strong population differences in those two countries, such variance could be the mere effect of 
Mexico having a greater amount of people. That is not the case, however, as dispossessions are 
still twice as many when they are considered as a percentage of the total population at the height 




The same happens with land reform allocations. While, as argued in Chapters 4 and 6, the 
best indicator of land reform claims for subnational comparisons is the number of allocations, the 
latter cannot be used for cross-country comparisons because, as seen in Chapters 3 and 5, 
allocations were made to collective units in Mexico and to individuals in Colombia. This means 
that Colombia had many more allocations than Mexico during the early implementation period 
of each land reform—45,882 and 5,683, respectively—but that does not necessarily indicate a 
greater scope of such implementation since each allocation had a single beneficiary, while those 
in Mexico had many. Therefore, Table 12 compares the land reform allocations of both countries 
in terms of the number of beneficiaries and the number of hectares which, again, was not the best 
indicator of land reform claims at the subnational level, but that offers an important measure of 
the scope of land reform implementation across-cases.  
As can be seen, both in absolute and relative terms, land reform allocations were much 
more generous in Mexico than in Colombia. The number of beneficiaries was more than 60 times 
greater in Mexico in absolute terms, and 5 times greater as a percentage of the population—
calculated on the basis of censuses made in a year midway of the implementation period in each 
country, i.e. 1921 in Mexico and 1951 in Colombia. In turn, the number of allocated hectares 
was 3 times greater in Mexico, and its percentage with respect to the total number of hectares in 














Table 12. Dispossessions and Land Reform Allocations in Mexico and Colombia 
                                                      
84 Total population reported in Census: 13,545,462.  
85 Total population reported in Census: 14,334,780.   
86 The total number of hectares in Mexico is 197,255,000, according to Encyclopedia of the Nations (2015). 
87 Total population reported in Census: 5’855,077.  
88 Total population reported in Census: 11’548,172.  
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These differences are particularly remarkable, given that I only take into account the 
early implementation period of the Mexican agrarian reform (1917-34), which was by no means 
its most redistributive or progressive one. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 3, many analysts of the 
Mexican case consider that the land reform did not produce significant outcomes before 1934, 
the year when Lázaro Cárdenas took power and made of the agrarian reform one of the most 
important causes of his populist government. I showed in Chapters 3 and 4 that, even if less 
numerous than in the subsequent period, land allocations between 1917 and 1934 responded 
quite directly to previous land dispossessions. But what we are observing here is that they were 
also quite important numerically, if compared to another case where land reform legislation also 
responded to prior dispossessions. Because in both cases dispossessions were a very significant 
and robust predictor of land reform allocations, we can also conclude that the greater number of 
dispossessions in Mexico is a powerful explanation of the greater scope of the land reform 
implementation therein.  
This does not mean, however, that the theorized mechanisms connecting dispossessions 
and land reform claims were not relevant--i.e., that only the number of dispossessions matters. 
Even though the magnitude of the latter phenomenon is clearly relevant for explaining the 
magnitude of land reform claims across cases, so is the shape that it took. As shown in Chapter 
3, the fact that dispossessions coveted lands collectively owned by indigenous/peasants who had 
formal titles to them implied that they had to be carried out through legal manipulation and that 
the victims resisted them mainly through legal means. When those means turned unfruitful, 
peasants mobilized very strongly in the political arena to push for a land reform that explicitly 




As shown in Chapter 5, such strong mobilization and its radical outcomes were not only 
or mainly the result of the preexisting collective action structure of indigenous/peasant groups 
who owned land. The fact of being a very old village did not multiply the effect of 
dispossessions on land reform allocations, which means that dispossessions in themselves 
increased those allocations. As argued, this was the result of dispossessions targeting lands with 
legal rights, which produced a strong motivation or justification for claim-making, and 
strengthened or created (when inexistent) the collective action of aggrieved groups.  
Because Colombian dispossessed peasants also had legal rights to the land, they too had a 
motivation or justification to make land reform claims. Further, the attempt on those rights also 
created a collective reaction that, in the Colombian case, clearly cannot be explained in terms of 
a preexisting structure of collective action. As shown in Chapter 4, individual peasant settlers of 
the agrarian frontier who had possession rights to the public lands that they occupied and 
cultivated also reacted to dispossessions through legal means and, in most cases, did so in 
groups, even though there was nothing in the rights they held or in the way in which they 
cultivated the land that facilitated collective action. It was dispossessions themselves which 
triggered collective action, by creating a common sense of injustice among the victims of a 
common dispossessor who had similar rights over neighboring lands. Such sense of injustice was 
not produced by the general process of public land allocations within which dispossessions were 
carried out during the export boom. As Chapter 6 shows, while dispossessions are a very 
significant predictor of land reform claims, public land allocations are not.  
However, because their rights were weaker and less certain, and hence easier to violate, 
Colombian dispossessed peasants were more vulnerable to dispossessions than Mexicans. 




fraud whenever peasants did not yet have formal titles to the lands, even if they had possession 
rights to them—i.e. in the majority of cases. This led peasants to resist dispossessions not only 
through petitions of protection before the state, but also through de facto means—mainly 
collective occupations. It also led them to have a weaker justification for claim-making, which 
implied that, even though peasants were strong enough to promote the enactment of a land 
reform legislation, such legislation did not address their claims in the way that they expected. 
Indeed, the Colombian land reform did not receive much input from peasant leaders or 
advocates, but was rather designed by moderate forces attempting to qualm their claims but at 
the same time to protect landowners from a radical reform. The result of Colombian peasants’ 
lower leverage was a land reform legislation that mainly attempted to resolve existing land 
conflicts but without carrying out significant redistribution measures.  
The former differences may not be entirely explained by the strength of landed elites or 
by elite splits. Landowners were pretty strong in both cases and they also faced the challenge of 
political splits that offered strong incentives for other elites to mobilize peasants —in Mexico, 
landowners were part of counter-revolutionary factions that struggled against leaders who 
redistributed, and in Colombia they managed to block a more redistributive land reform. But, as 
we saw, the extent of the mobilization and the way it impacted the enactment and content of land 
reforms varied considerably. This, I argue, was the result of the distinct experiences of 
dispossession that peasants faced and of the way they dealt with them.   
 
The Third Trajectory: Argentina 
The causal importance of the extent and form of prior dispossessions may be further illustrated 




with a different tenure than in the Mexican and Colombian paths. According to historians, in 
Argentina the export boom ranged between the 1880s and 1920s. The main products demanded 
internationally were lamb and wool in the early stages, and beef and grain in the later ones. 
There was also a rapid development of railroads that accompanied and further promoted 
agricultural and cattle production. Just like in Mexico and Colombia, both factors generated 
increases in land values and strong incentives to appropriate lands suitable for export production 
(see Sábato 1990; Adelman 1994; Barsky and Gelman 2001; Hora 2002; Girbal 2011).  
Coveted lands were mostly located in the region of littoral and the humid pampas, mainly 
comprised in the Buenos Aires and La Pampa provinces. Their potential for export production 
led to the state’s promotion of the infamous Conquest of the Desert (see CAN 1945; Gaignard 
1989; Halperín Donghi 2005; Delrío 2010). The conquest was a policy promoted by the 
government of Presidents Avellaneda and Roca between 1875 and 1883, in which the lands 
located in the south of the Buenos Aires province that had been long occupied by a few semi-
nomadic indigenous groups were reclaimed by the state as public. The idea was to expand the 
sovereignty of the state to indigenous territories and, at the same time, to put the lands into the 
market through sales or long-term rents. In that sense, the policy was akin to the Mexican and 
Colombian efforts to privatize public lands, which were inspired in the liberal ideology 
according to which all lands should be commercialized with the aim of expanding property.  
Until then, the lands occupied by indigenous had been considered outside the range of the 
state’s dominium, and peace treaties had been made with indigenous groups as if they were 
sovereign entities, in which territorial frontiers were delineated, and each of the parties declared 
to respect the other’s territory (CAN 1945; Delrío 2010).  But with the new potential of the lands 




economic elites and state authorities concerned with progress. Not only were the lands occupied 
by indigenous coveted by landowners and entrepreneurs; the latter also feared that their 
ownership would not be protected if indigenous remained nearby (Halperín Donghi 2005).  
Hence, with the desert’s conquest, the Argentine state decided to declare the lands 
occupied by the indigenous in the Buenos Aires Province as public lands, thus denying them 
legal rights of ownership or possession. Indeed, if they peacefully submitted to the campaign, 
indigenous could obtain circumscribed land grants from the state, but they were not recognized 
as preexistent right-holders, so they had to renounce to their claims to the rest of the lands. 
Therefore, the existing policy according to which public lands that were legally possessed could 
not be sold did not apply to them. If, instead, indigenous resisted the campaign, they were either 
killed in battle or taken as prisoners, where they also died in many cases due to strenuous 
conditions. Most indigenous tribes resisted the conquest giving a fight, and they were defeated 
and subdued. This led to the near extermination of Argentine indigenous, and it clearly led to the 
incapacitation of the survivors, who were forced to become soldiers or domestic employees, or 
confined in controlled territories.  
Nominally, the Conquest of the Desert entailed the dispossessions of numerous lands, 
given the great extension of the pampas. However, in terms of lands per capita, such 
dispossessions were likely much fewer than in the Mexican and Colombian cases. As I explain 
below, I am still building a measure of petitions of protection against dispossession for the 
Argentine case, but those petitions were likely negligible in number given that indigenous mainly 
resisted dispossessions through force, not legal channels. However, it is possible to very roughly 
estimate the impact of dispossessions through the number of people inhabiting the regions in 




indigenous in the south of the Buenos Aires province and in La Pampa oscillate between 20,000 
and 30,000 (Durán 1997; Trentini et al. 2007)—of which it is calculated that approximately 
14,000 were killed or taken as prisoners (CAN 1945). In contrast, the population in the states or 
departments in which most dispossession claims were made was of almost 6 million in Mexico 
and of almost 2 million in Colombia.90  
Dispossessions were not only possibly fewer in Argentina; they also mainly targeted 
lands to which occupants did not have any legal rights. Even though the pampas indigenous 
clearly had claims to their lands and had occupied them since times immemorial, such claims 
were not recognized by the state as rights. When peace treaties were made and applied, the 
Argentine state seemed to recognize some sort of sovereignty to indigenous tribes on their 
territory, but not ownership or possession rights enforceable under its rule of law. Moreover, 
when those treaties ceased to be respected, the ancestral occupation of the lands by the 
indigenous was not considered to have legal implications in terms of ownership or possession 
rights under Argentine law. The lands were considered public and vacant, and their occupation 
by indigenous was not considered an obstacle for allocating those lands to other people. In part, 
this was the case because of the widespread view of pampas indigenous as nomadic barbarians 
who were not civilized enough to own or legally possess lands (on this see Halperín Donghi 
                                                      
90 For Mexico, I used the 1900 population of the following 7 states: Hidalgo, Mexico, Michoacán, 
Morelos, Oaxaca, Puebla and Veracruz. The exact amount is 5,884,943. Interestingly, the number is quite 
similar to the one polemically calculated by Tannenbaum (1930, 473) of inhabitants of 
indigenous/peasant villages in 1910, which was 6,010,455. Tannenbaum’s calculation was based on the 
census’ rural settlements below 4,000 inhabitants, but it has been criticized by some historians, like 
Meyer (1986).  
For Colombia, I used the 1912 population of the following 7 departments: Antioquia, Bolívar, Cesar, 




2005, but also Mansilla 1973 [1870]; Barros 1975 [1872]; Prado 1977 [1872]; Ébélot 1960 
[1876, 1880]).  
According to my theory, it is because the state did not recognize the indigenous’ claims 
to the lands that it could easily reclaim them through sheer violence, and that indigenous resisted 
dispossessions also mainly through violence, instead of legal means. (Admittedly, the indigenous 
population was also quite small, a point to which I return in this dissertation’s conclusion). For 
indigenous, there was almost no point in going before national authorities to request the 
protection of their rights if the laws did not recognize them. And when they were defeated in 
battle, indigenous were too weak to make collective land claims, but they also did not likely 
believe that they had a strong justification to do so, since their dispossession had been supported 
by the state’s laws. 
The Conquest of the Desert was the main instance of dispossessions during the export 
boom in Argentina. Indeed, historical studies do not report them in other areas, despite the 
increase in land values that the boom generated. According to interviews with historians91, this 
was the case because, at least until 1914, the Argentine agrarian frontier remained open in the 
regions where export-production was most intensive, that is, in the provinces south of the Buenos 
Aires province. Consequently, massive amounts of lands were indeed appropriated during the 
boom, but in most cases they were public empty lands that were either rented through long-term 
leases or bought to the state in the framework of the liberal policy of privatization of public 
lands. The appropriation of these lands was often the result of speculation, and consequently led 
to high levels of land concentration in the hands of a few landowners (see Cárcano 1917; Oddone 
                                                      
91 Interviews with Roy Hora, Juan Manuel Palacio, Jorge Gelman, Javier Balsa, Noemí Girbal, Guillermo 




1930; Infesta 2003; Banzato 2005). However, in contrast with Mexico and Colombia, most of the 
lands were not occupied or cultivated before their appropriation, so enclosures did not bring 
about dispossessions against occupants with legal titles. 
In other regions where the boom also had an impact, dispossessions did not take place 
because most of the lands were held under formal individual ownership titles that remained 
unquestioned by liberal legislation. In the northern provinces of Jujuy, Salta and Tucumán, 
where a non-negligible amount of indigenous existed, their collective lands had ceased to exist 
long before the boom and had become absorbed by haciendas. As in the Colombian case, this 
had been a gradual process that had generated important but punctual grievances, given that it 
had affected an already decimated population (Madrazo 1982, 1990; Paz, 1988, 1991, 1997; 
Teruel 2005). But overall it led to the consolidation of strong individual ownership rights, which 
were very unequally distributed in certain places—like Jujuy (Paz 2003)—and much less so in 
others—like Tucumán (Bravo 1998). Consequently, at the moment of the boom, dispossessions 
did not occur even in provinces like Tucumán where sugar plantations abounded (Bravo 2008).  
In the littoral and the pampas, the concentration of the lands in the hands of a few 
powerful owners, who were often absentees, made tenancy relations become the rule— 43% of 
the economic units were rented in 1914, and that percentage rose to 59% by 1937, with the 
majority of tenants being foreigners of European origin (León and Rossi 2003, 96). Once the 
agricultural frontier began to be exhausted, landowners could no longer acquire more lands to 
increase production, so they seem to have begun to impose more stringent conditions to their 
tenants—charging higher rents, requiring them to buy supplies and machineries to specific 
intermediaries, and especially evicting them in moments of economic crisis (Palacio 2001). 




significant grievances, which were most importantly voiced in the Grito de Alcorta, a 1912 
rebellion that started in the province of Santa Fe and spread across the pampas through localized 
protests until 1920. Chacareros—the name given to Argentine peasants who owned or rented 
chacras, or small estates—demanded the improvement of tenancy conditions, and more timidly 
the redistribution of the land so that it be owned by those who worked it—following the slogan 
‘land to the tiller.’ Their protests brought about the creation of the Argentine Agrarian Federation 
(FAA), which mobilized politically for the peasants’ cause (Girbal 1988, 24-7).   
The punctual grievances of land tenants in the south and indigenous in the north attracted 
the attention of political elites when splits among them occurred in the first decades of the 20th 
century. In their early period, such splits took the form of an electoral antagonism between the 
Conservative Party and the newly created Radical Party, in which the latter promoted the 
extension of suffrage in an attempt to mobilize popular sectors against the Conservatives’ 
hegemony. Once the radicals won office (1916), they tried to cater to peasants by addressing the 
“agrarian question” through bills that proposed to expand the colonization of public lands 
beyond the pampas to increase the number of landowners, to provide credit to small landowners 
and tenants, and to promote the creation of cooperatives. At some point (1924), Radicals also 
proposed the expropriation of private lands for colonization purposes, given their much greater 
potential for production.   
However, all these projects were strongly opposed by the association of landowners 
(Argentine Rural Society, or SRA) and were eventually withdrawn by the government. The only 
bill that was enacted was the 1921 tenancy law (number 11.170), which sought to improve 
tenants’ conditions by lengthening the period of leases, imposing limits to evictions, and 




things. But the efficacy of this law was soon controverted. Later, other bills providing credits and 
subsidies to chacareros were also enacted, but none of them dealt even tangentially with the 
redistribution of land (Girbal 1988, 13-35).  
Radicals were kicked off from office by a military coup in 1930, which led to a second 
period of elite splits hatched mainly within the armed forces. Such splits eventually led to the 
ascendency of Juan Domingo Perón within the army and to his popular election in 1946, which 
inaugurated the classical populist era in Argentina. Even though Perón’s main basis of popular 
support were urban workers, he also made important promises to peasants, including notably an 
“agrarian revolution”, which would lead to the expansion of the right to ownership to every 
Argentine (cited in León and Rossi 2003, 103). However, once in power, Perón reneged to that 
promise and never enacted a specific land reform legislation, asserting in 1949 that such a reform 
had to be postponed, and taking since that date on measures to promote agricultural production, 
which implied the protection of landowners (León and Rossi 2003, 108; see also Lattuada 1986, 
79). At the beginning of his government, Perón was loud in his condemnation of landowners and 
took certain spectacular measures against a few of them, such as the expropriation of the lands of 
Patrón Costas in the Province of Jujuy, which had been long before owned by the kollas 
indigenous, many of whom now worked on his plantation (León and Rossi 2003, 104). But soon 
after, Perón became hesitant about taking a stance in favor of the rural poor. For instance, in 
1946, he disbanded and forced the return of the members of the Malón de la Paz, a protest of 
kollas indigenous who had marched into Buenos Aires demanding the expropriation of 
landowners that had absorbed their ancestral lands (see Maier 2012). And the measures he took 




Perhaps the most significant rural policy under Peronism was the improvement in the 
conditions of tenancy agreements, which implied prohibiting evictions, increasing the terms of 
agreements, and freezing the value of rents (Lattuada 1986, 78). The latter measure appears to 
have had indirect effects on land redistribution, since it pushed landowners to sell the lands from 
which they could no longer extract high rents to their tenants at low prices (see Balsa 2006). 
However, the measure did not aim nor directly carried out land redistribution and its effects on 
the latter were only observed decades later.  
In turn, the only measure that Perón took to redistribute land was to use the National 
Agrarian Council (CAN)—an organism created in 1940 by the law of colonization, which Perón 
himself had criticized for its inefficiency and lack of attention to the peasant cause—to acquire a 
few lands with the purpose of allocating them to tenants. But such measure had extremely 
meager effects. Under Perón, the CAN acquired 553,393 hectares with the purpose of allocating 
them to the landless, but only 192,827 were expropriated—the rest were bought or transferred to 
the CAN by other state institutions—and only around 200,000 were allocated (León and Rossi 
2003, 105). Around 53,000 hectares had been allocated before Perón, and 550,226 more were 
allocated between 1959 and 1975, after Peronism was kicked out of power and succeeded by a 
majority of conservative military governments. In addition, 1,266,358 hectares were acquired to 
create 120 colonies in which 47,000 people benefitted from the possibility of cultivating lands. 
The total amount of lands allocated by the CAN between 1940 and 1975 (2,069,584 hectares) 
constitutes 0.7% of the total amount of hectares in the country.92 And they roughly benefitted 
                                                      





50,229 individuals93, i.e. 0.02% of the total population of Argentina in 1960—midway into the 
implementation of the law that created the CAN.  
As Table 13 shows, both in terms of the amount and percentage of hectares and 
beneficiaries, the land distribution measures carried out during and after Perón’s government 
were very limited in comparison to those taken during the early periods of the Mexican and 
Colombian land reforms. The Colombian allocations—much lower than the Mexican ones—
were more four times greater in relative terms than those of Argentina if hectares are considered, 
and twice greater if beneficiaries are. These percentages would be much lower if only the 
Peronist period were considered. 
 




Land Allocations during Elite Splits  
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93 I calculated the beneficiaries of individual allocations (not colonies) using as basis the amount of plots 
allocated between 1959 and 1975, according to León and Rossi (2003, 109). Beneficiaries of such plots 
may include as well the families of individuals to whom they are allocated, but just as in the Colombian 
case I just use the individuals who receive the land title.  




What we can infer from the brief analysis of the Argentine trajectory is that the lack of 
significant dispossessions against lands with legal rights during the export boom is very likely to 
have affected the strength of peasants’ claims of land redistribution and their capacity to promote 
land reform legislation. The most vocal grievances during the period of elite splits were those of 
tenants mainly seeking to improve their rental agreements, not to obtain land redistribution. The 
latter was promoted by certain elites as a means not only to deal with peasant discontent but also 
to reduce objective inequality and expand ownership; but such promotion was not enough to 
bring about the enactment of a land reform policy. The lack of strong claims of land 
redistribution seems to have reduced the importance of the issue in the political arena, and 
consequently the elites’ interest in enacting a land reform policy. The focus on the policy 
regarding the conditions of tenancy agreements and the allocation of few lands through general 
colonization legislation seems to have been enough to satisfy peasant claims.  
A different story would have perhaps occurred if the grievances derived from indigenous 
dispossession in the north had been greater and more concentrated in time, or if the indigenous 
dispossessed during the conquest of the desert had had legal rights to their lands and had not 
been so incapacitated. Indeed, the few northern indigenous who vocalized their grievances of 
dispossession eventually received land titles—the kollas who participated in the Malón de la Paz 
finally received a collective title in 1999 (Zapiola 2008). So did some of the few southern 
indigenous tribes who claimed the ancestral occupation of the lands prior to the conquest of the 
desert (Delrío 2010). But since these indigenous were few, did not have titles to the lands and 
had been severely repressed by the government, in most cases their grievances of dispossession 
were not voiced as claims of restitution of lands to which they had rights and which the state was 




justification. Hence, even though both peasants and elites sustained the importance of land 
redistribution and even promoted some bills to bring it about, a land reform was never enacted, 
despite the high levels of land inequality in Argentina.  
 
Expanding the Findings, Generalizing the Argument  
 
 
So far, I have argued that Mexico, Colombia and Argentina traversed three different paths of 
rural conflict and agrarian reform in the late 19th and early 20th century. I have also argued that 
the differences in those paths are derived from the extent and type of land dispossessions 
occurred during each country’s export boom. Dispossessions were greater and attacked lands 
with firmer land rights in Mexico, followed by Colombia and Argentina. This implied that land 
reform legislation was more radical in content and brought about more land allocations in 
Mexico, again followed by Colombia and Argentina. I have supported my argument through 
secondary literature in the three cases, plus archival data analyzed through geo-referencing and 
statistics in the Mexican and Colombian cases.  
In future iterations of this work, I will offer similar archival data for the Argentine case, 
which I have compiled but not yet analyzed. Concerning the independent variable, this data 
consists in reports of the Ministry of Agriculture, which contain a few decisions aimed at 
resolving claims related to land conflicts, and which I take to be petitions of protection against 
dispossession during the period of the export boom. Concerning the dependent variable, this data 
consists in land allocations made not on the basis of specific land reform legislation—which, as 
seen, was never issued—but on colonization laws. Unfortunately, the only data that exists 
regarding these allocations is for the period 1958 and 1966, so results will not be as complete and 




Moreover, I will include additional archival data that I have compiled and begun to 
analyze for the three cases as indicators of both the independent and dependent variables. Such 
data consists, first, in judicial decisions related to land conflicts during the export boom. And 
second, in instances of peasants’ protests both during the period of the export boom and during 
elite splits.   
With the first type of data, I hope to complement the data on administrative petitions of 
protection against dispossession, both numerically and in content. Indeed, judicial cases have the 
benefit of offering much more details about the cases, which will allow me to more clearly 
identify dispossessions and, more importantly, to know what the result of a given conflict was 
and what the state’s formal reaction to it was. I have already compiled all decisions related to 
land conflicts made by the Supreme Courts of Justice of the three countries, and have recently 
completed the datasets for Mexico and Colombia, which include 3,580 and 1,180 decisions 
respectively. For Argentina, I have moreover compiled all decisions related to land conflicts 
made by the Supreme Court of the Buenos Aires Province, given that the Federal Court’s 
jurisdiction is too restrictive and the Buenos Aires Province is likely the area where most land 
conflicts occurred during the export boom.  
With the second type of data I also expect to complement the instances of protests that I 
have coded based on secondary literature, using archival sources such as peasants’ magazines 
and governmental reports. This should give me a clearer idea of the amount of protests occurred 
during the export boom, which would allow me to confirm the extent to which these were used 
more or less than the legal channels to resist dispossessions. Further, the data on protests will 





I have not gathered any of this data for other Latin American cases. However, the 
theoretical framework and research design that I have proposed in this dissertation may be 
applicable to such cases in several ways. First, I believe that, in general terms, each country 
should fit into one of the three trajectories of rural conflict and land reform identified by the 
theory. Determining what trajectory better describes each country may be done through analysis 
of secondary literature, which can let us find out the extent and main target of dispossessions 
during the export boom, as well as the extent and level of radicalism of land reform claims and 
legislation. Thus, it is very likely that Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru followed the trajectory 
followed by Mexico (Path 1 in Table 2, Chapter 1), since the literature has reported massive 
dispossessions of indigenous collective lands in those countries, and since land reform legislation 
was quite radical in them all. Also, it is probable that Brazil and El Salvador followed the 
Colombian trajectory (Path 2 in Table 2, Chapter 1), since the literature on both reports 
significant dispossessions affecting settlers of the agrarian frontier, and the land reform 
legislation therein has been considered moderate. Finally, Uruguay is likely to have followed a 
similar trajectory to that of Argentina, since land reform legislation was never enacted there 
during the 20th century, and that may be probably explained by low levels of dispossession 
against titled lands during the export boom.  
As said in Chapter 1, the paths identified by the theory identify stylized sequences, which 
implies that countries’ paths may actually not fully satisfy each of the links in the chains. 
However, it is still illuminating to locate the countries in the typology to understand the basic 
traits of their rural conflict and land reform histories. Furthermore, the trajectories may be useful 
not only for understanding countries’ trajectories but also regional trajectories within them. 




predominant target of dispossession, the other forms of dispossession had also occurred, and that 
they resulted in different outcomes at the subnational level.  
In Mexico, a few dispossessions were reported in the north during the export boom, 
where the agrarian frontier was open and titles were not abundant and where, consequently, land 
reform claims were less strenuous and allocations were fewer during the revolution. In 
Colombia, in turn, a few dispossessions of indigenous collective lands in the old settlements of 
Cauca also occurred during the export boom, which led to very strong and radical claims of land 
reform and to an important amount of allocations in the subsequent period. We also mentioned 
that, while most dispossessions in Argentina were carried out against indigenous that had no 
legal titles, a few dispossessions against indigenous with collective titles occurred in the north, 
and that they generated punctual but vocal grievances that were eventually addressed by the 
state. This may be the case of other countries as well, and hence my theory may be helpful in 
explaining regional variation of the extent and form of rural conflict and land reform.  
On the other hand, my methodological strategy and research design could be applied to 
other Latin American countries in order to show not only that they follow one of the three basic 
paths or that their regions do so, but also that prior dispossessions and land reform claims are 
geographically and statistically connected at a low level of analysis. For that purpose, one would 
need to find archival sources similar to the ones I found in my three cases, and to create 
municipal level datasets. In most cases, such data is likely to exist but has not been analyzed yet, 
and hence offers a fruitful avenue of research.  
In fact, the collection of that data may be used not only for testing my theory, but also for 
carrying out other interesting inquiries for Latin American politics. The data on land conflicts 




formation in the region—the late 19th and early 20th centuries did not only experienced the first 
export boom, but also the most significant projects of consolidation of national institutions. So 
such data may also be used as an independent variable, with the purpose of measuring the impact 
of the enforcement of property rights on important dependent variables like state capacity, 
political competition and social and economic development. I plan to carry out analyses of this 
type in future projects.  
 
Finally, my theory, methodology and research design may be used to explain the 
trajectories of rural conflict and land reform in other regions and time periods. The analysis of 
this dissertation has focused on Latin America’s first export boom and its impact on land reform 
during the first period of elite splits in the 20th century. However, I formulated the theoretical and 
methodological framework in such a way that other critical eras for the political economy of land 
occurred in Latin America but also in other regions of the world may be studied following a 
similar logic. Let us remember that I define critical eras as moments in which the values of land 
increase as a result of an exogenous shock, generating strong incentives for the appropriation of 
lands, and for their dispossession if they are occupied.  
Exogenous shocks of the sort may consist in export booms different from the one that I 
analyzed, including the current one that Latin America, Africa and other regions are facing. The 
current boom is similar to the one I describe throughout this dissertation in that it has originated 
in the high international demand for agricultural commodities like soy, and it has generated a 
steep increase in land values and strong incentives to appropriate lands and to dispossess people 
who occupy them. Such phenomena are currently commonly referred to as land grabs (see, for 




have already started to be voiced, could be analyzed through the theory, methodology and 
research design that I have proposed, making small adjustments so that they are applicable to 
different contexts.  
Exogenous shocks producing increases in land values and incentives to dispossess may 
also consist in other phenomena different from export booms, such as civil wars in which lands 
become valuable because of their potential as power bases of armed actors and as routes of drug 
and weapons traffic. In those contexts, dispossessions are also likely to occur and to generate 
future land reform claims, so my theory and research design could also be applied with some 
modifications, essentially aimed at capturing the role played by armed actors and violence. I am 
currently developing a project of the sort in Colombia to analyze the impact of dispossessions 
occurred during the most recent period of the country’s protected civil war (1980s-2010s) on 
current claims of land restitution and redistribution, which are mainly voiced by victims of 
internal forced displacement.   
 
In the following and last chapter of this dissertation, I present the potential theoretical and 








Throughout this dissertation, I argued and showed that redistributive claims for land reform are 
generated importantly by prior dispossessions. At the national level, the extent and target of 
those dispossessions determines the extent and level of radicalism of land reform claims and of 
the legislation that addresses them. When dispossessions are numerous, and they attack property 
rights, subsequent mobilization for land redistribution will be stronger, and it will promote more 
radical land reform legislation, than when dispossessions target possession rights or de facto 
occupations. The land allocations ensuing from land reform legislation are also greater when 
prior dispossessions of lands with legal rights have been greater. At the municipal level, the 
number of dispossessions is also a strong predictor of the number of land allocations made on the 
basis of land reform legislation. 
 The theory behind the former claims links redistributive demands to the prior 
dispossession of lands with legal rights through the perception or narrative of illegitimacy that 
such dispossessions produce. Quite obviously, any form of theft or dispossession generates 
grievances. But not all grievances are voiced as claims for the state to enact redistributive 
policies. Further, not all such claims actually promote legislation that addresses them both in the 
books and in practice. For grievances to be strong enough to produce such outcomes, I argue that 
they may be motivated or justified by an injustice such that the victims clearly consider 
themselves legally entitled to the lands in question and consequently wrongly dispossessed, and 
such that they clearly identify the state as the wrongdoer for not protecting their rights. This 




had to be carried out mainly through legal manipulation—not force—and victims resisted it 
unsuccessfully through legal channels. The perception or narrative of injustice derived from the 
theft of legally owned or possessed rights generates a sense of entitlement and a collective action 
capacity that translate into political challenges of the status quo of property rights through claims 
of land redistribution or agrarian reform.   
 To evaluate the plausibility of the theorized mechanisms, I proposed a methodological 
framework aimed studying critical eras or moments in the political economy of land in which 
land dispossessions are likely to be numerous due to the increase in land values. I argued and 
showed that one such moment was Latin America’s export boom (1870s-1920s), in which land 
values increased significantly as a result of the international demand for agricultural 
commodities and the development of transport infrastructure to commercialize them. I analyzed 
the way in which that export boom developed in Mexico and Colombia, and more briefly in 
Argentina, focusing on the extent and type of land dispossessions that it produced.  And I studied 
the impact that those dispossessions had on the rural mobilization and legislation of the 
subsequent period, a period of elite splits (1910s-60s).  
 My analysis combined the qualitative method of case studies with GIS geo-referencing 
and basic statistical analysis. For the latter two, I used original archival data that I collected 
during more than a year of field research on petitions of protection against dispossession during 
the export boom and land reform allocations in the aftermath of the boom. I was able to show 
that at the subnational level, there is a geographical coincidence and a significant and robust 
statistical correlation between land dispossessions and land reform claims. I also showed that the 
extent of the former predicts the extent of the latter at the national level. And hence, that land 




legal rights were also greater in both absolute and relative terms; and in turn, that land reform 
allocations were greater in Colombia than in Argentina—where allocations were not based on 
specific land reform legislation—because dispossessions against lands with legal rights were also 
greater.  
 
The proposed theoretical and methodological framework and the resulting empirical 
study contained in this dissertation expect to make contributions to the political science literature 
on several fronts. To begin with, my dissertation brings into the discussion about comparative 
explanations of agrarian reform in 20th century Latin America the from below perspective. So 
far, the comparative literature has focused on the supply side of agrarian reform, explaining the 
enactment of the latter as a result of inter or intra elite splits. This, I argue, is a necessary bot not 
on its own a sufficient factor producing land reform legislation. The extent and level of 
radicalism of peasants’ claims of land reform are crucial for understanding whether specific land 
reform legislation is enacted, as well as the level of radicalism of its content and the scope and 
beneficiaries of its implementation.  
My dissertation contributes to the comparative literature on Latin American land reforms 
not only an argument based on the demand side, but also an argument based on the past and its 
enduring legacies. Existing studies explain land reforms as an outcome of current political 
conditions. Again, this in part correct, as such conditions open the opportunities for reform 
claims to emerge and to be addressed in the political arena. However, as I argue and show, 
variation in the strength and radicalism of land reform claims is an outcome of previous rural 




in which they are carried out define distinct historical trajectories of rural mobilization and land 
reform.   
With these novel elements, my dissertation does not seek to disprove or replace existing 
comparative studies, but rather to complement and sharpen them, by arguing that it is the 
opening up of political opportunities generated by elite splits, along with the existence and 
strength of peasants’ land reform claims based on prior dispossessions, which explain the 
emergence of agrarian reforms in Latin America.  
If correct, my theory could better explain why—as Albertus (forthcoming) has argued—
Latin American authoritarian regimes were more likely to enact agrarian reform programs than 
democracies. In Albertus’ view, this was the case because of those regimes’ intra-elite splits and 
the existence of fewer veto points. However, some of the most prototypical authoritarian regimes 
in Latin America either never implemented agrarian reform programs—as in Brazil, Argentina 
and Uruguay—or dismounted agrarian reforms enacted by prior democracies—as in Chile and 
Guatemala. This is the case, in my view, because authoritarian regimes only enacted agrarian 
reforms when they were actually social revolutions or populist governments that needed the 
support of peasants and attempted to cater to their land demands. It is the distinct nature of these 
regimes and of their basis of support, and not only their splits and lack of veto points, which 
probably drives the correlation between authoritarianism and agrarian reforms.  
Moreover, my theory could complement Lapp (2004)’s explanation of land reforms as a 
result of elites’ mobilization of peasants through promises of suffrage extension and land 
redistribution. Lapp’s theory neatly captures the notion that agrarian reform responds to 
peasants’ demands for land and is therefore, at least to some extent, a from-below process. 




explaining the success of agrarian reform in democratic scenarios; it thus neglects the causal 
power of peasants’ demands for making that success more likely and for shaping the content of 
agrarian reform. Further, Lapp establishes too tight a link between agrarian reform and suffrage 
extension, which makes it hard to extend her conclusions to non-democratic scenarios. Instead, I 
claim that any form of elite splits (not only those resulting from democratization, but also from 
revolutionary and populist-authoritarian processes) is likely to open up opportunities for claims 
of land redistribution; however, the existence, strength and effectiveness of those claims does not 
only depend on such opportunities, but also on the strength and radicalism of peasants’ 
grievances based on prior dispossessions.  
 Finally, my theory could also help explain the different timings of agrarian reforms in 
Latin America not just as a product of policy diffusion—as Ondetti (2012)’s theory does—but 
also of the nature and strength of peasants’ claims. Indeed, Ondetti may be right in that many late 
agrarian reform programs were partly the result of their promotion by the Alliance for Progress, 
as a strategy to prevent social revolutions after the Cuban one. However, this does not account 
for many and some of the most radical agrarian reform programs——the Mexican, Bolivian, 
Guatemalan, Venezuelan, Colombian, among others—which were enacted much earlier than the 
Cuban revolution. My theory suggests that these early reforms probably resulted from prior land 
dispossessions that were massive in scope and very challenging to legal rights, so they were 
enough to push for redistribution when local political opportunities opened up, even in the 
absence of diffusion.   
 
My theory and methodology are used in this dissertation to explain the enactment of land 




deep and enduring effects on the politics of the region. However, the theory and methodology 
have been formulated in general terms, so that they may be used to explain other Latin American 
cases, as well as other regions and time periods in which land reform claims have been made 
from below. In particular, the proposed framework may be useful to analyze the current world 
trends of increases in the prices of agricultural commodities and land values, which have 
promoted large amounts of land grabs in Latin America and several other regions of the world 
(Zoomers 2010). From the perspective of my theory, such trends seem to be part of a new critical 
era for the political economy of land, which is likely producing massive dispossessions against 
peasants with legal rights to the lands, and hence generating the justification and collective 
action capacity for them to mobilize and demand land redistribution in the future.  
On the other hand, my theory expects to make a contribution to the wider discussion 
about contentious politics by highlighting the role of institutions as mediators between structure 
and agency. As we have seen, I argue that prior dispossessions at critical eras for the political 
economy of land are relevant for peasant mobilization for agrarian reform not only because of 
the material loss that they imply but also and especially because they may entail a denial of prior 
legal rights recognized by the state. This denial excludes right-holders from the institutional 
protection to which they had so far been entitled, and thus generates a strong perception or 
narrative of illegitimacy of the property rights system. It is this perception or narrative, along 
with the capacity to collectively mobilize that it promotes, which generate strong and radical 
claims for land redistribution. In that sense, the latter are not only or mainly motivated or 
justified by landlessness, but rather by the notion that landlessness is the consequence of 
institutional arbitrariness and should hence be challenged. The question remains open as to 




moreover to rights of another nature, such as civil and political, social and economic. This seems 
to be a fruitful path of research to be pursued in the future.  
My argument also seeks to shed light on the puzzle—highlighted by recent studies on 
democracy—that emerges from the lack of a clear relation between inequality and demands for 
redistribution. It does so by arguing that claims of redistribution do not result from inequality per 
se, but rather from the process of despoilment and rights denial through which inequality is 
created.  This would explain that in places where land inequality was high but prior 
dispossessions that attempted against legal rights were few (like Argentina), land reform claims 
were limited and incapable of achieving the enactment of specific legislation. It would also 
explain that places with lower levels of land inequality (like Mexico and Colombia) experienced 
much stronger and radical land reform claims due to the extent of prior dispossessions against 
legal titles. The distinct processes through which inequality is created generate more or less acute 
and radical perceptions or narratives of state institutions as the “culprits” of inequality.   
 
My argument moreover seeks to contribute to the discussion about the long-term effects 
of colonialism by insisting in the peculiar role played by the recognition and enforcement of 
property rights of indigenous and peasant groups since the colony. In certain analyses, Spanish 
colonial institutions explain the different economic and political outcomes of Latin American 
countries because their greater presence and exploitative nature hindered economic development 
and promoted political inequality. What in turn drove variation in the presence of colonial 
institutions was the amount of native populations that existed in different contexts: the greater 
such populations, the greater the presence of the colony, due to the incentives to exploit their 




2014). I believe this argument partly explains the trajectories of rural conflict and agrarian 
reform that I observe in the region, since the most radical agrarian reform claims and programs 
emerged in contexts where indigenous population was more abundant during the colony—
Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala (all in trajectory 1)—and where there were consequently more 
lands with collective ownership rights by the 19th century which, when threatened by 
dispossessions during the export boom, generated strong grievances. This does not mean, 
however, that the institutional mechanism that I hypothesize is irrelevant or spurious because 
entirely driven by amounts of indigenous population during the colony.  
Sure, such population quite possibly drove the amount of collective property that the 
crown allocated to indigenous groups, and even that which persisted until the late 19th century.  
However, the institution of collective property—even if endogenous to some extent—produced 
effects of its own by influencing the sense of entitlement and the degree of collective action of its 
beneficiaries, which in turn probably also increased the chances of survival—or at least of 
resistance against disappearance—of that institution. In other words, without the institution of 
collective property, rural conflict would have adopted a different path—probably a much less 
politically and legally contentious one—even if indigenous land occupants were quite numerous. 
Land dispossessions would have implied more force than fraud, and they would not have 
generated such a great perception or narrative of illegitimacy. Nor would they have been so 
resisted through legal means. Therefore, land dispossessions, even if great, would not have led to 
strong claims for agrarian reform.  
On the other hand, my argument does not predict land dispossessions to happen wherever 
there are indigenous groups but wherever the lands they own become valuable as a result of an 




always cultivate whatever is more valuable (in this case, export crops) wherever that is possible 
(due to the fertility of the land and the existence of infrastructure to access and transport 
produce). This means that they will appropriate the lands of indigenous, even when they are 
collectively owned, if (and only if) they are suitable for agricultural crops.  
For a similar reason, my argument is different from those explaining the patterns of rural 
conflict as a result of the type of agricultural frontier or the way in which it was conquered. 
Indeed, the period of land dispossessions that I study is the period in which Latin American 
states sought to impose their authority in frontier areas mainly by issuing titles to public empty 
lands—which, as I showed, in many cases were not really empty but were occupied by 
populations that had weak legal titles or claims. So one could think that what drove 
dispossessions was really the extent to which public lands were occupied and the type of rights 
or claims that occupiers had to them. Although this is clearly part of the story, it does not seem 
capable to explain the massive dispossessions suffered by indigenous/peasant groups that were 
not located on public lands and that had strong corporate ownership titles in places like Mexico 
and Bolivia. These countries also had agrarian frontiers to conquer, and states actually did 
actively conquer them; however, as we saw in the Mexican case, land dispossessions were much 
fewer in the frontier than in densely populated areas of indigenous corporate ownership, and the 
latter dispossessions seem to be strongly connected to areas where claims for agrarian reform 
clustered in the following period. This seems to indicate that land appropriations were not driven 
by land availability or the weakness of legal titles, since corporate lands were dispossessed even 
though emptier lands existed. Rather, land appropriations seem to have occurred in areas prone 





 My theory does not only seek to enrich the substantive discussion about the effect of 
institutions in Latin America; more widely, it wishes to contribute novel conceptual and 
methodological tools to understand the way in which institutions produce long-lasting or path-
dependent effects. Indeed, my argument is that Latin American countries exhibited different 
trajectories of rural conflict and agrarian reform claims not because of the liberal land laws that 
they enacted in the prior period—which, as shown, were very similar in their formal objectives 
and content—but because of the different ways in which those laws were implemented by state 
authorities to further the interests of large landowners and entrepreneurs. In that sense, I propose 
that the level of enforcement of institutions (not only their formal enactment) operates as a cause 
with long-lasting or path-dependent effects. This is why I have avoided the terminology of 
critical junctures—which refers to particularly important laws or institutions that set divergent 
historical paths at singular moments —and have proposed, instead, that of critical eras or 
moments for the political economy of land.  
These critical eras consist in long periods of time which are initiated by economic or 
political shocks that generate incentives for the promotion of distinct interpretations of similar 
laws in ways that favor the economic interests of the powerful. Such interpretations are capable 
of locking-in—in Pierson (2000)’s terms—certain institutional effects instead of others. But in 
doing so, they may also breed the seeds of their own destruction. If and when those 
interpretations ignore or deny the rights of less powerful groups that are explicitly recognized by 
the laws in question, they will generate enduring grievances that will transform into radical 
challenges of the institutions in charge of their implementation. In that sense, the path-dependent 
effects of certain institutions could be, at the same time, triggering the factors leading to their 




certain populations also promise their protection in the books, thereby operating as double-edge 
swords. This means that even if economic incentives are strong enough to exclude certain 
populations from the benefits of institutions, they are not strong enough to eliminate altogether 
the claims of such populations whenever those claims are based on the preexistent recognition of 
legal rights.  
As I showed, in Latin America, elites attempted to use liberal land laws and institutions 
to further their economic interests, but because popular groups had been previously recognized 
as right-holders they, too, claimed liberal laws to be applied in their favor. Peasants did not 
complain about the end of state paternalism brought about by liberalism; quite on the contrary, in 
many cases they celebrated liberal governments and their laws, and believed that they could have 
profited from the egalitarian treatment provided by them if only state authorities had actually 
lived up to it, instead of trampling upon their rights out of bias. So it was the unfair treatment of 
the state and the lack of protection of the rights that they were aware to have which generated 
their core grievance. This populist or from below promotion of liberalism would impede the 
interests of elites from being fully entrenched, and would allow their challenge in subsequent 
periods.  
 
Substantively, this suggests that the conception of justice that underlies even the most 
radical redistributive claims by the poor may not be as revolutionary as it could at first sight 
seem. Latin American peasants’ claims for land redistribution were strongly associated with a 
reproach of the state’s incapacity or unwillingness to protect their property rights from 
dispossession. This, as Hobsbaum (1974) has noted, is a quite conservative demand. Peasants 




wanted that system to be effectively and fairly applied, so that their legal rights were 
acknowledged and protected by state authorities. It was only when they suffered the denial of 
that protection that they opted for radically challenging the distribution of property rights, which 
had arbitrarily excluded them. And even then, their claims of land redistribution were justified in 
part as claims for the recovery of lost lands, and hence as claims for the protection of pre-existent 
ownership or possession rights. This indicates that political stability may depend, not only or 
mainly on radical measures of redistribution, but rather on the state’s capacity to ensure the fair 
inclusion of all citizens in the protections offered by the rule of law.  
 Now, the relationship between private property rights and stability that emerges from this 
is different from that found in standard accounts. The latter focus on economic development and 
hence only consider individual ownership rights, seen as the most prone to generate investment 
and productivity. I argue, instead, that the state’s protection of property rights is not only or 
mainly relevant from the point of view of economic efficiency or development, but also from the 
perspective of justice, and especially of the inclusion of the poor in the protection offered by 
state institutions and the rule of law.  I further argue that the recognition of collective property 
rights may generate an equally strong or even stronger sense of entitlement and collective action 
capacity than individual property rights. This suggests that the violation of collective rights may 
engender as high risks of political instability as the lack of economic development. So it might 
be worth it to balance the aims that can be achieved through the protection of collective rights 
and those that can be achieved by privileging individual rights as the sole or main form of 
ownership. This seems a particularly important issue today, given the current boom of export 
commodities and the parallel rise of claims of ethnic groups for the protection or recognition of 




 The latter claims are part of a wider movement that demands the recognition of culture-
specific rights to ethnic groups, which may allow them to develop their autonomy and self-
determination (Kymlicka, 1995). Such movement has been accompanied by a rise of analyses on 
identity politics, which focus on the impact of ethnicity on institutional content and enforcement. 
That move has however been recently challenged by studies that suggest that it is rather 
institutions which shape ethnicity and make it a salient political cleavage in certain contexts (see, 
for instance, Posner 2005).  My study offers support to the latter argument, by showing that the 
institutional and organizational platforms that certain identity groups like indigenous/peasants 
have are a determinant factor in the definition of the paths that rural contentious politics will 
traverse. Those platforms are not merely a reflection of group identity; they may actually 
produce or reinforce it, thereby making it the most salient political cleavage.  
 
 Finally, by showing that prior dispossessions have a causal effect on land redistributive 
claims, I am also showing that the classic analytical distinction—based on Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics (Book V, 1985)—between distributive and corrective justice may not be as 
clear cut in practice. Like typically distributive justice measures, land reforms seek to define a 
fair way of distributing a scarce good among citizens.1 However, if my theory is correct, land 
reforms have a strong corrective justice component, since they also seek to solve the conflict 
between persons or groups claiming to have rights to the same piece of land, and to repair the 
harm caused to the legitimate owner or possessor by the usurper. Therefore, land reform 
                                                      
1 For this definition and empirical examples of different criteria for distributing goods, see Elster (1992). 




programs tend to enmesh both dimensions of justice: they promise a fairer distribution of land 
ownership, but they also promise to repair prior dispossessions.  
The case studies in this dissertation illustrate this combination of corrective and 
restorative justice, both in the narrative of peasants’ claims for agrarian reform and in the formal 
justification of the latter. However, they do not seem to be exceptional. As Plutarch (1921) and 
others recount2, the legendary agrarian reform promoted by Tiberius Gracchus under the ancient 
Roman Republic (in 134 BC) was defended as a mechanism to restore to poor Italian ex-soldiers 
the lands that had originally been given to them for cultivation, but that had been usurped by the 
rich through legal stratagems.  This is also likely the case of many other land reforms in different 
regions, if indeed my theory is correct.  
There are other instances in which the distributive and corrective components of justice 
are enmeshed, such as the reparations of victims of atrocities during periods of transitions from 
authoritarianism to democracy or from war to peace. As Elster (2004) has shown, in some 
contexts, reparations that seek to redress the harms suffered by victims may exclude the 
compensation of sumptuary or luxurious assets on the basis of a distributive criterion: to avoid 
the reconstitution of previous fortunes. Post-World War II Norway and France offer examples of 
this. In turn, as Saffon and Uprimny (2010) have argued, in other contexts, reparations may seek 
not only to redress victims’ harms but also to enhance their socioeconomic wellbeing, especially 
when victims belong to marginalized populations.   
These examples suggest interesting avenues of research for the theories of justice. If, 
indeed, there tends to be a practical coincidence between corrective and distributive justice 
claims, then policies often conceived to address only one of those two dimensions of justice 
                                                      




should perhaps also be evaluated on the basis of the other. Moreover, efforts could be made to 
propose normatively adequate combinations of the two forms of justice to address complex 
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